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ABSTRACT 
 
A growing body of research has revealed that the financial cost and physical harmfulness 
of elite deviance overshadow the impact of street crime on society (Knowlton et al., 2011; 
Landrigan et al., 2002; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Herbert & Landrigan, 2000; 
Rebovich & Jiandani, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2010).  However, despite such discrepancies, 
crimes of the poor continue to outshine white-collar offenses in the news media (Barak, 1994; 
Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 1991; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & 
Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & Hammond, 2000), the criminal justice system (Calavita, 
Tillman, & Pontell, 1997; Maddan et al., 2011; Payne, Dabney, & Ekhomu, 2011; Tillman & 
Pontell, 1992) and even academia (Lynch, McGurrin & Fenwick, 2004; McGurrin, Jarrell, Jahn 
& Cochrane, 2013).  
Surprisingly, scholarly efforts that have investigated societal response to crimes of the 
powerful have limited their field of inquiry to public opinions about white-collar crime (e.g., 
Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010; Kane & Wall, 2006; Rebovich et al., 2000; Schoepfer, Carmichael 
& Piquero, 2007, etc.). While these studies have provided valuable empirical evidence of a 
growing concern among Americans regarding the danger posed by elite offenses, their failure to 
include a valid measure of lay knowledge about white-collar crime significantly limits our ability 
to infer the extent to which the public is familiar with the scope and magnitude of this social 
issue. 
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The present study seeks to address such limitation by providing the first measure of 
public knowledge about elite deviance. Four hundred and eight participants completed an online 
questionnaire that comprised measures of respondents’ knowledge and sentiments (i.e., 
perceived seriousness and punitiveness) about white-collar crime. Results of statistical analyses 
revealed that participants were not sufficiently informed about elite deviance and suggest the 
existence of popular “myths” about white-collar crime; more specifically, a substantial number 
of subjects were not inclined to acknowledge hard-earned empirical evidence such as the greater 
physical harmfulness of elite deviance over street crime and to recognize that some elite offenses 
- which they admit are common in underdeveloped nations (e.g., human trafficking) - can be 
committed in the United States with little to no legal repercussion for the perpetrators. Further, 
less knowledgeable subjects and “myth” adherers (including men, those with higher income 
levels, more politically conservative subjects, Republicans, conservative Protestants, and those 
who believed that white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions) were often more lenient 
in their attitudes towards elite deviance, both in terms of perceived seriousness and punitiveness, 
compared with street crime. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are 
thoroughly discussed. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Research has shown that fear of crime ranks high among Americans’ concerns about 
major national issues. More specifically, in a recent Gallup poll, respondents ranked feeling safe 
from crime ahead of job satisfaction, financial security, and health (Saad, 2011). Surprisingly, 
though, with violent and property crime rates at an all-time low in recent history (UCR, 2010), 
Americans fear crime much more than other harms likely to affect them.  For example, U.S. 
citizens are thirty times more likely to die of a heart attack than they are from criminal homicide 
(Kochanek et al., 2011), yet coronary infarction is not among the things of which most 
Americans are afraid. Such discrepancy between perceived and actual risks suggests an intrinsic 
lack of public knowledge regarding the criminal phenomenon. Moreover, it is possible that the 
definition of crime used in those opinion surveys helps further obfuscate what the public really 
knows about criminal activity.  
The vast majority of polls choose to focus on “street” crime (i.e., property and violent 
offenses such as burglary, larceny, assault, rape or homicide), which is predominantly committed 
by members of the lower class, and not “white-collar” or “suite” crime (i.e., illegal or unethical 
acts such as toxic dumping, labor exploitation, large-scale fraud, illegal warfare, etc.), which is 
perpetrated by corporations, politicians, and other elite groups. This almost exclusive focus on 
street crime is unfortunate, for research has established that white-collar crime greatly exceeds 
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the impact of street crime on society, both in terms of financial cost and harmfulness (Knowlton 
et al., 2011; Landrigan et al., 2002; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Herbert & 
Landrigan, 2000; Rebovich & Jiandani, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2010).  More specifically, 
while street offenders cost the public about $18 billion each year (UCR, 2010), annual losses due 
to financial crime (e.g., fraud) and health costs caused by work-related injuries and illnesses as 
well as environmental pollution add up to over a trillion dollars (Knowlton et al., 2011; 
Landrigan et al., 2002; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006).  
Similarly, whereas murder and negligent manslaughter claim the lives of about 14,000 
people annually (UCR, 2010), the number of victims of work-place related deaths (e.g., workers 
who sustain accidental injury due to the company’s negligence, illnesses caused by prolonged 
exposure to toxic chemicals, etc.), toxic waste dumping and deadly pollutants, faulty consumer 
products, and nefarious and addictive substances (e.g., tobacco) exceeds 100,000 a year (Herbert 
& Landrigan, 2000; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006). Moreover, another 225,000 have 
been estimated to be victims of medical malpractice annually (Starfield, 2000).  
However, despite these staggering differences, white-collar crime is still less prosecuted 
than street crime. In fact, corporate regulations are weak, the culpability of corporations harder to 
prove for prosecutors, and their sentences for corporate offenders have up until recently typically 
been more lenient compared to those imposed upon street criminals (Calavita, Tillman, & 
Pontell, 1997; Maddan et al., 2011; Payne, Dabney, & Ekhomu, 2011; Tillman & Pontell, 1992). 
Nevertheless, because of the way the aforementioned opinion surveys introduce crime to their 
respondents, whether the public is informed about such discrepancies remains unclear.   
Most of the empirical literature on public response to crime has focused on street 
offenders. Moreover, the majority of this body of research taps attitudes about it (i.e., perceived 
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seriousness) and not actual knowledge. The few studies (e.g., Bohm, 1987; Doob & Roberts, 
1983; Kappeler, Blumberg, & Potter, 1996; Macleans, 1995; Maguire & Pastore, 1995; Roberts 
& Stalans, 1997; Wilbanks, 1987) that explored public awareness of crime have identified 
several “myths” such as increasing crime rates (Macleans, 1995; Maguire & Pastore, 1995), 
violent crime rates increasing faster than property crime (Knowles, 1984), overly high recidivism 
rates (Doob & Roberts, 1983), and the deterrent effect of the death penalty (Bohm, 1987, 2003). 
While these “myths” have been debunked by existing research, they remain solidly anchored in 
the public psyche and belie a distorted view of the reality of crime marked by an overestimated 
perceived risk of victimization (Roberts & Stalans, 1997).  
Because the majority of public knowledge about crime and justice is derived from the 
media (Dowler, 2003; Roberts & Doob, 1990; Surette, 1998), it could be that news outlets do not 
perform their duty of disseminating scientific knowledge to the public. Moreover, street crime is 
given disproportionate coverage, both in newspaper headlines and in local television news, 
compared with white-collar crime (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 1991; 
Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & Hammond, 
2000). Consequently, given the public’s limited exposure to relevant information about white-
collar crime in the media, Americans might indeed hold “myths” about crimes of the powerful as 
they do regarding street crime. To date, no study has examined the extent of public knowledge 
regarding white-collar crime. Therefore, this dissertation proposes to assess the degree to which 
the public is informed or misinformed about white-collar crime. 
The present study is articulated around six chapters. Chapter one was meant to briefly 
introduce the topic and provide a rationale for measuring public level of knowledge about white-
collar crime. Chapter two provides a review of the literature on white-collar crime from its 
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inception as a sociological construct to the scientific debate regarding its exact definition, and 
acquaints the reader with the concept of elite deviance, its typology, the various issues scholars 
are confronted with when conducting research on it, as well as empirical evidence on its impact 
on society (i.e., financial cost, physical harm), and its perpetrators’ relative legal immunity 
compared with their street counterparts. Also reviewed are popular “myths” about traditional 
crime to buttress the argument that Americans may share similar misconceptions and erroneous 
beliefs about elite deviance, as well as scholarly findings on public attitudes about white-collar 
crime. Lastly, a rationale for the present study is reiterated and research questions presented.  
The methodology used in the present study is described in detail in chapter three, 
including a discussion about the sample, data collection process, measures (popular knowledge 
about white-collar crime, correlates of such knowledge, and public sentiments about elite 
deviance), and data analytic plan. Chapters four and five present the results of statistical analyses 
and provide answers to each of the research questions previously introduced. Finally, chapter six 
provides a discussion of these findings, including a summary and interpretations of the analytical 
findings, a review of the limitations of the present study, theoretical and practical implications as 
well as avenues for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The following review of the literature is organized into nine sections. As previously 
mentioned, the first section covers the original definition of the white-collar crime concept and 
the confusion that ensued within the academe regarding its actual significance and theoretical 
scope. Elite deviance is subsequently introduced in the second section as an alternative concept 
to remedy such confusion. The third section offers a typology of elite deviance, including 
economic domination, government control, and denial of basic human rights. Various 
methodological issues inherent in white-collar crime research are exposed in the fourth section. 
Sections five and six cover the empirically established greater financial impact and physical 
harm of elite deviance compared with traditional crime. Despite these findings, the relative legal 
immunity enjoyed by many white-collar offenders due to their status is also highlighted in 
section seven. The eighth section introduces popular “myths” about street crime and hints that 
the American public might hold similar misconceptions concerning crimes of the powerful. 
Section nine summarizes the empirical findings on public attitudes regarding white-collar crime. 
Lastly, the tenth section provides a rationale for expanding such research to the study of 
knowledge about elite deviance and introduces the research questions that this dissertation will 
strive to answer.
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Defining White-Collar Crime  
First coined in 1939 by the sociologist Edwin Sutherland during his address to the 
American Sociological Society annual conference, the term “white-collar crime” was 
subsequently defined as any “crime committed by a person of respectability and high social 
status in the course of his occupation” (Sutherland, 1949). This provocative conceptualization of 
criminals wearing the proverbial white-collar - a symbol of professional success as opposed to 
working class employees’ blue collar - was a landmark in the history of criminology. Until then, 
the field had maintained its focus on such offenses as burglary, armed robbery, sexual assault 
and murder, that is, illicit activities that were generally associated with impoverished 
neighborhoods (Akers & Sellers, 2008). Conversely, Sutherland’s argument that large-scale 
fraud was not only more socially harmful but also, because of the culprits’ high social standing, 
had better chances of going unreported and/or unpunished, provided fertile grounds for new 
criminological theories.  
Over time, though, considerable confusion in the literature has grown regarding the true 
nature and extent of white-collar crime. Some scholars have interpreted Sutherland’s original 
definition as ambiguous, reasoning that it does not distinguish crimes committed by individuals 
from those perpetrated by corporations (Clinard & Quinney, 1973). Other critics have pointed 
out that it could encompass both occupational crimes (i.e., acts committed in the course of one’s 
occupation for personal gain) and avocational crimes (i.e., acts that are usually unconnected with 
one’s profession such as income tax evasion or credit card fraud, Albanese, 1995). Strader 
(2002) has called the term “white-collar” a misnomer, arguing that these crimes can be 
perpetrated among the working class (e.g., scams, retail crime, tax evasion, etc.) as much as 
within the upper class (e.g., antitrust violation). According to her, the term is a useful moniker to 
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differentiate nonviolent crime for financial gain committed by means of deception (e.g., 
securities fraud) from more common (i.e., street) crime in the public mind. Similarly, Brightman 
(2009) has argued that the white-collar crime construct should include any non-violent act 
committed for financial gain, regardless of one’s social status.  
A similar perspective is echoed in the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime 
Reports (UCR), which collects information on all street crimes reported to the police each year. 
Interestingly, the eight index offenses included in Part I, which indexes violent crimes (i.e., 
aggravated assault, forcible rape, murder, and robbery) and property crimes (i.e., arson, burglary, 
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft), do not include any type of white-collar crime. In fact, 
embezzlement, forgery, counterfeiting, and fraud are the only potential white-collar crimes 
included in Part II, which indexes less serious crimes such as status offenses (e.g., curfew 
offenses, loitering, disorderly conduct, runaways, vandalism, etc.) and consensual crimes (e.g., 
drug offenses, prostitution, vagrancy, etc.). This assignment suggests that even law enforcement 
agencies nationwide perceive street crimes to cause the most physical and property damage to 
American society (Robinson 1994; Rosoff, Pontell, & Tillman, 2010).  
The problem is that those four types of crime do not fall under the umbrella of the white-
collar crime concept as envisaged by Sutherland. Sutherland was clear in his definition of white-
collar crime that the term described an offense committed by a person of high social status in the 
course of their occupation, which clearly leaves out working class crimes and crimes that are not 
part of work contexts. However, such misreading of Sutherland’s original work is still present 
today in the official data, which many criminologists rely upon in their investigation of white-
collar crime.  
Perhaps the economic changes that took place during the twentieth century were 
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responsible for causing scholars to misconstrue Sutherland’s message. Because the United States 
has shifted from an industrial to a service economy, the nature of the job market is now very 
different from what it was back in the 1940s. Today a postal clerk may well don a white collar 
but can hardly be considered a person of “high social status”. In fact, an employee embezzling a 
few hundred dollars from his/her company may share more similarities with a street offender 
than with the powers-that-be denounced by Sutherland. If one defines power in terms of 
economic control (i.e., ownership of the means and modes of production) and political influence, 
then, respectable but relatively powerless figures (e.g., bank tellers, accountants, etc.) that would 
be considered white-collar offenders according to the UCR do not quite fit Sutherland’s original 
definition. Since white-collar crime has lost its original meaning, the term “elite deviance” may 
be more apt to encapsulate the social class dimension of the construct.  
Elite Deviance  
Acknowledging the obsolescence of the “white-collar crime” appellation, some scholars 
have favored the terms “crimes of the powerful” (Quinney, 1978) and “elite deviance” (Simon & 
Eitzen, 1993), and used conflict as a theoretical framework to guide their research. Conflict 
theory is a sociological paradigm that views society as being in a constant state of internal 
conflict between a small ruling elite and the masses (Bonger, 1916; Chambliss, 1964; Lynch & 
Michalowski, 2006; Mills, 1956; Paternoster & Bachman, 2001; Quinney, 1974; Sellin, 1938; 
Turk, 1969; Vold, 1958). Following Sutherland’s introduction of the white-collar crime concept, 
C. Wright Mills (1956) coined the term “power elite” to describe the unequal balance of power 
between the leaders of military, political and corporate entities, and relatively powerless citizens. 
Such imbalance is seen as running counter to the principles of fairness and equality before the 
law, which form the basis of the American criminal justice system. More precisely, under this 
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perspective, those in power may manipulate the law to maintain their status and prosper while 
keeping others subservient (Siegel & Welsh, 2011). 
Criminal and deviant behaviors are by definition relative concepts that may differ from 
one society to another and vary over time (Barkan, 2012). As Becker (1963:9) noted, “social 
groups create deviance by making the rules whose infraction constitutes deviance, and by 
applying those rules to particular people and labeling them as outsiders”.  Since illegality is 
determined by a distinct elite group of officials (i.e., the legislature), the same elite that labels 
and prohibits street crime may overlook white-collar crimes such as war profiteering, 
government corruption, large-scale fraud, or toxic dumping to protect powerful interests. 
Consequently, corporations can engage in unethical (i.e., intentional, reckless, and negligent) 
behaviors that are not legally defined as criminal (e.g., regulatory offenses) - even though they 
may kill and injure more people every year than do street crimes - with little fear of legal 
consequences (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006).  
With elite deviance as a theoretical avenue to guide the present study, the measurement 
of public knowledge about white-collar crime will extend well beyond the FBI’s official but 
narrow definition and back to Sutherland’s original concept. More precisely, based on Friedrichs 
and colleagues’ distinction between “organizational” offenses (e.g. committed by corporations) 
and “individualistic” ones (i.e., perpetrated by individuals), this dissertation will mostly focus on 
corporate crime because of its greater damaging impact on society. Moreover, to avoid 
redundancies, the terms “white-collar crime” and “elite deviance” will be used interchangeably 
and should be understood as synonyms of a form of criminal behavior performed by a small 
dominant group of individuals in control of a disproportionate amount of power.  
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Typology  
The three power elite groups referred to here - corporate, political, and military 
institutions - can harm society through economic domination, government control, and denial of 
basic human rights, respectively (Simon & Eitzen, 1993).  
Economic Domination 
Economic domination includes both financially and physically harmful offenses. Elite 
deviance can be financially detrimental to the public when corporations defraud the government 
(Theobald, 2009) or engage in tax evasion (DeBacker, Heim, & Tran, 2012). Companies can also 
cheat consumers in cases of price-fixing (i.e., establishing the price of a product or service, rather 
than allowing it to be determined by supply and demand, Connor, 2008), price-gouging (i.e., 
artificially inflating prices when no alternative retailer is available, Zwolinski, 2008), and false 
advertising and misrepresentation of products (Tushnet, 2010). Moreover, competitors can be the 
victims of anti-trust law violations (i.e., monopolistic practices, Dogan, & Lemley, 2008), and 
insider trading (i.e., buying or selling of a security by someone who has access to nonpublic 
information, Meulbroek, 2012). Finally, owners and creditors can be wronged via managerial 
fraud (Fairchild, Crawford, & Saqlain, 2009), self-dealing (i.e., a fiduciary acting in his/her own 
best interest in a transaction rather than his clients’, Djankov et al., 2008), and strategic 
bankruptcy (Moerman & Van De Laan, 2009). 
Corporate offenses can also be physically harmful to the public through unsafe 
environmental practices such as toxic emissions above the legal limit (Katz, 2012; Lynch, & 
Stretesky, 2010), toxic dumping and hazardous waste disposal (Waldo, 2009), and the release of 
deadly pollutants (Rao, 2012). Moreover, corporations can harm consumers with the 
manufacturing and distribution of unsafe products (Pyke & Tang, 2010). Lastly, employees can 
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be victimized when subjected to unsafe working conditions (Landsbergis, 2009), which can lead 
to preventable occupational diseases, accidents and deaths (MacDonald, Cohen, Baron, & 
Burchfiel, 2009).  
Similarly, crimes by professionals in the medical, legal, academic, and religious sectors 
can also be defined as elite deviance, insofar as the perpetrators operate under the guise of 
respectability and the protection of powerful guilds. More specifically, physicians can harm their 
patients through medical negligence and malpractice, unnecessary operations, tests, and other 
procedures, as well as false and fraudulent billing (Gogos et al., 2011; Miller, 2012). The same is 
true about attorneys when they defraud their clients or collude with their crimes (Abel, 2012). In 
addition, college faculty can abuse their position through gross negligence in the fulfillment of 
their teaching responsibilities, or when using fraudulent data in research (Michalek, Hutson, 
Wicher & Trump, 2010). Lastly, televangelists (i.e., a portmanteau term referring to preachers 
using television to communicate the Christian faith) sometimes engage in scams to defraud 
believers and use offerings or donations for corrupt purposes (Morefield & Ramaswamy, 2011).   
Government Control 
Government control (i.e., state crime) can occur domestically when offenses are 
committed by the legislative, judiciary and executive branches of power as is the case with 
corruption (Issacharoff, 2010), corporate tax loopholes (McIntyre, Gardner, Wilkins, & Phillips, 
2011), crimes of electioneering and usurpation of power (Christensen & Colvin, 2009), 
violations of individual civil rights such as illegal surveillance by law enforcement agencies 
(Michelman, 2009), denials of due process of law (Heupel, 2009), and political party infiltration 
(Werbner, 2010). Governments can also impact and destabilize foreign nations through coups 
d’état (Marshall, 2009), international law violation, unlawful warfare and war profiteering 
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(Sandholtz, 2009), the threat of nuclear war (Escalona, 1982), state repression and corruption 
(Ross, 2010), and even collaboration with organized crime (Armao, 2012). Further, an indirect 
negative consequence of government control and state crime is the erosion of public trust in 
elites whose behavior fosters demoralization, cynicism, and alienation and deviance (i.e., street 
crime).  
Denial of Human Rights 
State crimes may also include denial of human rights. The denial of basic human rights 
refers to threats to the dignity and quality of life of humankind and particularly oppressed 
minorities. It is logically expected when the unequal distribution of power places non-elites at 
the mercy of profit-seeking groups that happen to define and control the law. Human rights 
violation can be experienced among workers through economic exploitation and human 
trafficking, both in underdeveloped and/or instable nations (Shelley, 2010) and in the United 
States (Bales, 2004; Gillmore, 2004), unfair labor practices (e.g., surveillance of employees, 
Gorman, 2006), sexual harassment (Murrell, Olson, & Frieze, 2010), and racial and gender 
discrimination in the workplace (Beal, 2008; Pinzon-Rondon et al., 2010).  
 Denial of human rights reaches a culmination point with rape, torture, genocide and 
ethnic cleansing (Totten & Parsons, 2012). Importantly, now that the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights - to which the United States is signatory - has been ratified by a sufficient number 
of nations (Tsutsui, 2012), such acts should fall under international law. Nevertheless, more than 
sixty years after its issue, Amnesty International and other sources report that individuals are still 
tortured or abused in at least 81 countries, face unfair trials in at least 54 countries, and are 
restricted in their freedom of expression in at least 77 countries (Hopgood, 2010).  
Even in the United States, some types of human rights violations that are legally defined 
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as crimes by American law (e.g., affirmative action prevents discrimination against employees or 
applicants for employment, on the basis of color, religion, sex, or national origin) are difficult to 
prosecute due to the status of the offenders (Push, 2011).  Prosecution is even impossible for 
related offenses that have not been criminalized by the legislature (i.e., one of the three branches 
of the power elite). For example, the forced labor of inmates by corporations, though arguably 
unethical, is authorized by the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution.  
Similarly, while domestic human trafficking and workers’ exploitation does fall under 
American law, the use of sweatshops and child labor in underdeveloped countries by U.S.-based 
firms - facilitated by corporate globalization - allow these companies to lower costs and increase 
profits with relative legal impunity due to their complicity with the local polity (Rosen, 2002). 
These discrepancies further exemplify the collusions between state and corporations. In fact, the 
interconnections between the political sphere and elite deviance could explain the paucity of 
official data regarding white-collar crime.  
Issues in Research 
           While administrative and regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) do collect information on regulatory offenses, they are given considerable 
discretionary leeway in defining and responding to these offenses (Friedrichs, 1995). In fact, as 
of 2011, OSHA had only secured 12 criminal convictions on the 51 cases the Department of 
Justice agreed to prosecute since the administration’s inception in 1971 (Tribe, 2011).  
Criminologists often rely on two types of data to examine officially recognized white-
collar crime: The UCR and victimization surveys.  There are several problems related to the use 
of the UCR.  First, as previously mentioned, the offense reported may not accurately reflect the 
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definition of white-collar crime proposed by Sutherland.  Moreover, white-collar crime victims 
are often unlikely to report the crime to authorities (Jesilow, Klempner, & Chiao, 1992; Titus, 
Heinzelmann, & Boyle, 1995), either because they feel the police are neither willing nor able to 
help or they are unaware of the existence of special fraud units (Friedrichs, 1995). Moreover, 
victimized corporations may be reluctant to file reports because they fear negative publicity or 
loss of trust from shareholders in the organization (Levi, 1992).  
Similarly, using victimization surveys to draw an accurate picture of the prevalence and 
impact of elite deviance has several limitations.  Among these are the delayed harm white-collar 
crime creates as well as its lack of immediacy compared with traditional crime, which may result 
in a failure to recognize or report these offenses. More specifically, because there is typically 
little direct contact between the offender and the victim in white-collar crime (Friedrichs, 1995; 
Weisburd & Schlegel, 1992), many victims may not know they are victimized until later 
(Albanese, 1995). Further, victimization surveys do not often directly ask about white-collar 
crime victimization experiences. For example, while the National Crime Victimization Survey 
(NCVS) conducts yearly household surveys, it mostly collects information about street crimes 
such as rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, and tends to bypass 
white-collar offenses.  
Moreover, researchers in the social sciences have rarely attempted to employ their usual 
data collection methods such as surveys, interviews, direct observations and examination of case 
records to explore the problem of white-collar crime. First, it is understandably more difficult to 
collect data within the corporate world than from offenders such as juvenile delinquents. Before 
one can obtain the cooperation of an organization or corporation, the research proposal has to be 
introduced in a non-threatening way and present a potential benefit for the organization (Yeager 
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& Kram, 1990). Further, peer review panels for government research funding tend to favor 
studies relevant to conventional crime and its control more than projects that intend to investigate 
the wrongdoings of major corporations and government organizations (Galliher, 1979).  
There are, however, alternative ways to conduct research on elite deviance. For example, 
numerous databases maintained by a variety of state agencies address white-collar or elite crimes 
(e.g., injury, disease, employment, and inflation data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, costs data from the National Council on 
Compensation Insurance and the Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project, the National Academy 
of Social Insurance, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, the National Center for Health Statistics, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Health 
Care Financing Agency, the Practice Management Information Corporation, etc.).  However, 
because these data are not collected uniformly nor centralized, it remains difficult to estimate the 
exact extent of the white-collar crime problem. Still, despite difficulties in aggregating these 
data, it has been established that the financial and physical impact of elite deviance on society 
overshadows that of traditional crime - even if, perhaps, the true extent of elite crime has been 
underestimated in prior research. 
Financial Impact  
When he devised his conceptualization of white-collar offenses, Sutherland (1977:5) 
already suspected that “the financial cost of white-collar crime is probably several times as great 
as the financial cost of all the crimes which are customarily regarded as the crime problem”. He 
also noted, however, that the financial harm resulting from white-collar crime was still less 
important than the damage it caused to “social relations” through violation of trust as well as its 
physical harmfulness. As previously mentioned, the exact impact of elite deviance is difficult to 
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ascertain. What is known, however, is that whatever figure white-collar crime represents in terms 
of financial cost to society, that figure greatly exceeds the physical and financial harms caused 
by traditional crimes. More precisely, it has been estimated that street offenders cost the public 
an average $18 billion each year (UCR, 2010). This amount includes the total economic loss to 
victims, that is, $1.19 billion for violent crime (e.g., loss of revenue due to homicide, health costs 
as a result of assault, rape, etc.) and $16.21 billion for property crime (BJS, 2007). More 
specifically, in 2010 the average dollar loss due to robberies reported to the police was $456 
million, $6.1 billion were lost to larceny/thefts, $1.4 billion to arsons, $4.6 billion to burglary 
(UCR, 2010), and another $499.9 million in victim compensation programs (NACVCB, 2011).  
Figures related to the cost of street crime, although considerable, are still relatively 
modest compared to the combined costs of corporate crime such as fraud, tax evasion, price-
fixing, price-gouging, false advertising (see, e.g., Simon, 1999; Simon & Eitzen, 1993), anti-trust 
violations, and embezzlement (see, e.g., Weisburd et al., 1991), which add up to over $500 
billion dollars annually (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Rebovich & Jiandani, 2000; Reiman & 
Leighton, 2010). Of course, this figure does not include occasional scandals such as the Enron 
debacle, which cost its shareholders an outstanding $74 billion (Pava, 2010). Even an individual 
white-collar crime such as Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme added up to $65 million in economic 
losses for investors (Arvedlund, 2009), and alone far exceeds the cost of all street crimes that 
year.  
Health costs due to corporate misconduct must also be included. The number of fatal and 
nonfatal injuries in the workplace in 2007 was estimated to cost $6 billion and $186 billion, 
respectively. Similarly, the cost of fatal and nonfatal illnesses was estimated at more than $46 
billion and $12 billion, respectively. For injuries and diseases combined, cost estimates were $67 
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billion, and indirect costs were almost $183 billion. Overall, the total estimated medical costs 
were approximately $250 billion (Leigh, 2011).  
Further, total annual health costs associated with environmental pollutants (e.g., toxic 
chemicals of human origin in air, food, water, and communities) were estimated to be $43.4 
billion for lead poisoning, $2.0 billion for asthma, $0.3 billion for childhood cancer, and $9.2 
billion for neurobehavioral disorders. Alarmingly, this sum constitutes almost 3 percent of total 
U.S. health care costs (Landrigan et al., 2002). Moreover, besides medical and insurance 
administration expenses, indirect categories such as lost earnings, lost home production, and lost 
fringe benefits further add up to the economic burden of elite deviance (Leigh et al., 1997). 
 Finally, the impact of corporate activity on the environment also comes at a price. More 
specifically, costs associated with predicted climate change–related events such as ozone 
pollution, heat waves, hurricanes, infectious disease outbreaks, river flooding, and wildfires have 
been estimated to be as high as $14 billion. Ninety-five percent of this figure can be attributed to 
the value of lives lost prematurely. Moreover, subsequent health care costs due to these climate 
change-related events add up to $740 million (Knowlton et al., 2011). If we add up all these 
figures, it appears white-collar crime may cost society over a trillion dollars a year compared 
with the $18 billion lost to street crime. Perhaps more disconcerting than the gargantuan 
economic impact of elite deviance is the evidence that it causes more violent and physical harm 
than does street crime.  
Physical Harm  
            Official statistics reveal that about 14,000 people are victims of murder and negligent 
manslaughter every year (UCR, 2010). In contrast, reasonable estimates place the number of 
deaths due to toxic waste dumping and deadly pollutants, preventable occupational diseases, 
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accidents and deaths, faulty consumer products (e.g., automobiles, toys, food, drugs, etc.), and 
nefarious and addictive substances (e.g., tobacco) at 100,000 a year, that is, eight times as much 
as the number of street crime victims (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Reiman & Leighton, 2010).  
As of 2000, approximately 65,000 workers died each year of work-related injuries (e.g., motor 
vehicle accidents, machinery-related events, manslaughter, falls, and electrocution) and 
occupational diseases such as cancers, asbestosis, and silicosis (Herbert & Landrigan, 2000). In 
2007, the numbers of fatal and nonfatal injuries were estimated to be more than 5,600 and almost 
8,559,000, respectively. Further, the numbers of fatal and nonfatal illnesses were estimated at 
more than 53,000 and nearly 427,000, respectively (Leigh, 2011).  
Moreover, iatrogenic effects (i.e., injuries caused by a physician, including both error and 
nonerror adverse events) have made medical care the third leading cause of death in the United 
States, after heart disease and cancer (Starfield, 2000). An estimated 12,000 people die each year 
from unnecessary - but lucrative - surgeries such as silicon breast implants, circumcision, 
coronary artery bypass, hysterectomies, and cesarean (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006), 7,000 of 
medication negligence in hospitals, 20,000 of other errors in hospitals, 80,000 of infections in 
hospitals, and 106,000 of negative effects of drugs, for an estimated total of 225,000 victims of 
medical crime (Starfield, 2000).  
The harm caused by the premature - and profit-driven - release of potentially deleterious 
drugs should also be included. One such example was the Fen/Phen drug case (Mundy, 2001) in 
which the injurious effects of a supposedly harmless medicine were silenced until they had 
caused the death of more than 100 people. Another similar scandal was the Thalidomide 
prescription disaster where a sleeping-pill-tranquilizer caused 8,000 babies to have been born 
deformed (Pontell & Geis, 2007). Due to the ties between the pharmaceutical industry and the 
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polity, such examples qualify as elite deviance. Indeed, the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) 
sometimes overlooks international regulations regarding potentially harmful drugs. For instance, 
it approved a livestock drug - beta agonist ractopamine (i.e., a repartitioning agent that increases 
protein synthesis) - which had been banned in 160 nations due to its correlation with 
hyperactivity, muscle breakdown and ten percent mortality in pigs (Rosenberg, 2010). 
Finally, the harmfulness of environmental pollution cannot even be clearly calculated. 
Attaching an economic or physical cost to that kind of behavior becomes difficult when the end 
result is the destruction of the environment, extensive human and animal misery. Nevertheless, if 
the intent is simply to compare elite deviance with traditional crime in terms of physical harm, 
currently available figures suggest that white-collar crime may harm or injure over 8,986,000 
people every year and lead to the untimely death of another 283,600 people, that is, more than 20 
times as many as street crime. Contrasting these figures to the 24,330 homicides reported by the 
FBI when homicide rates nationwide peaked in 1990 (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006) further puts 
the potential public “myth” that street crime is more harmful than elite deviance back in 
perspective. 
Relative Legal Immunity 
Nevertheless, because of the abovementioned difficulty to investigate these offenses, this 
figure may well underestimate the magnitude of the problem. Again, many acts that endanger 
human lives without being clearly defined as illegal or criminal (e.g., state and government 
crime) inevitably remain unreported and/or unpunished. Worse yet, even white-collar offenses 
that fall under American law are statistically less likely to be prosecuted than street crime. In 
fact, despite efforts to bring white-collar offenders to justice (e.g., citizen suits by private parties 
who have been injured or threatened, or class action suits by a group of directly injured parties, 
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Friedrichs, 1995), corporate regulations are weak and corporate offenders have the financial 
means to provide effective defenses, delay judgments, avoid criminal sanctions and receive more 
lenient sentences compared to those imposed upon street criminals (Calavita, Tillman, & Pontell, 
1997; Maddan et al., 2011).  
Further, given the difficulty in establishing criminal intent when dealing with a complex, 
hierarchized organization, prosecutors are often reluctant to take on corporate crime cases 
(Braithwaite, 1982; Braithwaite and Geis, 1982; Sinden, 1980) and usually prefer to focus on 
individual white-collar offenders. Business organizations undeniably profit from the “rotten 
apple” perspective on occupational crime, which favors an individualistic rather than systemic 
explanation of elite deviance (Ashforth et al., 2008; Gottschalk, 2012). Based on such a 
perspective, Bernard Madoff ’s surprisingly severe prison sentence could be understood as 
symbolic degradation (Levi, 2009), that is, an attempt to soothe public outrage at other, more 
harmful white-collar offenses such as the British Petroleum gulf oil spill, which resulted in a 
$7.8 billion class action settlement but no criminal prosecution and no prison time for the 
company’s executives (Thomas, 2012). Perhaps more alarming is the unwillingness of 
economically depressed communities to cooperate and press charges against local corporations if 
such legal action could result in massive unemployment in the area (Friedrichs, 1995).  
Given the wide gap between the deleterious impact of elite deviance on society and that 
of street crime, the relative legal immunity enjoyed by white-collar offenders should logically 
cause indignation among the populace. It is not certain, however, to what extent the public is 
aware of the body of knowledge that has been amassed by the empirical literature on white-collar 
crime. In fact, research shows that Americans are not well informed about crime in general. 
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Popular “Myths” about Traditional Crime 
National and state surveys conducted in the United States (e.g., Knowles, 1984, 1987; 
Maguire & Pastore, 1995), Canada (e.g., Doob and Roberts, 1982) and Australia (e.g., 
O’Connor, 1978; Indermaur, 1987) have revealed that the public holds several misconceptions 
about crime rates (Robert & Stalans, 1997). One such misconception is crime being rampant 
(Barkan, 2012). More specifically, Knowles (1984) reported that when the annual rate of violent 
crime in Ohio was fewer than four incidents per 100 residents, only 5% of respondents perceived 
the rate to be that low. Similarly, in a 1993 Harris poll that asked Americans whether they 
thought crime rates had increased, decreased or remained the same, more than 50% of 
respondents believed that crime had increased when in fact significant declines had been 
observed for a variety of crimes (Maguire & Pastore, 1995). Official statistics reveal that crime 
has been falling sharply and unexpectedly since the mid-1990s. For example, between 1993 and 
2000, murder and robbery rates both declined over 40% (Blumstein, 2006), and the trend is 
ongoing today (Barkan, 2012; UCR, 2010). Nevertheless, a 2010 Gallup poll revealed that 67% 
of respondents believed that crime rates were increasing (Albanese, 2012). 
Another popular misconception seems to be the particularly violent nature of crime 
(Indermaur, 1987; Macleans, 1995; Warr, 1980, 1982) when in reality official data and 
victimization surveys suggest that violent crime (i.e., homicide, rape, robbery, and assault) only 
represents 12% of all serious crimes reported to the police and 20% of all crimes counted by 
victimization surveys, whether reported or not (Albanese, 2012; Barkan, 2012; Robert & Stalans, 
1997). The belief in high recidivism rates constitutes yet another public misconception. Doob 
and Roberts (1983) found that 60% of their respondents over-estimated the recidivism rate for 
property offenders, while 79% over-estimated the figure for violent offenders. Other “myths” 
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include the belief that most victims are Whites and targeted by African American criminals 
(when in fact most violent crime is intraracial, and Blacks are more likely to be victimized than 
Whites, Lundman, 2003), and that most violent offenders are youths (when in reality, only about 
14% of violent crime is committed by teenagers, Dorfman & Schirardi, 2001). 
Perhaps the most salient crime “myth” is the deterrent effect of “get tough” policies (e.g., 
“three strikes and you’re out” laws, longer sentences for less serious crimes, use of the death 
penalty, etc.), which are all corollaries of a more punitive approach to crime control. Although 
several studies have found some evidence for the purported deterrent effect of incarceration on 
crime rates, they also vary widely in their conclusions about its strength (Blumstein, 2006; 
Blumstein & Wallman, 2000, 2006; Levitt, 2004). For example, Doob and Webster (2003) found 
some inconclusive or, at best, weak evidence of marginal deterrence.  Similarly, Pratt and 
colleagues (2006) maintained that the effects of severity estimates and deterrence/sanctions 
composites, even when statistically significant, are too marginal to suggest practical policy 
implications. More recently, Paternoster (2010) critiqued deterrence research and effectively 
suggested that the evidence is so weak that criminologists should stop examining this point 
altogether. Lastly, despite popular belief, the vast majority of studies on capital punishment have 
concluded to its lack of deterrent effect (for a review, see Bohm, 1987, 2003). 
How to explain such discrepancy between actual crime statistics and common 
perceptions among the public? Why are people so misinformed? Where do they get their 
information? Research suggests that Americans derive most of their knowledge about crime from 
the news media (Dowler, 2003; Roberts & Doob, 1990; Surette, 1998). Unlike street crime, 
which is overemphasized on local news stations (Barlow, Barlow, & Chiricos 1995; Chiricos 
1995; Marsh 1991; Ruel 1994; Welch et al. 1998), white-collar crime is not widely reported 
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(Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 1991; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006, 
Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & Hammond, 2000). Further, when it is, the 
perpetrators are often portrayed in a less negative light than are street offenders (Geis & Meier 
1977; Welch et al. 1998; Williams 1992). Although a case could be made that the treatment 
Bernard Madoff received in the wake of his Ponzi scheme scandal was nothing short of media 
lynching, news networks are less prone to vilifying well-known and respected companies such as 
Microsoft, which nonetheless engage in equally reprehensible white-collar offenses (Lande & 
Hawker, 2011).  
Some scholars view this disparity as the result of powerful entities exerting control over 
the media (Barkan, 2012; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006). In keeping with conflict theory, which 
denounces the imbalance of power between a ruling elite and the rest of the populace (Mills, 
1956), corporations should logically benefit from the public’s ignorance of white-collar crime. 
Absent ubiquitous awareness of the deleterious effects of elite deviance, these corporations can 
persist with their wrongdoings without fear of legal consequences. Consequently, the media’s 
almost exclusive focus on traditional crime may serve to distract citizens away from other and 
arguably more serious types of criminality, leaving the American public with distorted views 
concerning the reality of street crime and, expectedly, very limited knowledge about elite 
deviance. In fact, people may very well harbor “myths” about white-collar crime as they do 
regarding traditional crime. Nevertheless, such hypothesis has never been directly tested since 
most of the empirical research on elite deviance has focused on attitudes and not knowledge. 
Public Attitudes about White-Collar Crime 
The literature on perceived seriousness of street crime generally reveals high levels of 
consensus among the American public (Grabosky, Braithwaite, & Wilson, 1987; Hauber, 
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Toonvliet, & Willemse, 1988; Newman, 1976; Scott & Al-Thakeb, 1977; Warr, 1989; Wolfgang 
et al., 1985). More specifically, a majority of respondents tend to view conventional crime as a 
serious social issue that requires harsh sanctions. Conversely, early research on public 
perceptions of elite deviance suggested that Americans did not consider white-collar crime as an 
important social problem, especially in comparison to crimes committed against a person or the 
public (Geis, 1973; Sutherland, 1949; Wheeler et al., 1988). Two probable factors for such 
apathy could be the aforementioned delayed harm and lack of immediacy of white-collar crime. 
For example, work-related illnesses and deaths may occur years after exposure to toxic 
substances in the workplace and may not shock public opinion as much as homicide (Albanese, 
1995).  
Nevertheless, Braithwaite (1982:732-733) noted that “contrary to a wide spread 
misconception, there is considerable evidence to support the view that ordinary people 
subjectively perceive many types of white-collar crime as more serious than most traditional 
crime.” Similarly, Conklin (1977:27) posited that there is a “greater degree of public 
condemnation of business violations than is thought to exist by those who claim that the public is 
apathetic or tolerant of business crime”.  In fact, several studies (Cullen, Link, & Polanzi, 1982; 
Cullen, Clark, Mathers, & Cullen, 1983; Cullen et al., 1985; Grabosky, Braithwaite, & Wilson, 
1987; Geis, 1972; Hauber, Toonvliet, & Willemse, 1988; Holtfreter et al., 2008; Meier & Short, 
1982; Rebovich & Jiandani, 2000; Rebovich & Kane, 2002; Rossi et al., 1974; Schrager & Short, 
1980; Sinden, 1980; Wolfgang et al., 1985) have suggested that the traditional wisdom about 
public apathy regarding white-collar crime might be erroneous. 
It could be that elite deviance draws more attention when it mimics street crime’s 
violence and physical harmfulness (Albanese, 1995). For example, Holtfreter and colleagues 
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(2008) found that while fraud might be viewed more favorably than robbery (perhaps because 
the latter implies a violent act), white-collar offenses such as work-related deaths that could have 
been prevented are usually perceived more negatively. Importantly, their respondents were not 
opposed to severe sanctions for white-collar offenders if evidence of harm to society could be 
provided. Nevertheless, harmfulness may not be the decisive factor in explaining perceived 
severity of elite deviance. In fact, Schoepfer, Carmichael and Piquero’s 2007 study of public 
perceptions of sanction certainty and severity indicates that both robbery and fraud are perceived 
to be equally reprehensible. 
National research efforts reveal similarly surprising public perceptions of white-collar 
crime’s seriousness relative to street crime. Every five years since 1999, the National White-
Collar Crime Center (a congressionally funded non-profit corporation) has been surveying public 
attitudes about the seriousness and impact of elite deviance. More precisely, the National Public 
Survey on White-Collar Crime has been conducted and published on three consecutive occasions 
(Rebovich et al., 2000; Kane & Wall, 2006; Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010). The first iteration, 
conducted by Rebovich and colleagues (2000), compared respondents’ perceptions of the 
likelihood of apprehension of street and white-collar offenders with their opinions on how they 
should be sanctioned. Participants were presented with a scenario that compared the chances of 
apprehension of someone stealing $1,000 in a robbery with someone obtaining $1,000 through a 
fraudulent action. Only 22% of the sample believed the fraudster had a greater likelihood of 
being apprehended. Even fewer respondents (16%) believed that the convicted fraudster would 
be punished more severely by the criminal justice system. Although public knowledge about elite 
deviance was not directly measured, these results nonetheless suggest that people may be partly 
aware of the relative legal immunity enjoyed by white-collar offenders compared to their street 
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counterparts.  
A comparison of the respondents’ perception of who would be arrested with their beliefs 
about who should be punished more severely revealed an interesting difference. More 
specifically, less than one third thought that the robber should be punished more severely, while 
higher percentages believed the fraudster deserved greater punishment and that both should be 
punished with equal severity. Again, these results run counter to the old perception that people 
are apathetic about or more lenient with elite deviance. 
The second effort by the National White-Collar Crime Center (Kane & Wall, 2006) 
expanded upon the original by proposing a more comprehensive definition of the white-collar 
crime construct that included illegal or unethical acts violating fiduciary responsibility or public 
trust for personal or organizational gain. This new definition incorporated high-tech crimes and 
crimes committed both inside and outside of the occupational setting. Importantly, the survey 
focused on three areas of public experience with white-collar crime: victimization, reporting 
behaviors, and perceptions of crime seriousness. Participants were presented with twelve 
scenarios depicting both white-collar offenses and more traditional types of crime. These 
scenarios were dichotomized into the following categories: white collar/traditional crime, 
physical harmful/financially costly crime, organizational/individual offenders, and high-
status/non-status offenders. Respondents were found to rate white-collar crime as equally serious 
as street crime. Moreover, physically harmful crimes were perceived to be significantly more 
serious than those that involved monetary loss. Interestingly, organizational offenders were rated 
more negatively than individual offenders. Finally, participants reacted more harshly against 
crimes committed by high-status offenders in a position of trust. 
 These results were echoed in the third and latest National Public Survey on White-Collar 
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Crime (Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010). Once again, measures of public opinion about and 
perceived seriousness of various types of elite deviance were collected. As was the case before, 
researchers developed a series of scenarios that were first incorporated into different categories 
expressing specific variables and then grouped on the basis of common attributes to compare the 
perceived seriousness (1) of a white-collar crime to that of street crime, (2) of a crime involving 
harm to that of a crime involving financial loss, (3) of a crime involving an organizational 
offender to that of a crime involving an individual offender, and (4) of a crime committed by a 
high-status offender (e.g., an individual in a position of trust) to that of a crime committed by a 
low-status offender.  
This time, survey results indicated that the public tended to view white-collar crime as 
slightly more serious than street crime. Not surprisingly, crimes that involved direct physical 
harm to individuals were once again found to be more serious than the crimes that resulted in 
monetary loss. As was the case in 2006, participants reacted more harshly to cases involving 
organizational instead of individual offenders. Similarly, crimes involving high-status offenders 
were statistically deemed more serious than those involving low-status offenders. Although the 
National Public Survey on White-Collar Crime examined only a limited number of white-collar 
and street crime scenarios, these findings suggest that Americans may see elite deviance as a 
more serious social issue than was previously hypothesized and might even sometimes take it 
more seriously than traditional crime.  
Perhaps, then, punitiveness is a function of knowledge. After all, maybe the 2010 British 
Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico met with such public indignation and outrage because 
of the visible, tangible damage it provoked. The greatest limitation of the National White-Collar 
Crime Center survey may have been its failure to control for public knowledge about elite 
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deviance. While respondents’ fear and negative attitudes about corporate offenders suggest a 
reasonable amount of knowledge about this form of deviance, the true extent of information 
among the public - particularly in regards to the physical costs of white-collar crime - remains 
uncertain. Hypothetically, there could be increased demand for tougher sanctions against high-
status offenders if people were better informed about the tremendous impact of elite deviance on 
society. Then again, this suggestion is mere conjecture since no study, to date, has provided a 
measure of what people really know about white-collar crime. Measuring public knowledge 
about elite deviance and comparing it to sentiments about white-collar crime would therefore 
represent an important contribution to the field. 
The Present Study 
The present study expands research on public opinions about white-collar crime by 
providing a much-needed measure of popular knowledge regarding elite deviance. The following 
research questions will be addressed: 
            1) Is the public informed about elite deviance? If it is, to which extent are Americans 
informed about it?  
 The field of epistemology (i.e., the branch of philosophy concerned with the study of 
knowledge) differentiates truth (evidence-based information) from belief (non-evidence-based 
opinion). One proposition is that knowledge may be better understood as justified true belief 
(Turri, 2012).  That is, a belief becomes knowledge if it is both believed to be true and currently 
supported by extant research. Knowledge about elite deviance will therefore be conceptualized 
and operationalized as statements that according to extant research are commonly regarded as 
valid (e.g., superior harmful costs to society compared with street crime). As previously 
mentioned, since most Americans derive their information from the news media (Dowler, 2003; 
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Roberts & Doob, 1990; Surette, 1998), and because the news media do not report on cases of 
white-collar crime at the same rate they do on street crime (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 
2010; Ericson et al., 1991; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, 
Stretesky & Hammond, 2000), it is plausible to expect that the public is not well educated about 
the problem of elite deviance. 
            2) Is there a gap between the public’s subjective and objective knowledge about white-
collar crime?  
            By “subjective” knowledge, one must understand what people think they know about 
elite deviance. Conversely, “objective” knowledge refers to what they actually know about 
white-collar crime. Several studies in the social science have observed a gap between the 
public’s subjective and objective knowledge about various issues related to crime and the 
criminal justice system. Phrased differently, there can be a discrepancy between what individuals 
believe they know and how informed they truly are. As previously mentioned, extant research on 
public knowledge about street crime has revealed gross differences between the people’s 
perceived and actual risks of victimization (e.g., Doob & Roberts, 1983; Kappeler, Blumberg, & 
Potter, 1996; Macleans, 1995; Maguire & Pastore, 1995; Roberts & Stalans, 1997; Wilbanks, 
1987). Such discrepancy was also observed with measures of public information about capital 
punishment (Bohm, 1987, 2003; Cochran & Chamlin, 2005). More specifically, those studies 
revealed that Americans were not as informed about issues related to the death penalty as they 
thought they were. Therefore, there might be a similar gap between what individuals think they 
know about white-collar crime and their actual level of information regarding elite deviance. 
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            3) Does the public hold common “myths” about elite deviance like they do regarding 
street crime?  
            With knowledge about elite deviance conceptualized and operationalized as statements 
that according to extant research are commonly regarded as valid (e.g., superior harmful costs to 
society compared with street crime), unsubstantiated beliefs and arguments that have been 
debunked by science but which the American public might still commonly hold therefore 
constitute white-collar crime “myths”. As previously mentioned, research has identified public 
“myths” about street crime and the criminal justice system (e.g., Bohm, 1987; Doob & Roberts, 
1983; Kappeler, Blumberg, & Potter, 1996; Macleans, 1995; Maguire & Pastore, 1995; Roberts 
& Stalans, 1997; Wilbanks, 1987). Given the limited coverage allotted to various forms of white-
collar crime in the news media (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 1991; 
Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & Hammond, 
2000), it is very likely that Americans harbor specific “myths” regarding elite deviance. Recall 
that some studies have shown that people tend to rate white-collar crime as less serious than 
street crime until they are presented with evidence of the harmfulness of elite deviance 
(Albanese, 1995; Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010; Holtfreter et al., 2008). Consequently, the 
perceived harmlessness of white-collar crime compared to its street counterpart could be one of 
many prevalent “myths” about elite deviance. This study will therefore attempt to identify such 
public “myths”. 
            4) What are the correlates of knowledge about white-collar crime?  
            Because white-collar crime is such a complex social phenomenon, information about elite 
deviance might correlate positively with one’s general level of education. That is, those with 
higher degrees may have had previous exposure to relevant information about white-collar crime 
	  	  	  
	  
31 
and possess better knowledge and understanding of it. Still, it is not clear what other 
characteristics may be associated with knowledge about elite deviance, either positively or 
negatively. Does knowledge about white-collar crime vary by age, race, gender, profession, 
socioeconomic status, or other sociodemographic characteristics? Research suggests significant 
variations in perceived seriousness of white-collar crime among the public. More specifically, 
some studies found that older people and people of lower socioeconomic status tend to view elite 
deviance as somewhat more serious than conventional violent crime and narcotic offenses 
(Grabosky, Braithwaite, & Wilson, 1987; Hauber, Toonvliet, & Willemse, 1988). Further, 
Blacks tend to rate white-collar crimes directed at consumers (e.g., fraud, health threats and 
deception from the production and sale of goods and services, etc.) as somewhat more serious 
than do Whites, who seem more sensitive to white-collar crimes directed at businesses (e.g., 
forgery, embezzlement, etc., Miethe, 1984). However, it is not known whether such attitudes 
were dictated by prior knowledge of the problem. 
            5) Is knowledge about elite deviance correlated with public opinion regarding white-
collar crime?  
            Several studies have found that because business executives, managers, criminal justice 
bureaucrats, and lawyers are aware of the complexity of white-collar crime compared to street 
crime, they tend not to consider harsh penal sanctions to be the most effective way to deal with it 
(Cole, 1983; Frank et al. 1989; Hartung, 1953; McCleary et al., 1981). Of course, it could be that 
such individuals are unlikely to support severe sentences for white-collar offenses because they 
are themselves part of the elite groups that engage in those acts. It is uncertain, however, whether 
and how knowledge about elite deviance may affect public opinion regarding its seriousness as 
well as the measures that should be taken against its perpetrators (e.g., type of legal actions, 
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choice of punishment, sentence severity, etc.).  
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CHAPTER THREE: 
METHODS 
 
Sample 
The subjects in this study were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a web service 
that coordinates the supply and demand of human intelligence tasks (HIT). More precisely, 
requesters post HITs that can be done on a computer (e.g., a survey) and workers volunteer to 
complete them based on the size of the reward (i.e., a small payment) and maximum time 
allotted for the completion. Mechanical Turk has recently become popular in the social sciences, 
particularly in psychology (e.g., Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011; Horton, Rand, & Zeckhauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010), but 
also in criminology (Nadler & McDonnell, 2012; Robinson, Goodwin, & Reisig, 2010) as a 
source of data collection due to its low cost and convenient recruitment. 
Mechanical Turk presents several advantages compared to other data collection methods. 
Recruitment is made easy by the increasing popularity of crowdsourcing platforms (i.e., websites 
that outsource jobs to an undefined group of individuals in the form of an open call). 
Crowdsourcing offers a large, stable pool of people willing to participate in experiments for very 
low pay (Mason & Suri, 2011). Since there are no travel costs, and because workers choose 
when they want to complete tasks, the effort to participate is much lower than in lab-based 
experiments. As a result, rewards typically range from $0.01 to $1, with most HITs being paid 
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$0.10, which makes it a relatively inexpensive way to collect data. While compensation rate and 
task length do impact participation, payment levels do not appear to affect data quality. For 
example, mean alphas computer by Buhrmester and colleagues (2011) for data collected at three  
levels of compensation (2, 10, and 50 cents) were within one hundredth of a point across the 
three compensation levels. Further, research suggests that data collected on Mechanical Turk are 
as reliable as those obtained via traditional methods. More specifically, Paolacci and colleagues 
(2010) replicated standard judgment and decision-making experiments among subjects recruited 
on Mechanical Turk, online discussion boards, and at a large university and found the results to 
be qualitatively identical. In addition, Mechanical Turk workers are at least as representative of 
the U.S. population as traditional subject pools, with gender, race, and age all matching the 
population more closely than college undergraduate samples and Internet samples in general 
(Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2011; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler, & 
Ieirotis, 2010).  
Moreover, Amazon’s terms of service follow standard guidelines in conducting research 
with human subjects. For instance, both requesters and workers must be at least 18 years of age. 
In addition, the system does not allow requesters to ask for identifying information, thus 
protecting workers’ anonymity. More specifically, workers’ IDs are anonymized strings that do 
not contain personally identifiable information. Subjects are further protected in that they can 
read brief descriptions and see previews of the tasks before accepting to work on them.  
Informed consent is provided via a statement on the preview page of the HIT that 
explains the purpose, risks and benefits of the task, and where to contact the researcher (and/or 
IRB). The working conditions and hours are entirely determined by the worker and there is no 
direct or indirect obligation on the workers to do any unwanted work. Once they choose to 
	  	  	  
	  
35 
complete a task and effectively do so, the researcher who supplied that task pays them. Payment 
is denied if the task is not entirely completed, which helps ensure data quality and minimize 
attrition. Furthermore, confidentiality is facilitated by the use of external HITs. More 
specifically, by providing a survey link to another website instead of uploading the survey 
directly on Mechanical Turk, the data go straight from the worker to the external website (e.g., 
Qualtrics, a web-based survey service that provides advanced security and confidentiality for 
results with password protection) and are never available to Amazon.  
Data Collection Process 
Once approved by the IRB, a questionnaire was uploaded on Qualtrics and a survey link 
was made available on Mechanical Turk. The preview page included the title of the study and a 
brief description of the purpose, risks and benefits of the project. The name and contact 
information of the lead investigator (myself) and institutional review board were included. The 
description of the study stated that subjects’ participation was voluntary, that in accordance with 
Amazon’s terms of service their identity would remain anonymous, and that the information they 
would provide would not be tied to them in any way.  
Also included was the payment amount and expected completion time. These two 
elements are important in determining sample size. Prior research suggests that recruiting 500 
subjects on Mechanical Turk for a social science experiment is a realistic goal (see, e.g., 
Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2011; Buhrmester; Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Paolacci and colleagues 
(2010) posted a task that required workers to answer a 5-minute survey for $0.10 and were still 
able to attract 131 workers. Because the instrument to be used in the present study was twice as 
long (pilot-testing showed that completion time was about 10 minutes) and admittedly more 
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complex, a monetary incentive of $2.00 per respondent was proposed to maximize completion 
rate.  
Prospective subjects were also informed that they could take the survey only once. 
Restricting a task to one attempt was made easy by Amazon’s policy, which prevents workers 
from having multiple accounts. Moreover, while Mechanical Turk is available in several nations, 
it was possible to restrict the desired sample to one country only. This is a non-negligible 
advantage, given that the present study proposes to measure public knowledge and attitudes 
about elite deviance in the United States. Lastly, because it was uncertain how fast quality data 
would be obtained, it was decided that the survey would be initially available for one month and 
could be extended for another until the sample size goal had been reached.  
Data collection took place on April 1st, 2013. The sample size goal of 500 participants 
was reached within only three hours. As previously mentioned, piloting of the instrument 
indicated that at least 10 minutes were necessary to read all questions carefully and provide 
honest answers. As a result, every survey completed in less than 10 minutes was considered 
unusable and subsequently deleted. Eliminating incomplete and/or dubious surveys yielded a 
final sample of 408 respondents. Overall participants rated the experience favorably. More 
specifically, several respondents took the time to email the lead investigator to comment on the 
interest they took in the survey’s topic and expressed their desire to seek out further information 
about white-collar crime.  
The demographic characteristics of the sample were somewhat representative of the 
overall American population. The 2010 United States Census indicates that the national median 
age is 36.8, that 50.8% of Americans are females, that 78% identify as Whites, 13.1% as Blacks, 
1.1% as Middle Eastern, 1.2% as American Indians or Alaskan Natives, 5% as Asians, 0.2% as 
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Native Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders, and 16.7% as Hispanics. Comparatively, the median age 
in this study was 31, 49.8% of the respondents were females, 83.6% of them identified as 
Whites, 8.8% as Blacks, 0.5% as Middle Eastern, 0.5% as American Indians or Alaskan Natives, 
5% as Asians, 0.2% as Native Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders, and 6.9% as Hispanics. Further, 
the median annual household income was between $40,000 and $49,000 (i.e., slightly lower than 
the national estimate of $52,762). College graduates (Bachelor’s degree or higher) accounted for 
49.5% of the total sample (against only 28.2% at the national level), and 41.7% of the 
respondents were employed full-time (against 44.1% of the overall population). 
It therefore appears that the largest discrepancies with national rates involve age, 
race/ethnicity, and education. These gaps can be explained by the choice of data collection 
method. Despite its increasing popularity, Amazon’s Mechanical Turk is still a relatively new 
market place for work that is restricted to a specific category of individuals with knowledge of 
and interest in computer technologies and online crowdsourcing. Not surprisingly, these 
individuals are more likely to be younger and better educated. It is not clear, however, why racial 
and ethnic minorities were not more represented. A likely explanation is that while the 
proportion of Black and Hispanic Internet users has nearly doubled between 2000 and 2010, 
African-Americans and immigrant Spanish speakers are still less likely than Whites to go online 
(Smith, 2010). Despite its imperfections, the sample in this study is still an acceptable proxy for 
the American public, following national trends closely in terms of gender, household income and 
employment status distribution. Table A (see Appendix A) summarizes the descriptive statistics 
of the variables and measures that follow.  
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Measures  
The questionnaire used in this study included five sections: (1) Respondent 
sociodemographic characteristics (items 1 to 17), (2) measures of public knowledge about elite 
deviance (items 18 to 27), (3) perceived seriousness of white-collar crimes compared with a 
baseline street crime (items 28 to 38), (4) punitiveness, including perceived seriousness of white-
collar crimes involving physical risks compared to harmful street crimes with choice of 
prosecution process, sentence determination, and sentence severity (items 39 to 43),  and (5) 
choice of attribution style (i.e., perceptions of white-collar offenders’ motives; items 44 to 51).  
Sociodemographic Control Variables 
A sociodemographic questionnaire was used to control for certain variables that might 
account for variation in public information and opinions concerning elite deviance. As 
previously mentioned, these potential correlates of knowledge about white-collar crime include 
gender (0 = female, 1 = male), age (coded in years), and race (1 = White, 2 = Black or African 
American, 3 = Asian, 4 = Middle Eastern, 5 = Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander, 6 = 
American Indian or Alaskan Native, and 7 = Other). The following dummy variables were then 
created: Whites, Blacks, and Other race. Further, ethnicity was measured via the following 
options: Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (1 = yes, 2 = no) and then dichotomized  (0 =Non-
Hispanic, 1 = Hispanic).  
 In an effort to control for cultural differences in knowledge and opinions about white-
collar crime, the region where the respondents grew up was also included (1 = North, 2 = East, 3 
= South, 4 = West, 5 = Midwest, 6 = Other) and then dummy coded (1 = Northeast, 0 = Other)1. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ANOVAs between all six groups yielded statistically significant differences both in knowledge and opinion about 
white-collar crime for subjects from the North and from the East, which might be due to the industrial and financial 
history of Northeastern states. 	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Also included was participants’ current residence (1 = A large central city (over 250,000), 2 = A 
medium size central city (50,000 to 250,000), 3 = Suburb of a large central city, 4 = Suburb of a 
medium size central city, 5 = An unincorporated area of a large central city (e.g., township, 
division, 6 = An unincorporated area of a medium central city, 7 = A small city (10,000 to 
49,999), 8 = A town or village (2,500 to 9,999), 9 = An incorporated area less than 2,500 or an 
unincorporated area (1,000 to 2,499), and 10 = Open country within larger civil divisions (e.g., 
township, division). This variable was then dummy coded (0 = Rural, 1 = Urban). 
Again, household income (1 = Under $10,000, 2 = $10,000-$19,999, 3 = $20,000-
$29,999, 4 = $30,000-$39,999, 5 = $40,000-$49,999, 6 = $50,000-$69,999, 7 = $70,000-
$89,999, 8 = $90,000-$119,999, 9 = $120,000-$149,000, and 10 = More than $150,000), and 
completed education (1 = Grade school or less, 2 = Some high school, 3 = High school graduate, 
4 = 1 or more years of technical, vocational, or trade school, 3 = Some college, 6 = College 
graduate, 7 = 1 or more years of graduate, law, or medical school, and 8 = Advanced degree 
(e.g., Master’s, Ph.D., J.D., M.D., etc.) were also included. 
Further, a measure of profession seemed warranted. Recall that in previous studies, 
criminal justice elites did not consider harsh penal sanctions to be the most effective way to deal 
with such a complex phenomenon as white-collar crime (Cole, 1983; Frank et al. 1989; Hartung, 
1953; McCleary et al., 1981). Measures of employment status and occupation were also included 
to determine whether individuals in different lines of work shared such opinion. Employment 
status was measured by asking subjects whether they were disabled, employed full-time, 
employed part-time, self-employed, or unemployed (including students, homemakers and 
retirees), and then dummy coded (0 = Not employed full-time, 1 = Employed full-time), 
Respondents were then asked which option best described their occupation. Importantly, to avoid 
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long response options the question was deliberately left open-ended. The coding system of the 
2010 US census was subsequently used to provide a comprehensive measure of occupation.2  
Moreover, political ideology was also included as they could potentially affect the 
subjects’ perception of seriousness of elite deviance, particularly at the corporate level. More 
specifically, conservative subjects might support elements of neoliberal economics such as 
market deregulation, which has been shown to facilitate the commission of certain white-collar 
crimes (see, e.g., Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Rosoff, Pontell & Tillman, 2010). Such support, 
in turn, might lead them to overlook corporate crime. Conversely, those leaning toward the left 
end of the political spectrum might have had greater exposure to information about elite deviance 
through their favorite media source and be more critical of it. Political ideology was measured by 
asking the respondents to describe their personal social and political views (1 = Very liberal, 2 = 
Liberal, 3 = Somewhat liberal, 4 = Somewhat conservative, 5 = Conservative, and 6 = Very 
conservative). Political affiliation was measured via the following: “Republican Party”, 
“Democrat Party”, “Independent Party”, “Reform Party”, “Other”, “I am not registered”, and “I 
do not identify with any political party”. The following dummy variables were then created: 
“Republican”, “Democrat”, “Other party”, and “No party”. 
Lastly, because it is possible that one’s religious affiliation might influence personal 
opinions regarding the ethicality of corporate crime, the subjects were asked which religion, if 
any, they identified with (1 = Catholicism, 2 = Protestantism, 3 = Judaism, 4 = Buddhism, 5 = 
Islam, 6 = Hinduism, 7 = Other, and 8 = None). Based on the respondents’ answers, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  ANOVAs and correlational analyses between profession, other predictors and all dependent variables yielded no 
significant pattern. The problem lies in the crude way in which the occupation variable was measured. Answers were 
for the most part ambiguous and difficult to code. For example, it was impossible to determine what “manager” 
referred to without any reference to the subjects’ line of work. Consequently, it was decided that the occupation 
variable should be dropped from the analyses. 
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following dummy variables were then created: “Catholic”, “Protestant”, “Other religion”, and 
“No religion”. Further, those subjects who identified themselves as Protestant were asked to 
choose a particular denomination (1 = Baptist, 2 = Assembly of God, 3 = Church of Christ, 4 = 
Lutheran, 5 = Methodist, 6 = Presbyterian, 7 = Episcopalian, and 8 = Other). Based on previous 
classifications (e.g., Cochran & Beeghley, 1991; Smith, 1990), participants’ answers were then 
included into one of the following dummy-coded categories: “Conservative Protestant” (i.e., 
Baptists, Assembly of God, Church of Christ, and other), “Moderate Protestant” (i.e., Lutherans 
and Methodists), and “Liberal Protestant” (Presbyterians and Episcopalians).  
Attribution Style 
Because societal response might be determined by perceptions of the offender’s motives 
as much as by the nature of the crime itself, controlling for attribution styles seemed warranted. 
Attribution theory (Heider, 1958) addresses how people explain their own behavior and the 
behavior of others. Behaviors are generally attributed to two different causes: internal 
(dispositional) or external (situational). Research suggests that those who employ a dispositional 
attribution style consider that criminals choose to commit crime, which makes them morally 
culpable and, in turn, leads to more severe sentence options. Conversely, those who employ a 
situational attribution style tend to blame the system and view criminals as the victims of 
external social forces, which makes them less morally culpable and, in turn, leads to more lenient 
sentence options (Blatier, 2000; Carroll, 1978; Cochran, Boots, & Heide, 2003; Cullen, Clark, 
Cullen, & Mathers, 1985; Debuyst, 1985; Grasmick & McGill, 2004).  
Applied to the present study, attribution theory might explain respondents’ choice of 
societal response to the three white-collar crime scenarios involving harmfulness. The 
participants were presented with a series of items measuring both dispositional and situational 
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attribution styles. Those items that measure the dispositional attribution style focus on the 
personal motive and characteristics (Wheeler et al., 1979) of the offender. They include “Most 
white-collar offenders are greedy individuals”, “Most white-collar offenders have bad characters 
and no personal ethics because they place profit above public safety”, “Most white-collar 
offenders choose to violate the law when the perceived benefits of their actions outweigh the 
perceived costs” and “Most white-collar offenders have the inability to control themselves”. 
Conversely, those items that measure the situational attribution style focus on the 
business/environment type motivation (Wheeler et al., 1979), that is, systemic pressures or forces 
acting upon the offender. They include “Most white-collar offenders’ business environment 
promotes competition and encourages the commission of white-collar crimes”, “Most white-
collar offenders are pressured/coerced by their superiors to reach business goals”, “Most white-
collar offenders have a fiduciary responsibility (i.e., a legal or ethical relationship of trust) to 
their company’s shareholders”, and “Most white-collar offenders are otherwise law-abiding 
citizens who do not think that their business practices are really wrong”. The participants were 
asked the extent to which they agreed with each of these items. Response options for all these 
Likert-type items were as follows: 1 = “Strongly agree”, 2 = “Somewhat agree”, 3 = “Somewhat 
disagree”, and 4 = “Strongly disagree”.  
The first four items tapping dispositional attribution were entered into a principal 
components factor analysis from which a single factor solution best fit these data (eigenvalue = 
1.73). This factor explained 43.2 percent of the variation among those items and produced factor 
loadings from .22 and .78. After discarding the low self-control item, factor loadings from .65 
and .8 emerged. Nevertheless, the Cronbach’s alpha reliability for this additive scale is .61, 
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which is under the commonly accepted threshold of .7 indicating a moderately reliable scale 
(Nunally, 1978). 
The second four items tapping situational attribution did not fare any better. Once again a 
single factor solution best fit these data (eigenvalue = 1.51). This factor explained 37.7 percent of 
the variation among those items and produced factor loadings from .54 and .75. After dropping 
the fiduciary item, factor loadings from .62 and .74 were produced. However, the Cronbach’s 
alpha reliability for this additive scale is .44, substantially lower than what would be considered 
acceptable.  
Unnever and colleagues (2010) have suggested that people may not fall into either one 
category and might in fact evince both dispositional and situational attribution styles depending 
on the type of crime presented to them.  Thus, using a bipolar scale (i.e., with dispositional items 
on one end and situational items on the other) or two separate scales simultaneously may not be 
the best way to measure complex opinions about crime. Consequently, attribution was measured 
via eight different variables, each reflecting a potential cause people regard white-collar crime as 
resulting from. In the tables presented in chapter 4 and 5, these variables are designated as 
“greed”, “moral”, “control”, “choice”, “influence”, “fiduciary”, “pressure”, and “no wrong”.  
Knowledge about White-Collar Crime 
Knowledge about elite deviance was measured via a two-pronged approach. More 
specifically, the instrument included measures of both subjective and objective knowledge. 
Again, since most Americans have been shown to rely on the news media as their main source of 
information (Dowler, 2003; Roberts & Doob, 1990; Surette, 1998), and because white-collar 
crime is not as widely reported as street crime (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et 
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al., 1991; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006), there might be a considerable gap between the 
participants’ perceived and actual knowledge about elite deviance.  
Subjective knowledge 
            Subjective knowledge was measured several ways. First, respondents were asked to self-
assess the degree to which they felt they were informed about white-collar crime (1 = Not 
informed, 2 = Somewhat informed, 3 = Informed, 4 = Very informed). Importantly, the 
participants were also asked about their primary sources of information (1 = Television news 
stations, 2 = Radio news stations 3 = Newspapers, 4 = Magazines, 5 = Books, 6 = Internet, and 7 
= Other). Based on the subjects’ answers, the following dummy variable was then created (0 = 
traditional media, 1 = Internet). Second, subjects were asked whether they previously had been 
exposed to relevant information about white-collar crime, and if so what medium they used to 
educate themselves (1 = College course, 2 = Movie/TV series, 3 = Documentary, 4 = Television 
news report, 5 = Newspaper article, 6 = Book, 7 = Other, and 8 = I have not been exposed to 
such information). Lastly, participants were asked how confident they felt about their answers to 
an objective knowledge questionnaire (1 = Not at all confident, 2 = Somewhat confident, 3 = 
Confident, and 4 = Very confident). This questionnaire is described in greater detail in the 
following section. 
Objective knowledge 
Objective knowledge was measured via a 10-item questionnaire that includes multiple-
choice and true or false questions largely derived from the bank of test items developed for 
Rosoff, Pontell and Tillman’s text Profit Without Honor: White-Collar Crime and the Looting of 
America (2010). One caveat when developing valid and reliable measures of public knowledge is 
to craft questions that are reasonably understandable to a large number of people with response 
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options that are not too specific. Rosoff and colleagues’ test bank was originally supposed to be 
administered to students enrolled in a college course on white-collar crime. As such, it may not 
work well with a more heterogeneous population with probably little previous exposure to 
relevant information about elite deviance. To address this problem, only those items that tapped 
broad dimensions were selected while those that focus on specific examples and use precise 
figures in their response options were deliberately excluded. Moreover, several questions and 
answer options had to be rephrased to make them more accessible to a non-educated audience. 
This questionnaire taps ten different dimensions of elite deviance.  
            1) Meaning of the term “White-Collar” Crime 
The first dimension is the meaning of white-collar crime. It is not at all certain that the 
public even knows and understands Sutherland’s implicit reference to upper class professionals.  
This dimension was measured by asking respondents about the origin of the term (response 
options include “The types of victims”, “The occupations of the perpetrators”, and “The 
offenders’ association with religion”). 
            2) Financial Cost 
            The second dimension is the financial cost of elite deviance, which was measured by 
asking respondents how much they thought street crime cost the American public compared to 
white-collar crime. Response options included “Significantly less”, “Somewhat less”, “The costs 
are about the same”, “Somewhat more”, and “Significantly more”. As previously mentioned, 
research indicates that street crime costs approximately $18 billion to the public while the 
financial impact of white-collar crime on society due to fraud and various medical costs resulting 
from workplace injuries and illnesses (due to corporate negligence) and environmental pollution 
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exceeds a trillion dollars every year (Knowlton et al., 2011; Landrigan et al., 2002; Leigh et al., 
2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Rebovich & Jiandani, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2010).  
            3) Harmfulness 
The third dimension is elite deviance’s harmfulness and was measured by asking subjects 
how likely street crimes like assaults, murders, and muggings were to injure or kill people 
compared with white-collar crime. Response options were: “Significantly less likely”, 
“Somewhat less likely”, “As likely”, “Somewhat more likely”, and “Significantly more likely”. 
Again, research indicates that the physical danger caused by elite deviance greatly exceeds that 
of street crime (Herbert & Landrigan, 2010; Kramer, 1984; Langrin, 1988; Leigh, 2010; Lynch 
& Michalowski, 2006; Reiman, 1998; Reiman & Leighton, 2010; Starfield, 2000).  As 
previously mentioned, white-collar crime may harm or injure over 8,986,000 people every year 
and lead to the untimely death of another 283,600 people, that is, more than 20 times as many as 
street crime.  
           4) Legal Immunity 
The fourth dimension is the relative legal immunity enjoyed by white-collar offenders 
compared with street criminals, and was measured by asking subjects how likely they believed 
someone who committed a street crime like burglary and stole $1000 was to be convicted and to 
receive a similar sentence as someone who committed a white-collar crime like fraud and stole 
$1000. Response options were: “Significantly less likely”, “Somewhat less likely”, “As likely”, 
“Somewhat more likely”, and “Significantly more likely”. Again, research suggests that white-
collar offenders are more likely to avoid criminal convictions and to receive more lenient 
sentences compared to those imposed upon street criminals (Calavita, Tillman, & Pontell, 1997; 
Maddan et al., 2011; Tillman & Pontell, 1992). Although recent research suggests a toughening 
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of white-collar crime prosecution (Payne, Dabney, & Ekhomu, 2011), individual offenders are 
still easier targets than are business organizations, possibly because establishing criminal intent 
for a corporation is a difficult task (Ashforth et al., 2008; Gottschalk, 2012). 
            5) Reckless Disregard 
The fifth dimension is reckless disregard. While corporations typically escape 
convictions of purposeful intent to cause harm, they can be found guilty of engaging in acts they 
know to be dangerous while ignoring potential harmful consequences (Treiman, 1981). Reckless 
disregard was measured by asking respondents whether the following narrative was true or false: 
“Although Ford knew their Pinto model’s gas tank represented a safety defect, they chose not to 
invest in an inexpensive and safer design, reasoning that it would be cheaper to pay out expected 
wrongful death lawsuits. As a result, several people died in fiery crashes.”  The answer is “true”.3 
            6) Medical Crime 
The sixth dimension is medical crime and was measured by asking participants how 
many people in the U.S. they believed died from medical malpractice each year compared with 
criminal homicides. Response options included the following: “More”, “An equal number”, and 
“Fewer”. Recall that approximately 14,000 people die from homicide annually (UCR, 2010). 
Conversely, the empirical literature estimates that 225,000 victims die each year from medical 
crime (Starfield, 2000).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The car manufacturer giant avoided a sentence for criminal homicide by paying millions of dollars in 
compensatory and punitive damages after its refusal to redesign a defective fuel tank on the Pinto model had lead to 
several deaths by burning in rear-end collisions. Such choice was the result of a risk/benefit calculation based on the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration‘s estimate for the dollar value of human life. Based on the numbers 
Ford used, the cost to implement the design change would have been $137 million, almost three times as much as 
the $49.5 million in compensation for deaths, injuries, and car damages. Ironically, though, it would have cost Ford 
a mere $11.00 per vehicle to fix the problem (Leggett, 1999). 	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            7) Human Trafficking 
            The seventh dimension is human trafficking in the United States. Subjects were asked 
whether they believed the statement “Human trafficking is more common in underdeveloped 
countries than in developed nations” was true or false. While the public may associate human 
trafficking with squalid living and working conditions in U.S. company-owned Southeast Asian 
sweatshops, the existence of domestic slavery among foreign workers on American soil has been 
documented.4  
8) State-Corporate Crime 
The eighth dimension is state-corporate crime and was measured by presenting subjects 
with the following statement and asking them whether they believed it was true: “Private 
American military companies have been accused of engaging in a number of human rights 
violations including the abuse and torture of detainees, shootings and killings of innocent 
civilians, destruction of property, and sexual harassment and rape”. The same statement can be 
found on the Amnesty International website to illustrate allegations of involvement in human 
rights violations such as torture at the American prison camp of Abu Ghraib, Iraq and the 2007 
shootings of Iraqi civilians in Nisoor Square by private U.S. security contractor Academi 
(formerly Blackwater), which resulted in 17 deaths and 24 people injured. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 For example, Berkeley’s Human Rights Center and the Washington D.C.-based, anti-slavery group Free the Slaves 
have evidenced illegal practices in over 90 American cities ranging from prostitution and sex services to forced 
labor (Gilmore, 2004). R&A harvesting, a farm labor contractor, used threats of violence to force 700 Mexican and 
Guatemalan workers to labor as Florida citrus pickers for little or no pay (Bales, 2004). Further, the “Boot the Bell” 
campaign, started by the Coalition of Immokalee Workers (CIW), forced the fast food giant Taco Bell and parent 
company Yum Brands to ensure a minimum wage for tomato pickers, adopt a zero tolerance policy for slavery and 
to establish an “enforceable code of conduct” (Bales, 2004). McDonald’s followed but Burger King resisted until it 
was revealed that a private security firm owner hired by the chain had infiltrated the CIW (Soodalter & Bales, 2009).  
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            9) Toxic Dumping 
            The ninth item taps the environmental crime dimension and asked participants to 
determine whether they believed landfills and toxic waste disposal sites were most likely to be 
located near African American communities (response options included “true” and “false”). As 
previously mentioned, research indicates that those sites do tend to be found close to 
disadvantaged, predominantly African American neighborhoods with very limited legal recourse 
(Lynch, 2004; Pueschel, Linakis, & Anderson, 1996; Roderick, 1992; Wargo, 1998; Colborn, 
Dumanoski, & Myers, 1997; Needleman et al., 1996; Pihl & Ervin, 1990; Dietrich et al., 2001; 
Lynch & Stretesky, 2001; 2004; Denno, 1990; Barnette, 1999). 
            10) Toxic Emissions 
            The tenth and final item also taps environmental crime by asking respondents whether 
they believed it was true that current levels of toxic emissions had not been reduced as much as 
they easily could have been (response options include “true” and “false”). A relatively new 
paradigm concerned with the impact of environmental crime, green criminology (Benton, 1998; 
Frank & Lynch, 1992; Groombridge, 1998; Lane, 1998; Lynch, 1990; Lynch & Stretesky, 2003; 
South, 1998; South & Beirne, 2006) interprets America’s refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol (an 
international treaty pledging to reduce greenhouse gas emissions), or to invest in modern, 
sustainable forms of energy (e.g., solar roofing in Florida) as being driven by corporate interests, 
simply because these progressive ventures are deemed financially detrimental to American 
corporations.  
Each correct answer to those ten items was entered into an overall knowledge scale so 
that a percentage of correct answers could be calculated. The intent was to attribute a percent 
score to subjects, as would be the case if they had taken a test based on a 100-point grading 
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scale. As with subjective knowledge, the following grading policy was used: 90-100 = “Very 
informed”, 80-90 = “Informed”, 70-80 = “Somewhat informed”, and below 70 = “Not 
informed”. Further, a measure of “truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence was provided. White-
collar “myth” variables were created whenever subjects felt either “confident” or “very 
confident” about their answer to a knowledge item even though they chose the wrong response 
option. Similarly, white-collar “truth” variables were created each time participants picked the 
correct answer to a knowledge item while feeling “confident” or “very confident” about it. 
Subjects who felt “not confident” or only “somewhat confident” about their response yet 
answered correctly are hereupon classified as “lucky guessers”. Conversely, those who answered 
incorrectly while feeling either “not confident” or ”somewhat confident” are arbitrarily referred 
to as “honestly uninformed”. Table 1 presents the classification of subjects based on the 2X2 
cross-tabulation of answer correctness and confidence. 
Table 1. Classification of Subjects Based on the 2X2 Cross-Tabulation of Answer 
Correctness and Confidence (N= 408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 Answer Correctness 
Yes No 
Answer Confidence Yes “Truth” Accepters “Myth” Adherers 
No Lucky Guessers Honestly Uninformed 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Sentiments about White-Collar Crime 
The amount and quality of knowledge about elite deviance may help fashion public 
opinion regarding crimes of the powerful. As previously mentioned, while early research 
suggested that white-collar offenses such as fraud were not viewed as serious by the public as 
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violent crimes like robbery (Geis, 1973; Rossi et al., 1974; Sutherland, 1949; Wheeler et al., 
1988), studies that provided respondents with examples of corporate wrongdoings involving 
injury or death have found support for more severe sanctions against such crimes (Huff, Desilets, 
& Kane, 2010; Holtfreter et al., 2008). These findings indicate that an informed audience might 
view white-collar crime more negatively than do uninformed citizens.  
Public opinion about elite deviance was measured in several ways. First, the subjects 
were presented with a series of items derived from the 2010 National Public Survey on White-
Collar Crime (Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010). These items consisted of eleven5 short scenarios 
involving two street crimes (i.e., burglary and assault) and nine different types of white-collar 
crime. The first of these scenarios described a burglar stealing $10,000 worth of jewelry from a 
private residence while the owner was away on vacation. The second one tapped embezzlement 
by describing a bank teller befriending a customer and stealing $10,000 out of his personal 
account over the course of two years.  The third scenario described identity theft by a computer 
hacker who stole personal patient information from a healthcare clinic’s database and then sold 
this information to a third party for $10,000.  
Scenario number four dealt with false charges added by a large manufacturing company 
to an invoice, costing a small business owner $10,000. In scenario number 5, robbery and assault 
were described with someone attempting to rob several joggers in the park, and - despite the 
robbery being foiled - the joggers sustaining non-fatal injuries and receiving treatment at the 
hospital. Scenario number six described hacking, with an individual sending out viruses on the 
Internet and infecting many personal computers with software that allowed the hacker to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The National White-Collar Crime Center survey originally included 12 scenarios, one of which described 
overbilling (“A company overbills another company it supplies with heavy equipment, making an extra $10,000 in 
unwarranted profits.”). This last variable was inadvertently omitted in the present study. 
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distribute millions of spam. A pharmaceutical company falsely advertising as safe an anti-
depressant drug it knew to be unsafe was described in scenario number seven; importantly, it was 
indicated that the drug was later found to be related to a string of random violent acts, costing the 
lives of several people.  
Espionage was introduced in scenario number eight, with a former employee of a U.S. 
defense contractor selling nuclear secrets and other classified information he acquired during his 
employment to foreign governments. The ninth scenario tapped market rigging by describing a 
Wall Street financial firm that conspired to manipulate the precious metals market, profiting at 
the expense of other traders and owners of precious metals who were unaware of the price-fixing 
scheme. In the tenth scenario, counterfeiting was introduced by describing a person selling a 
counterfeit antique bracelet on an online auction site, misrepresenting its true value and making 
an extra $1,000. Lastly, insurance overcharge was the main topic in the eleventh scenario; more 
specifically, an insurance agent was described as selling an insurance policy at an inflated price 
to an unsuspecting customer and pocketing an extra $20,000.  
Participants were then asked to compare the seriousness of each offense described in 
these scenarios with someone stealing a parked car worth $10,000 (1 = Much less serious, 2 = 
Somewhat less serious, 3 = About as serious, 4 = Somewhat more serious, and 5 = Much more 
serious). Interestingly, with the exception of counterfeit sales, previous respondents rated these 
scenarios as being more serious than motor vehicle theft (Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010). These 
results tend to indicate that, when presented with several concrete examples of elite deviance, the 
people’s level of indignation about white-collar crimes might increase relative to traditional 
crime. As such, they merit replication.  
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However, it could also be that the baseline crime scenario was not shocking enough. 
Perhaps a violent - instead of property - street crime would have invited a lower degree of 
perceived seriousness for the various white-collar crime scenarios. Recall that the National 
Public Survey on White-Collar Crime proposed to measure respondents’ perceived offense 
seriousness by contrasting the abovementioned scenarios with a single baseline vignette 
describing a property crime (i.e. motor vehicle theft). With the exception of robbery (which only 
resulted in injuries) and false drug label, all the other scenarios described financially costly but 
not physically harmful offenses. This could explain why subjects only rated three of them as 
much more serious than the baseline scenario. To remedy this limitation, participants were also 
asked to read another five vignettes partly derived from Kennedy’s ethics scenarios (2010), some 
describing violent street crimes and others harmful white-collar crimes.  
Street crime scenarios included homicide (“Someone attempts to rob a couple while they 
are walking back to their car at night. The husband tries to disarm the attacker, but is shot by 
him. He later dies of his injuries.”), and forcible rape (“Someone breaks into a dorm at night and 
forcibly rapes a female student.”). Harmful white-collar crime scenarios included consumer 
safety violations endangering children (“Because of cost reductions, the materials used by a 
company to build a popular toy will present a potential hazard to the product’s users. The 
company decides to manufacture and distribute the toy regardless of the risks.”), illegal toxic 
waste disposal (“In order to increase profits and meet production goals, a manufacturing 
company uses production processes that allow for the release of pollutants into the water and air 
and exceed legal limits. Several people become seriously ill as a result.”), and denial of risk and 
peril by failing to enforce safety measures on the workplace and to take responsibility for 
employees’ toxic contamination (“A mining company fails to ensure safety measures such as 
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proper ventilation and the use of masks, goggles and gloves among its workers, and covers up 
evidence regarding the link between asbestos exposure and lung cancer deaths.”).  
 For each scenario, the respondents were asked to rate the seriousness of the offense (1 = 
Not very serious, 2 = Somewhat serious, 3 = Serious, and 4 = Very serious), decide how the case 
should be handled (1 = By some non-legal means, 2 = In a non-criminal court, 3 = In a criminal 
court), and determine the proper societal response (i.e., punishment) to them. Response options 
included fine, financial compensation for the victims, or imprisonment. Finally, subjects were 
also asked to choose specific dollar amounts for monetary sanctions via a 5-point ordinal scale (0 
= No fine/compensation, 1 = Under $100,000, 2 = $100,000-$499,000, 3 = $500,000-$999,999, 
4 = Above $1,000,000) as well as the number of years for incarceration via a 7-point ordinal 
scale (0 = No prison, 1 = 1-5 years, 2 = 6-10 years, 3 = 11-20 years, 4 = 21-30 years, 5 = 31-40 
years, 6 = 41 years-life).  
Data Analytic Plan 
The first research question asks two different things: (1) Whether the public is informed 
about elite deviance, and (2) the extent to which it is. To answer these questions, the percentage 
of correct answers to the objective knowledge questionnaire will first be compared to the 
aforementioned total knowledge index. As previously mentioned, a percent score of 70 or below 
will indicate a lack of information. Descriptive statistics will also be used to describe the 
distribution of correct answers for each of the ten knowledge questionnaire items. 
The second research question asks to compare objective and subjective knowledge about 
white-collar crime. Any discrepancy between perceived and actual levels of information will be 
revealed by comparing the number of correct answers to the objective knowledge questions with 
two measures of subjective knowledge: (1) Subjects’ answers to the question asking how 
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informed they felt they were about elite deviance, and (2) their answers as to how confident they 
were that they answered the knowledge items correctly. Further, respondents’ primary sources of 
information will be correlated with objective knowledge to determine which types of media have 
the highest educational value relative to white-collar crime.  
Examining subjects’ answers to the ten dimensions of elite deviance tapped by the 
knowledge questionnaire will answer the third research question asking whether the public holds 
common “myths” about elite deviance like it does regarding street crime. More precisely, 
statistically significant variation in the answers will indicate that knowledge about these issues is 
normally distributed among the American people. However, if the distribution is skewed toward 
incorrect answers, it could be that a majority of respondents share certain misconceptions about 
white-collar crime. Once again, the term “myth” refers to more than a simple assumption and 
involves a certain amount of confidence that a particular belief is true. As previously mentioned, 
white-collar crime “myths” will be operationalized as every knowledge item that subjects 
answered incorrectly while feeling confident that they were right. Descriptive statistics will be 
used to determine which dimensions of the knowledge questionnaire seem to be popular “myths” 
about elite deviance. 
The fourth research question as to whether public information about elite deviance has 
specific sociodemographic correlates will be answered via simple bivariate zero-order 
correlations between the objective knowledge variable and the abovementioned 
sociodemographic characteristics including gender, age, race/ethnicity, education level, 
employment status, household income, area of residence, region where the subjects grew up, 
political ideology, religious affiliation, source of information, and attribution style (i.e., 
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dispositional [attributing guilt to the offender] or situational [attributing guilt to external 
factors]).  
            Finally, the fifth research question as to whether knowledge about white-collar crime is 
correlated with attitudes towards elite deviance will be answered by correlating objective 
knowledge with several measures of opinion: 1) Perceived seriousness of financially costly and 
harmful white-collar crimes, as well as violent and property street crimes, and 2) respondents’ 
punitiveness. Punitive scales include choice of prosecutorial process (i.e., by some non-legal 
means, in a non-criminal court, or in a criminal court) for the perpetrators, choice of punishment 
(i.e., fine, monetary compensation, or prison), and punishment severity (i.e., amounts in dollars 
for the monetary sanctions and number of years in prison).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of statistical analyses and provides answers to each of 
the five research questions. As previously mentioned, those questions include (1) the extent of 
public knowledge about elite deviance, (2) whether a gap exists between subjective (perceived) 
and objective (actual) knowledge, (3) the existence of popular “myths” about elite deviance, (4) 
the correlates of knowledge about white-collar crime, and (5) whether such knowledge is 
correlated with attitudes towards elite deviance. Such attitudes comprise (a) participants’ 
perceived seriousness of financially costly and harmful white-collar crimes as well as property 
and violent street crimes, and (b) respondents’ punitiveness, including choice of prosecutorial 
process and punishment (i.e., monetary compensation, fine, and/or prison sentence), and 
punishment severity.  
Public Knowledge about Elite Deviance 
Subjective vs. Objective Knowledge 
The first two research questions pertain to the extent of lay knowledge about white-collar 
crime. In other words, how much does the American public really know about elite deviance? 
Further, is there a gap between participants’ perceived and actual knowledge? To answer these 
questions, participants were first asked to self-assess their level of familiarity with the topic. 
Subsequently, a measure of actual knowledge about white-collar crime was provided via a 10-
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item multiple-choice and true/false questionnaire, which then served as a 100-point 
knowledge scale. Again, the following grading policy was used: 90-100 = “Very informed”, 
80-90 = “Informed”, 70-80 = “Somewhat informed”, and below 70 = “Not informed”. As is 
evident in Table 2 (which compares percent subjective and objective knowledge about white-
collar crime), respondents tended to overestimate their actual level of information about elite 
deviance. While 75.5% were found to be “not very informed” about the subject, only 12.5% 
clearly admitted lacking knowledge in this area. Further, whereas 73.5% estimated being 
“somewhat informed”, a mere 14.7% objectively deserves to be referred to as such. It should 
be noted, however, that a mere 14% estimated being either “informed” or “very informed”. 
These findings suggest that although participants overestimated their true level of knowledge 
about white-collar crime, they did not feel confident enough to rate their knowledge of elite 
deviance highly.  
Table 3 provides a more in-depth report of participants’ objective knowledge about 
white-collar crime by presenting the percentage of subjects with scores on the overall 
knowledge scale. Recall that based on the classification that was adopted in this study, a 
score of at least 70% (i.e., 7 correct answers) was necessary to be deemed “somewhat 
informed”. Only about one fourth of the sample scored above that cut-off point. Further, only 
7.4% answered enough questions correctly to be considered “informed” and a mere 2.4% 
were found to be “very informed” about elite deviance. Since respondents were found to be, 
at best, superficially informed about white-collar crime, understanding their primary source 
of information seemed warranted. Eighty-one point one percent cited the Internet as their 
medium of choice for keeping informed of important issues, far above television news 
stations (15%) and other traditional forms of media. However, when asked whether they had 
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been previously exposed to relevant information about white-collar crime, only 3.2% 
mentioned the Web as their prior source of knowledge. Instead, 38.5% reported having 
received some form of information about the subject by watching television news reports, 
12% by reading newspaper articles, 10.3% by watching documentaries, 9.3% by watching 
movie/TV series, and only 6.6% by taking a college course. Further, 18.1% admitted having 
never received any form of information about white-collar crime.  
As previously mentioned, white-collar crime is generally underreported by the news 
media compared with street crime (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 
1991; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & 
Hammond, 2000). Admittedly, so little time allotted to the coverage of elite deviance may 
not suffice to thoroughly educate television audiences about this multi-faceted social issue. 
Since a majority of participants rely on TV news reports as their main source of information 
about white-collar crime, their apparent lack of knowledge about the topic is therefore not at 
all surprising. What remains to be seen is whether subjects were more informed about certain 
aspects of elite deviance than others, and whether their level of confidence in their answers to 
questions tapping those specific dimensions matched their degree of knowledge.  
Recall that this study’s conceptualization of knowledge relies on a fourfold 
classification based on the intersections of answer correctness and confidence: (1) “Truth” 
accepters (i.e., answered questions both correctly and confidently), (2) lucky guessers (i.e., 
answered questions correctly but not confidently), (3) “myth” adherers (i.e., answered 
questions incorrectly but confidently), and (4) honestly uninformed (i.e., answered questions 
incorrectly and without confidence). Table 4 presents the percentage of subjects falling in 
each of these four categories along with the mean score on the overall knowledge scale, and 
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percent correct, percent incorrect and percent confident on the ten items that comprise it. The 
following is a description of these data. 
Percent Correct 
The second column in Table 4 presents the mean score on the overall knowledge 
scale and the percent correct on the ten items that comprise it. With an average overall score 
of 54.9 out of 100, the sample in this study was far from reaching the cut-off point of 70 
meant to represent “somewhat informed” subjects. Nevertheless, it appears that participants’ 
level of knowledge varied greatly depending on which aspects of the topic they were 
addressing. For example, a large proportion (89.2%) of respondents correctly indicated that 
the term “white-collar crime” is based on the occupation of the perpetrators. However, only 
23.8% answered that street crime costs significantly less to the American public than does 
white-collar crime. Interestingly, very few (3.2%) estimated that statistically, street crimes 
like assaults, murders, and muggings are significantly less likely to injure or kill people than 
is white-collar crime. Further, only a third (32.8%) indicated that someone who commits a 
street crime like burglary and steals $1,000 is significantly more likely to be convicted than 
someone who commits a white-collar crime like fraud and steals the exact same amount of 
money.  
Moreover, while a large percentage (75.5%) deemed the description of the Ford Pinto 
case accurate, only 38.2% seemed to agree that more people in the U.S. die each year from 
medical malpractice than from criminal homicide. In addition, although less than a third 
(30.9%) correctly indicated that the statement pertaining to human trafficking was false, 
66.7% got the toxic dumping question right. Lastly, an overwhelming majority of 
respondents correctly answered those questions that tapped the dimensions of state-corporate 
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crime (91.2%) and toxic emissions (97.1%). Though necessary, participants’ correct 
responses are nonetheless not sufficient to provide evidence of knowledge about white-collar 
crime. Only by comparing subjects’ answers to how confident they felt about them can we 
(1) provide a valid indicator of knowledge (Hunt, 2003) and (2) determine which of the four 
abovementioned categories to which subjects belong (i.e., “truth” accepters, lucky guessers, 
“myth” adherers, and honestly uninformed).  
Percent Confident              
The fourth column in Table 4 presents participants’ percent confident in their answers 
to the knowledge scale. Interestingly, subjects were not very confident about their choices, 
even when they did respond correctly. Recall that the average overall score on the knowledge 
scale was 54.9. Comparatively, the average overall level of confidence was only 49.9. A 
closer look at each individual item reveals further gaps. While 89.2% of the sample correctly 
answered the question pertaining to the meaning of the term “white-collar crime,” fewer 
subjects (71.8%) felt confident about their choice. Similarly, subjects evinced little 
confidence in their answer to the item that tapped reckless disregard (30.1%) compared to the 
75.5% who chose the right answer. A similar finding is echoed in the question about medical 
crime. More specifically, while 38.2% picked the correct answer, only 25.7% felt confident 
about their choice. 
Moreover, compared to the 91.2% who correctly indicated as true the statement that 
private American military companies have been accused of engaging in a number of human 
rights violations, only 61.2% were confident in their answer. Likewise, while 66.7% 
correctly answered the question that asked whether landfills and toxic waste disposal sites are 
more likely to be located near African American communities, only 39.2% were confident 
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about their choice. Further, while almost three fourth of the sample (74.8%) were confident 
in their answer to the question that asked whether toxic emissions could be reduced much 
more if industries agreed to employ appropriate technologies, a much larger percentage 
(97.1%) answered that question correctly. 
Nevertheless, a reverse gap between answer correctness and confidence could be 
observed in regard to four items. More precisely, whereas only 23.8% seemed to agree that 
white-collar crime is significantly more financially costly to society than is street crime, a 
somewhat larger percentage (27.7%) felt confident in their answer. A similar gap emerged 
with the item that tapped the legal immunity of white-collar offenders compared to street 
criminals. More precisely, while a mere 32.8% found the right answer, 58.5% were positive 
about their choice. Likewise, while 43.4% were certain that they answered the item that 
tapped human trafficking correctly, only 30.9% actually did. The greatest gap that could be 
observed had to do with the item tapping the harmfulness of elite deviance. Whereas very 
few (3.2%) subjects correctly indicated that white-collar crime claims more lives annually 
than does street crime, 66.2% of the sample were certain that they chose the correct answer. 
This outstanding discrepancy suggests that participants in this study had difficulty ascribing 
the concept of physical harm to crimes of the powerful.  
Two important findings emerge from this analysis. First, as far as knowledge is 
concerned, participants seemed more informed about certain dimensions of white-collar 
crime than they are about others. More specifically, a majority of respondents were familiar 
with the term “white-collar crime” and its actual meaning. Further, subjects were found to be 
quite knowledgeable about some of the harmful activities that some corporations undertake 
(e.g., reckless disregard for customers’ safety, human rights violations in occupied countries, 
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and reluctance to implement pollution-reducing policies). Nevertheless, respondents were 
less likely to acknowledge the overwhelming physical harmfulness of white-collar crime 
compared to street crime, and tended - albeit to a lesser degree - to underestimate the 
former’s considerable financial burden on society. Similarly, respondents were reluctant to 
recognize the fact that medical crime claims more lives every year than do criminal 
homicides, or to realize that white-collar offenders are statistically more likely than street 
criminals to avoid criminal prosecutions.  
Second, except for a few items (tapping the harmfulness of elite deviance, the relative 
legal immunity of white-collar offenders, human trafficking in developed nations and - to a 
lesser degree - the financial cost of white-collar crime), the percentage of questions answered 
confidently was systematically lower than that of correct answers. This finding suggests that 
respondents may not be familiar enough with the subject and might have chosen the right 
answers by chance alone. The next step is thus to determine the percentage of participants 
who qualify as “truth” accepters rather than lucky guessers. 
“Truth” Accepters vs. Lucky Guessers 
Columns 5 and 6 in Table 4 present the percentage of “truth” accepters and lucky 
guessers, respectively. Once again, while this classification refers to subjects who answered 
correctly, the main difference between these two categories lies in how confident participants 
felt about their answers. Phrased differently, whereas “truth” accepters responded both 
correctly and confidently, lucky guessers did not evince such confidence and may have 
picked the right answers by chance alone. First of all, the overall percentage of “truth” 
adherers (32.8%) is larger than that of lucky guessers (22.1%). That is, the proportion of 
subjects who answered correctly while feeling confident about their choice was generally 
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greater than that of participants who chose the right answers as a result of a guess. Such gap 
is particularly noticeable in regard to the items tapping the meaning of the term “white-collar 
crime” (66.9% of “truth” adherers vs. 22.3% of lucky guessers), legal immunity (27.2% vs. 
5.6%, respectively), state corporate crime (60.3% vs. 30.9%), and toxic emissions (73.8% vs. 
23.3%).  
However, the gap is reversed with the items tapping reckless disregard (27.5% of 
“truth” accepters vs. 48% of lucky guessers), medical crime (13.2% vs. 25%), human 
trafficking (11% vs. 19.9%), and toxic dumping (31.4% vs. 35.3%). That is, for these items, 
it appears that luck more than actual knowledge can explain correct answers. Discrepancies 
are nevertheless far less visible with the items that tapped the financial cost (13.7% vs. 
10.1%) and harmfulness (2.7% vs. 0.5%) of elite deviance. Recall that participants scored 
particularly poorly on the question pertaining to the greater physical harmfulness of elite 
deviance compared to street crime (only 3.2% answered it correctly). However, 66.2% were 
confident about their answer, a finding consistent with the “myth” adherence taxon used in 
this study. The next step is therefore to distinguish “myth” adherers from those subjects who 
were honestly uninformed.  
“Myth” Adherers vs. Honestly Uninformed Subjects 
 The third research question asks whether the American public adheres to “myths” 
about white-collar crime as it does with street crime. Again, “myth” adherence in this study 
is operationalized as an incorrect answer held with confidence. Columns 7 and 8 of Table 4 
present the percentage of “myth” adherers and honestly uninformed subjects, respectively. 
The overall proportion of respondents who gave incorrect answers without feeling confident 
about their choice (28.6%) was greater than that of respondents who adhered to “myths” 
	  	  	  
	  
65 
(16.5%). Such gap was larger for those items that tapped the financial cost of white-collar 
crime (62.2% vs. 14%), legal immunity (42% vs. 25.2%), reckless disregard (21.8% vs. 
2.7%), medical crime (49.3% vs. 12.5%), and toxic dumping (25.5% vs. 7.8%), and smaller 
in regard to state corporate crime (7.8% vs. 1%), the meaning of the term “white-collar 
crime” (5.9% vs. 4.9%), human trafficking (36.7% vs. 32.4%), and toxic emissions (1.9% vs. 
1%). However, the gap was reversed with the item that tapped the harmfulness of elite 
deviance; more specifically, the percentage of subjects who gave a wrong answer while 
stubbornly sticking to their positions was almost double that of participants who answered 
incorrectly yet with no confidence (63.5% vs. 33.3%, respectively). 
It therefore appears that the crux of the concept of “myths” about white-collar crime 
lies within the dimensions of harmfulness, human trafficking, and legal immunity. One may 
already discern two interesting patterns from these findings. First, an important number of 
subjects seem to share a deeply rooted notion that elite deviance represents more of a 
financial threat to society than a physical one. Second, some answers suggest trust in the 
institutions of the American criminal justice system belied by subjects’ reluctance to admit 
that U.S. corporations, though believed to engage in unethical acts abroad, can do the same in 
the United States with relative impunity. These conjectures will be more thoroughly 
discussed in chapter six. 
Conclusion 
In summation, it appears that participants in this study may not be sufficiently 
knowledgeable about elite deviance. On average they scored well below the cut-off point 
meant to represent “somewhat informed” respondents. Further, the gap between correct 
answers and actual “truths” about white-collar crime suggests a lack of confidence among 
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participants in their knowledge about the subject. In fact, while they overestimated their 
actual level of information about elite deviance, few of them considered themselves very 
informed, and almost one fifth of the sample confessed to having never received any kind of 
information about it. Lastly, the existence of popular “myths” about white-collar crime is 
seemingly supported by respondents’ reluctance to acknowledge the greater harmfulness of 
elite deviance over street crime and - to a certain extent - that specific white-collar offenses 
believed to be more common in underdeveloped nations can be committed in America with 
little to no legal repercussion. Now that a measure of public knowledge about white-collar 
crime has been established, determining its correlates seems warranted as it is uncertain 
which specific demographic variables may be associated with either the acceptance of 
“truths” or the adherence to “myths” regarding elite deviance.  
Correlates of Knowledge about Elite Deviance 
The fourth research question asks what are the correlates of knowledge about white-
collar crime. Table 5 presents the results of one-way between subjects ANOVAs in the effect 
of sociodemographic predictors of knowledge about white-collar crime, “truth” acceptance 
and “myth” adherence. F-tests and effect sizes (eta squared) are reported. Analysis of 
variance showed significant differences in knowledge about elite deviance in regard to the 
region where subjects grew up [F (4, 403) = 2.44, p < .05, η2  = .024], their level of education 
[F (6, 401) = 4.48, p < .000, η2  = .06], their political ideology [F (5, 402) = 2.87, p < .05, η2  
= .03], their religious affiliation [F (7, 400) = 2.57, p < .05, η2  = .03], as well as attribution of 
blame to choice [F (3, 404) = 2.99, p < .05, η2  = .02] and to outward influences [F (3, 404) = 
5.84, p < .001, η2  = .04]. However, the eta squared statistics indicated small to moderate 
effect sizes.  
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Post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s test failed to find any statistically significant 
mean group differences for the region where subjects grew up and attribution of blame to 
choice. Subjects who held an advanced degree (M = 6.27, SD = 1.46) were found to be more 
knowledgeable about white-collar crime than those who only completed high school (M = 
4.96, SD = 1.37), one or more years of technical, vocational, or trade school (M = 4.67, SD = 
1.61), and some college (M = 5.44, SD = 1.52). Further, participants who identified as “very 
liberal” (M = 6.02, SD = 1.57) were statistically more knowledgeable about elite deviance 
than were “somewhat conservative” subjects (M = 5.12, SD = 1.47). In addition, Protestant 
respondents (M = 5.17, SD = 1.56) were less knowledgeable about white-collar crime 
compared to subjects who reported belonging to no religion (M = 5.73, SD = 1.54). Lastly, 
those who strongly agreed that white-collar crime is mainly the result of business 
environmental influences (M = 5.96, SD = 1.52) were more knowledgeable than subjects who 
somewhat agreed (M = 5.38, SD = 1.54), somewhat disagreed (M = 5.34, SD = 1.45) and 
strongly disagreed (M = 4.87, SD = 1.52).  
With respect to “truth” acceptance, significant differences were found as far as 
subjects’ level of education [F (6, 401) = 3.47, p < .01, η2  = .05], political views [F (5, 402) 
= 4.16, p < .001, η2  = .05], political affiliation [F (5, 402) = 2.91, p < .05, η2  = .03], as well 
as attribution of blame to low self-control [F (3, 404) = 4.33, p < .01, η2  = .01] and to 
outward influences [F (3, 404) = 5.24, p < .001, η2  = .04]. However, it should be noted that 
eta squared statistics once again indicated only small to medium effect sizes. Tukey post hoc 
comparisons showed that subjects with an advanced degree (e.g., master’s, Ph.D., M.D., J.D., 
etc.) were more likely to accept “truths” about elite deviance (M = 3.81, SD = 1.99) than 
were those who only completed high school (M = 2.64, SD = 1.77) and one or more years of 
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technical, vocational, or trade school (M = 3.58, SD = 1.68).  
Moreover, participants who identified as “very liberal” were more likely to be “truth” 
accepters (M = 4.33, SD = 1.85) than were all other subjects. Further, Republicans were less 
likely to accept “truths” (M = 2.75, SD = 1.67) compared with Independents (M = 3.75, SD = 
1.92). In addition, those who somewhat disagreed with the notion that white-collar crime 
results from low self-control were less likely to be “truth” accepters (M = 2.86, SD = 1.62) 
than were those who strongly disagreed (M = 3.56, SD = 1.95) and somewhat agreed (M = 
3.58, SD = 1.97). Lastly, those who strongly agreed that elite deviance is a consequence of 
negative business environment influences were more likely to accept “truths” (M = 3.87, SD 
= 1.92) compared to those who somewhat disagreed (M = 3.03, SD = 1.83) and somewhat 
agreed (M = 3.08, SD = 1.75). 
In regard to “myth” adherence, significant group differences were found for race [F 
(6, 401) = 3.24, p < .01, η2  = .05], but post hoc comparisons could not be performed due to 
one category (“Native Hawaiian or pacific Islander”) having less than two cases. An 
independent sample t test using the dichotomized variable “White” showed a significant 
difference, t (406) = -2.65, p < .01, with white subjects (M = 1.56, SD = .1.28) being less 
likely than their non-white counterparts (M = 2.00, SD = .165) to adhere to “myths” about 
elite deviance. However, Cohen’s effect size (d = .30) suggested modest practical 
significance. Similar differences emerged in regard to the region where subjects grew up [F 
(4, 403) = 2.93, p < .05, η2  = .03]. More specifically, “myth” adherence was higher among 
subjects who grew up in northern states (M = 2.06, SD = 1.43) than among those who grew 
up in the Midwest (M = 1.25, SD = .98).  Although small but significant differences emerged 
for income [F (9, 398) = 2.41, p < .05, η2  = .05], post hoc comparisons using Tukey’s test 
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failed to find any mean group differences. 
Significant differences emerged in regard to the type of information source that 
subjects used [F (6, 401) = 2.63, p < .05, η2  = .04]. Once again, post hoc comparisons could 
not be completed due to several groups having less than two cases. An independent samples t 
test using the dichotomized variable “Internet” yielded a significant difference, t (406) = -
3.15, p < .01, with web users (M = 1.55, SD = 1.29) being less likely to adhere to “myths” 
about elite deviance than are those who relied on traditional media (M = 2.09, SD = 1.63). 
Cohen’s effect size (d = .37) suggested moderate practical significance. Further differences 
emerged for attribution of blame to outward influences [F (3, 404) = 4.39, p < .01, η2  = .03]. 
More precisely, subjects who strongly disagreed that the commission of elite deviance is 
encouraged by white-collar offenders’ business environment (M = 2.49, SD = 1.70) were 
more likely to be “myth” adherers than all other subjects.   
Finally, small but significant mean group differences could be observed for 
attribution of blame to pressure to succeed [F (3, 404) = 2.68, p < .05, η2  = .02]. More 
specifically, those who strongly disagreed that white-collar offenders are coerced by their 
superiors to reach business goals (M = 2.53, SD = 1.77) were more likely than all other 
participants to adhere to “myths”. Taken together, these results suggest small yet statistically 
significant differences in knowledge about white-collar crime as well as in the acceptance of 
“truths” and adherence to “myths” about elite deviance. As such, they warrant further 
investigation. 
Table 6 presents zero-order correlations between sociodemographic characteristics, 
knowledge about elite deviance, “truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence. Correlation 
coefficients reported are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous predictors and Spearman’s rho 
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when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. Importantly, it should be noted 
that the majority of the correlations failed to attain statistical significance. Further, significant 
associations tended to be weak (i.e., less than +/- 0.20). Although no difference was found for 
gender in terms of overall knowledge about white-collar crime, statistically significant 
differences emerged for “truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence. More specifically, men 
were not only more likely to accept “truths” (r = .127) but also to adhere to “myths” (r = 
.160). Recall that “truths” and “myths” were operationalized as subjects’ confidence in 
correct or incorrect answers, respectively. It therefore appears that males were more 
confident in their response choices than were their female counterparts who showed more 
reservation. These findings are concordant with previous research suggesting that women 
tend to express less confidence in their self-assessments (Clark & Zehr, 1993; Smith, 
Morrison, & Wolf, 1994), whereas men evince greater belief in their scholarly abilities (Sax 
& Harper, 2007). As for race, Whites were more knowledgeable (r = .154) and less likely to 
adhere to “myths” (r = -.131) while Blacks (r = .114) were more likely to adhere to them. 
Further, Hispanics were less likely to accept “truths” than non-Hispanics (r = -.110). 
Moreover, education was positively correlated with knowledge (r = .219) and “truth” 
acceptance (r = .175).  
Statistically significant relationships were also found for political ideology. Recall 
that measures of political views and affiliation were included as potential correlates of 
knowledge about white-collar crime due to the fact that right-wing politics tends to support 
elements of neoliberal economics such as market deregulation, which has been shown to 
facilitate the commission of certain white-collar crimes (see, e.g., Lynch & Michalowski, 
2006; Rosoff, Pontell & Tillman, 2010). In turn, such attitudes may lead conservatives to 
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discard information that equates corporations with street criminals. As expected, more 
politically conservative subjects and Republicans were less knowledgeable about white-
collar crime (r = - .158 and 113, respectively) and less likely to accept “truths” (r = -.142 and 
-.129, respectively). Results for conservative Protestants mirror those findings. More 
specifically, they were also less knowledgeable (r = -.142) and less likely to admit “truths” 
about elite deviance (r = .142). In fact, subjects who reported not having any religion were 
more knowledgeable (r = .140) and more likely to accept “truths” (r = .118). 
Perhaps more interestingly, those who selected the Internet as their main source of 
information relative to other traditional media were less likely to adhere to “myths” (r = -
.155). Such finding suggests that the Web represents a formidable educational platform, at 
least for active Internet users.  From social networks to non-profit organizations disclosing 
classified information (e.g., WikiLeaks), websites may provide their users with a wider 
variety of sensitive topics than do official news media, which are usually owned by 
corporations and sometimes serve a specific political agenda.  
The results are more ambiguous in regard to attribution of blame. While those 
subjects who believed that white-collar crime is the result of low moral standards were both 
more knowledgeable (r = .140) and more likely to accept “truths” about elite deviance (r = 
.118), similar findings were found among those participants prone to believe white-collar 
offenders are otherwise law-abiding citizens who see no wrong in their actions (r = .182 and 
.151, respectively). Similarly, respondents who agreed that pressure to succeed causes elite 
deviance (i.e., a situational attribution style) were also found to be more knowledgeable 
about the topic (r = .119).  
In summation, despite very weak correlation coefficients no greater than +/- 0.20 and 
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most failing to attain statistical significance, it appears that respondents’ gender, 
race/ethnicity, income, education, political ideology, religious affiliation, source of 
information, and attribution style were associated with their level of general knowledge about 
white-collar crime, as well as their “truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence. Having 
established generally what participants know about elite deviance, what remains to be seen is 
how they feel about it. In other words, what are respondents’ attitudes and opinions about 
white-collar offenses and their perpetrators? How serious do they perceive those acts to be 
relative to street crime? Moreover, what do they believe is the appropriate societal response 
(i.e., how should society punish such offenders)? Further, do the same sociodemographic 
variables predict both knowledge and sentiments about white-collar crime? Lastly, are there 
any associations between subjects’ knowledge, “truth” acceptance, and “myth” adherence, 
and their perceived seriousness of and punitiveness about elite deviance?  
Opinions about Elite Deviance 
Perceived Seriousness  
The fifth and last research question asks whether knowledge about white-collar crime 
is correlated with attitudes towards elite deviance. In order to answer this question, one must 
first identify such sentiments. An important attitude about white-collar crime is respondents’ 
perceived seriousness of such activities. The third National Public Survey on White-Collar 
Crime (Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010) features a valid measure of perceived seriousness of 
elite deviance and street crime. Its results are used in the present study for comparative 
purposes. Table 7 presents mean crime seriousness scores for white-collar and street crime 
compared with motor vehicle theft in the National White-Collar Crime Center Survey and the 
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present study6. Several findings are noteworthy. First of all, perceived seriousness was lower 
in this dissertation’s sample than among the participants of the National White-Collar Crime 
Center’s survey (M = 3.9 and 4.2, respectively). That is, with the exception of espionage (M 
= 4.8), subjects in the present study rated all scenarios as less serious than did those in the 
Huff and colleagues’ sample.   
The largest discrepancy between both samples was observed with the scenario 
describing a hacker who infects computers with spam (mean difference = 1.2). Subjects in 
the National Public Survey on White-Collar Crime: (1) only rated counterfeit sales (M = 2.9) 
as equally serious as motor vehicle theft, (2) rated burglary (M = 3.7), invoice charges (M = 
3.8), and hacking (M = 3.9) as somewhat more serious, and (3) considered embezzlement (M 
= 4.1), identity theft (M = 4.3), robbery (M = 4), false drub label (M = 4.8), espionage (M = 
4.8), market rigging (M = 4.3) and insurance overcharge (M = 4.4) as much more serious. 
Conversely, in the present study, participants: (1) considered both hacking (M = 2.7) and 
counterfeit sales (M = 2.3) less serious offenses than stealing a parked car worth $10,000, (2) 
considered that burglary (M = 3.2), embezzlement (M = 3.7), identify theft (M = 3.9), invoice 
charges (M = 3.5), robbery (M = 3.6), and insurance overcharge (M = 3.7) were only 
somewhat more serious, and (3) recognized only false drug labeling (M = 4.7), espionage (M 
= 4.8), and market rigging (M = 4.2) as much more serious issues. 
Despite their relatively lenient rating of crime seriousness, it is important to note that 
subjects in the present study deemed false drug labeling, espionage, and market rigging as 
more serious offenses than a violent crime such as robbery that resulted in victims’ 
hospitalization. Such attitudes might be a corollary to the acceptance of “truths” about elite 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Tests of statistical difference between the two samples could not be run due to the NW3C’s survey not 
reporting standard deviations.	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deviance. Recall that “truth” accepters were more likely to accept information relative to 
state-corporate crime and the kind of unethical activities some large, powerful firms are 
alleged to engage in (e.g., environmental pollution, violating human rights in invaded 
countries, etc.). In fact, hostility toward organizational and high-status rather than individual 
and non-status offenders in this study’s sample mirrors the National White-Collar Crime 
Center’s findings. That is, in both samples, scenarios that described the unlawful activities of 
corporations or high-status offenders (i.e., false drug label, market rigging, espionage, etc.) 
were rated more negatively than those that depicted relatively powerless individuals (i.e., 
hacking, counterfeit sales, etc.). In summation, it can be said that, despite being less critical 
of crime in general (a finding to be discussed in chapter six), subjects in this dissertation 
rated various instances of white-collar crime more negatively than they did street crime. 
How do such attitudes hold when comparing white-collar crimes with more harmful 
street crimes? Table 8 presents the results of paired samples t-tests to compare mean 
perceived seriousness of scenarios describing both physically injurious white-collar crimes 
(i.e., knowingly manufacturing a potentially dangerous toy, releasing deadly pollutants in a 
river, and knowingly exposing workers to asbestos) and violent street crimes (i.e., murder 
and forcible rape). All scenarios have a mean above 3.00, which is the score meant to 
represent “serious” offenses. As could be expected, homicide (M = 3.91, SD = 0.36) and 
forcible rape (M = 3.94, SD = 0.24) were perceived to be more serious than the white-collar 
crimes described. More precisely, the mean for the murder scenario was statistically higher 
than those for the defective toy vignette (t = 12.10, p < .01, d = 0.60), the deadly pollutants 
scenario (t = 11.50, p < .01, d = 0.57), and the asbestos exposure scenario (t = 6.68, p < .01, d 
= 0.33). Similarly, rape was statistically perceived as more serious than consumer safety 
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violation (t = 13.12, p < .01, d = 0.65), toxic dumping (t = 12.89, p < .01, d = 0.64), and 
reckless endangerment of employees (t = 8.13, p < .01, d = 0.40). In all cases, Cohen’s effect 
sizes suggested small to moderate practical significance. Conversely, the means for the two 
street crime scenarios were the only ones to not statistically differ from one another.  
Of the three harmful white-collar crime scenarios, the one describing the deliberate 
manufacturing of a defective toy (M = 3.43, SD = 0.76) was considered less serious than the 
toxic dumping scenario (M = 3.51, SD = 0.64, t = -1.98, p < .05, d = -0.10) and the asbestos 
exposure scenario (M = 3.72, SD = 0.52, t = -7.76, p < .01, d = -0.38). However, Cohen’s 
effect sizes were this time smaller. Similarly, releasing deadly pollutants was considered less 
serious than the reckless endangerment of employees (t = -7.07, p < .01, d = -0.35). This 
should come as no surprise since the defective toy scenario only alluded to a potential risk 
whereas the toxic dumping vignette referred to people falling “seriously ill”, and the words 
“cancer” and “deaths” were mentioned in the asbestos exposure scenario. Perhaps a clearer 
mention of harm resulting from consumer safety violation might have invited higher 
perceived seriousness.  
Still, the forcible rape scenario was judged more negatively than all three examples of 
white-collar crime, including the asbestos exposure vignette in which employees die from a 
lethal disease contracted in the workplace. This is surprising since, despite the violent nature 
of sexual assault, no mention of death was made. It is possible that contextual details 
influenced respondents’ attitudes. The rape victim was assaulted in her own bedroom, which 
might have made the crime appear even more frightening. Because delayed victimization is a 
common characteristic of white-collar crime (e.g., work-related diseases may take years 
before being diagnosed and attributed to one’s professional activity), elite deviance may not 
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elicit the same amount of shock and fear, which might in turn explain this study sample’s 
lower level of perceived seriousness of such offenses. It is not certain, however, whether 
similar differences exist in punitiveness. 
Punitiveness  
The second attitude about elite deviance measured was subjects’ level of punitiveness 
for the abovementioned harmful white-collar offenses compared with the two violent street 
crimes. Measures of punitiveness included (a) choice of prosecution process (i.e., by some 
non-legal means, in a non-criminal court, or in a criminal court), (b) punishment for their 
perpetrators (i.e., fine, monetary compensation, and/or prison) and (c) sentence severity (i.e., 
in dollar amounts and/or number of years in prison). Table 9 presents the results of paired 
samples t-tests to compare subjects’ choice of prosecutorial process for white-collar crime 
and street crime. First of all, no subject chose the non-legal means alternative for any of the 
five scenarios. Conversely, homicide was the only scenario for which every participant 
recommended the perpetrator be tried in a criminal court (M = 3.00, SD = 0.00).  
In fact, the murder scenario was the only one to be statistically different from all other 
instances of crime described, including white-collar offenses such as consumer safety 
violation (M = 2.74, SD = 0.47, t = -11.13, p < .01, d = 0.55), toxic dumping (M = 2.70, SD = 
0.51, t = 11.90, p < .01, d = 0.59), and asbestos exposure  (M = 2.71, SD = 0.50, t = 11.75, p 
< .01, d = 0.58), but also - although to a lesser degree - forcible rape (M = 2.99, SD = 0.99, t 
= 2.01, p < .05, d = 0.10). Further, subjects were statistically more likely to recommend a 
harsher prosecution process for the rapist than they were for white-collar offenders in the toy 
scenario (t = 10.37, p < .01, d = 0.51), the deadly pollutants scenario (t = 11.39, p < .01, d = 
0.56), and the asbestos exposure scenario (t = 11.34, p < .01, d = 0.56). Nevertheless, there 
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was no statistical difference between subjects’ choice of prosecutorial process for these three 
white-collar crimes. It therefore appears that relative consensus emerged in this study’s 
sample regarding the best way to try white-collar and street offenders. That is, participants 
were more inclined to select a non-criminal court for the perpetrators of offenses they 
perceived to be less serious than murder and forcible rape. 
Similar differences emerged when asking subjects how much, if any, of a fine should 
be imposed to the offenders in each scenario. Table 10 presents the results of paired samples 
t-tests to compare subjects’ choice of fine amount for white-collar crime and street crime. 
Once again, murder (M = 2.25, SD = 1.75) and rape (M = 0.35, SD = 0.96) did not 
statistically differ from one another. While means for both street crimes are well under 1.00 - 
i.e., the score meant to represent a fine under $100,000 - white-collar offenses such as selling 
customers a hazardous product (M = 1.83, SD = 1.72), dumping toxic waste above the legal 
limit (M = 2.25, SD = 1.75), or being negligent in implementing proper safety measures in 
the workplace and denying risk and peril (MD  = 1.78, SD = 1.82) elicited average fine 
amounts ranging between $100,000 and $499,000. Large and statistically significant 
differences were found between the murder scenario and those that described the defective 
toy (t = -16.99, p < .01, d = -0.84), deadly pollutants (t = -21.51, p < .01, d = -1.06), and 
asbestos exposure (t = -15.77, p < .01, d = -0.78). 
Similar differences were found between rape and consumer safety violation (t = -
17.44, p < .01, d = -0.86), toxic dumping (t = -21.68, p < .01, d = -1.07), and the reckless 
endangerment of employees (t = -16.99, p < .01, d = -0.84). While the defective toy scenario 
slightly differed from the deadly pollutants one (t = -5.21, p < .01, d = -0.26), it was not 
statistically different from the asbestos vignette. Conversely, the work-related disease 
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scenario elicited a smaller fine amount compared with the toxic dumping scenario (t = -5.53, 
p < .01, d = -0.27). In short, it seems subjects were more inclined to choose a higher fine 
amount against white-collar offenders (particularly the company responsible for polluting 
over the legal limit) than they were against the murderer and rapist. 
 Slightly similar findings emerged when asking subjects how much, if any, of a 
monetary compensation should be granted to the victims and their families. Table 11 presents 
the results of paired samples t-tests to compare subjects’ choice of compensation amount for 
white-collar crime and street crime. As was the case with fine, a majority of respondents did 
not consider such form of punishment adequate when dealing with offenders described in the 
murder and forcible rape scenarios. More specifically, the means for homicide (M = 0.97, SD 
= 1.52) and rape (M = 0.77, SD = 1.30) did not even reach the cut-off point of 1.00 that 
indicates the first range of amount (i.e., anything under $100,000).   
While means for both street crimes only slightly differed from one another (t = 3.90, 
p < .01, d = 0.19), larger statistical differences emerged between those offenses and all three 
instances of elite deviance. Subjects were less inclined to recommend monetary 
compensation in the homicide scenario than they were in the defective toy scenario (t = -
7.00, p < .01, d = -0.35), the deadly pollutants scenario (t = -9.72, p < .01, d = -0.48), and the 
asbestos exposure vignette (t = -15.73, p < .01, d = -0.78). Similarly, participants were less 
prone to support a high monetary compensation amount against the rapist than they were 
against those responsible for violating consumer safety (t = -10.18, p < .01, d = -0.50), 
polluting over the legal limit (t = -13.04, p < .01, d = -0.64), and lying to their employees 
regarding the risk of contracting lethal diseases in the workplace (t = -19.16, p < .01, d = -
0.95).  
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Consensus did not emerge regarding the appropriate punishment against white-collar 
crime. More specifically, while the mean for the asbestos exposure scenario (M = 2.42, SD = 
1.54) is above the cut-off point meant to represent a monetary compensation amount ranging 
between $100,000 and $499,000, those for the defective toy scenario (M = 1.58, SD = 1.48) 
and toxic dumping (M = 1.85, SD = 1.59) are below that threshold. In fact, the mean for the 
asbestos vignette statistically differed from those for the consumer safety scenario (t = 10.71, 
p < .01, d = 0.53) and the deadly pollutants scenario (t = 7.30, p < .01, d = 0.36). Further, the 
defective toy scenario invited a slightly less monetary compensation amount than did the 
toxic dumping vignette (t = -3.35, p < .01, d = -0.17). 
In summation, whereas toxic dumping elicited higher fine amounts than did all other 
crime scenarios, respondents in this study were more inclined to recommend higher monetary 
compensation against those responsible in the asbestos exposure vignette. While supporting 
greater economic sanctions against white-collar crime than street crime seems logical, what 
remains to be seen is whether respondents were prone to punish white-collar offenders and 
street offenders with equally long prison sentences.  
Table 12 presents the results of paired samples t-tests to compare mean prison 
sentence severity for white-collar crime and street crime. In other words, does the nature of 
the crime described in each scenario (i.e., elite deviance or traditional offense) influence 
subjects’ decision regarding how much, if any, prison time the perpetrators should serve? 
Although not originally given as a response option, capital punishment is nonetheless 
included here since a few subjects were punitive enough to require a death sentence for 
murder (M = 4.68, SD = 1.63), corporate negligence and denial of risk and peril in the case of 
asbestos exposure (M = 1.35, SD = 1.79), and rape (M = 3.26, SD = 1.57).  Such 
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recommendation belies a lack of knowledge about the criminal justice system since sexual 
assault is no longer punishable by death.  
Once again, both street crimes elicited longer prison sentence lengths ranging 
between 11 and 30 years than did white-collar crimes for which the average prison sentence 
did not exceed 5 years. Compared with homicide, a majority of respondents did not perceive 
incarceration as the appropriate punishment for the offenses involving the defective toy (M = 
0.84, SD = 1.18, t = -40.20, p < .01, d = -1.99), illegal toxic dumping (M = 0.94, SD = 1.32, t 
= -38.32, p < .01, d = -1.90), and even lying about the link between unprotected asbestos 
exposure and lung cancer (t = -29.45, p < .01, d = -1.46). Further, Cohen’s effect sizes 
suggested large practical significance. 
Mean prison sentence severity was also statistically higher in the murder scenario 
than in the rape vignette (t = 16.75, p < .01, d = 0.83), although the difference is less 
pronounced than with white-collar offenses. Rape invited higher prison sentence severity 
than did consumer safety violation (t = 26.39, p < .01, d = 1.31), toxic dumping (t = 24.79, p 
< .01, d = 1.23), and the reckless endangerment of employees (t = 18.13, p < .01, d = 0.90). 
Further differences emerged between the three instances of elite deviance, with the defective 
toy scenario eliciting less prison severity than the asbestos exposure vignette (t = -5.90, p < 
.01, d = -0.29), but not statistically differing from the deadly pollutants scenario. Conversely, 
toxic dumping invited a shorter prison sentence than did the reckless endangerment of 
employees (t = -5.48, p < .01, d = -0.27).  
Conclusion 
To conclude, respondents were generally less punitive about elite deviance than they 
were regarding street crime. Phrased differently, they were more likely to perceive murder 
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and forcible rape as offenses of greater seriousness to be prosecuted in a criminal court and 
punished with longer prison terms compared with all three examples of white-collar crime. 
Such findings hold after controlling for harm intensity. For example, even the scenario that 
described a corporation failing to protect its workers from dangerous toxic contamination and 
denying its responsibility when they develop and die from fatal diseases contracted in the 
workplace met with less popular disapproval than did sexual assault, regardless of the fact 
that no mention was made of the rape victim dying.  
Further, while subjects tended to consider economic sanctions such as fine and 
monetary compensation more appropriate punishments against elite deviance, it is 
noteworthy that no scenario describing white-collar crimes generated mean financial 
penalties even close to the maximum amount range (i.e., $1,000,000 and above). Despite 
their relative lack of knowledge about the issue (and particularly in regard to corporate 
offenders’ greater legal immunity compared with street criminals), perhaps some subjects 
were already aware of the difficulty in prosecuting and punishing a firm. Companies are 
shielded by their employees whom bankruptcy and dissolution would impoverish, causing 
tremendous unpopularity for the prosecutor and judge and therefore possibly jeopardizing 
their reelection. In addition, corporations have the power and financial means to avoid 
criminal prosecution by reaching financial settlements with victims’ families. Moreover, as 
previously mentioned, corporations are monitored and more likely to be dealt with by 
administrative and regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA). Maybe those subjects more inclined to accept “truths” about 
elite deviance were also more likely to recognize these obstacles and, unenthusiastically, to 
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not recommend sanctions that they believe would be ineffective. The next logical steps are 
thus to determine (a) if the sociodemographic correlates of the attitudes under investigation 
(i.e., perceived seriousness and punitiveness) match those of knowledge, acceptance of 
“truths” and adherence to “myths” about white-collar crime, and (b) and whether such 
knowledge in turn influences public sentiments towards elite deviance. 
Sociodemographic Correlates of Perceived Seriousness  
Table 13 presents the sociodemographic correlates of perceived seriousness of the  
National White-Collar Crime Center scenarios compared with motor vehicle theft. As was 
the case for associations between these correlates and knowledge, “truth” acceptance and 
“myth” adherence, statistically significant correlation coefficients are both scarce and weak. 
Overall, men - relative to women - rated embezzlement (r = -.139), identity theft (r = -.102), 
false charges (r = -.184), counterfeit sales (r = -.104), and insurance overcharge (r = -.160) as 
less serious than motor vehicle theft, and only found market rigging (r = .105) to be a more 
serious offense. While market rigging can hypothetically affect a lot more people, it is 
surprising to note that robbery - which led to victim’s hospitalization - did not attain 
statistical significance. 
As one might expect, age was positively associated with robbery (r = .222), hacking 
(r = .192), false drug label (r = .144), espionage (r = .128), and counterfeit sales (r = .128). 
That is, older subjects were more inclined to consider these offenses to be of greater 
seriousness compared with motor vehicle theft. Few differences could be found between 
races. More specifically, while Whites deemed hacking (r = -.131) and counterfeit sales (r = -
.102) to be less serious than stealing a car, Blacks considered hacking (r = .142) to be a more 
serious offense. Such discrepancy may be explained by racial gaps in criminal involvement. 
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Whereas African Americans are disproportionately represented in the criminal justice system 
for street offenses, Whites - who enjoy greater educational and professional opportunities - 
are more likely to engage in elite deviance (Barkan, 2012). It is therefore possible that Blacks 
harbor more hostile feelings for crimes of greed (which they are statistically excluded from) 
than they are for crimes of need. 
Though still premature and requiring further investigation, the hypothesis that social 
inequalities may predict attitudinal differences in regard to perceived seriousness of elite 
deviance also finds support with the variable measuring subjects’ annual household income. 
More specifically, respondents with higher income levels only found burglary (r = .118) and 
robbery (r = .098) - i.e., the only two street crimes of the list - to be more serious than 
stealing a car. Similarly, those subjects currently employed rated burglary (r = .103) but not 
hacking (r = -.122) as being more serious than auto theft. Such choices could be due to a 
perception that, unlike their unemployed counterparts, spending most of the day away from 
home and being expectedly more affluent puts them at a higher risk of being burglarized, a 
notion that may elicit more fear than spam and viruses.     
Analogously, hacking was considered less serious than motor vehicle theft by 
members of other political parties, by subjects with no religious affiliation, and by those who 
reported the Internet as their medium of choice (r = -.112, -.115, and -.102, respectively). 
Further, those subjects who grew up in the Northeast only rated false charges (r = .101) as 
more serious than motor vehicle theft. Interestingly, more conservative respondents evinced 
lower perceptions of seriousness for the false drug label scenario (r = -.122). Similarly, 
conservative Protestants were less inclined to recognize market rigging (r = -.144) as more 
serious an offense than auto theft, unlike counterfeit sales (r = .144).  
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These findings are puzzling. Recall that the market-rigging scenario described a Wall 
Street financial firm that conspires to manipulate the precious metals market, profiting at the 
expense of other traders and owners of precious metals who are unaware of the price-fixing 
scheme. Conversely, the counterfeiting scenario described a person selling a counterfeit 
antique bracelet on an online auction site, misrepresenting its true value and making an extra 
$1,000. While no dollar amount was given for the market-rigging scheme, the resulting 
losses for traders and owners could be expected to be significantly higher than the $1,000 
made by the counterfeiter. How then can the conservative Protestants preference that deemed 
the former to be less serious and the latter more serious than motor vehicle theft be 
explained? Perhaps the historical link between Protestantism and the spirit of capitalism 
(Weber, [1905] 2002) can account for such tolerance toward the competitiveness displayed 
by the Wall Street firm compared with the sale of a fake bracelet, an offense that any petty 
street thief could engage in. Conversely, those subjects with other religions rated 
embezzlement (r = .122) as being more serious than car theft while those with no religious 
affiliation at all found hacking (r = -.115) and counterfeiting (r = -.108) to be less serious 
than the baseline scenario.  
A similar finding can be observed among those subjects who used the Internet over 
other traditional media as their primary source of information. More precisely, these subjects 
found hacking (r = -.102), counterfeit sales (r = -.137) and insurance overcharge (r = -.135) 
to be less serious than car theft. Recall that Internet users were statistically less likely to 
espouse “myths” about white-collar crime. It could be that, being aware of more serious 
cases of elite deviance (e.g., state-corporate crime, human trafficking, etc.), they found these 
white-collar offenses to pale in comparison.  
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Lastly, a number of differences in perceived seriousness of crime were observed in 
regard to attribution style. More specifically, those participants inclined to believe that such 
offenses are the result of greed were more likely to consider identity theft, false drug label, 
espionage, counterfeit sales and insurance overcharge as more serious offenses than car theft 
(r = .110, .212, .131, .124 and .124, respectively).  These results are mirrored among those 
respondents who attributed white-collar crime to bad moral character in regard to false drug 
label, espionage, market rigging and counterfeit sales (r = .177, .113, .126, and .124, 
respectively). Likewise, those more inclined to attribute elite deviance to a rational choice 
selected identity theft, false drug label, and market rigging as more serious offenses than 
motor vehicle theft (r = .098, .195 and .121, respectively).  
Those who attributed white-collar crime to business environmental influences and to a 
fiduciary responsibility to shareholders both rated embezzlement (r = .140 and .104), identity 
theft (r = .117 and .123), false charges (r = .105 and .102), false drug label (r = .104 and 
.137), market rigging (r = .220 and .129), and insurance overcharge (r = .121 and .099) as 
more serious offenses. It should be noted, however, that the latter group of subjects also rated 
robbery (r = .103) and espionage (r = .162) as being more serious than car theft. Further, 
those more inclined to attribute elite deviance to pressure to succeed selected embezzlement 
(r = .240), identity theft (r = .188), false charges (r = .239) and market rigging (r = .177) as 
more serious than car theft.  
Participants who evinced a more situational attribution style were less likely to perceive 
white-collar crime scenarios as more serious than car theft. More precisely, those more 
inclined to believe white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions were less likely to 
rate embezzlement (r = -.109) as a serious offense. However, the attribution of blame to low 
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self-control is more equivocal. More specifically, those inclined to believe white-collar 
offenders simply lack the ability to refrain from crime were less likely to rate false drug label 
(r = -.102) and espionage (r = -.128) as serious offenses compared with car theft. It is 
therefore unclear whether low self-control in this sample was deemed an aggravating or a 
mitigating factor in the commission of white-collar crime. 
In summation, despite weak coefficients, statistically significant correlations were 
observed between certain sociodemographic variables (including gender, age, race, region 
where subjects grew up, income, employment, political ideology, religious affiliation, 
information source, and attribution style) and perceived seriousness of the scenarios used in 
the National White-Collar Crime Center survey. Overall, it appears the greatest gaps might 
be due to attitudinal differences toward capitalism. That is, those subjects with higher income 
levels, religious and political beliefs favorable to free market economics, and who explained 
elite deviance as the result of external pressures in a competitive environment were less 
inclined to rate white-collar crime as more serious a problem than street crime.  
If differences in politico-religious attitudes create popular dissensus regarding 
perceived seriousness of elite deviance, such findings should hold even after controlling for 
harm intensity. Recall that this study’s sample was found to be less critical of white-collar 
crime (even physically harmful offenses such as deadly pollutants release) when presented 
with examples of violent street crime. Table 14 presents sociodemographic correlates of 
perceived seriousness of consumer safety violation, illegal toxic dumping, and denial of risk 
and peril after workers die from unprotected asbestos exposure in the workplace compared 
with two violent crimes (i.e., murder and forcible rape). As was mentioned earlier, no 
baseline was used for comparison purposes. Rather, participants were asked to rate the 
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seriousness of the case on a scale of 1 (not very serious) to 4 (very serious). 
Once again, very few correlation coefficients attained statistical significance. Further, 
such coefficients are - at best - weak to modest in strength. Compared with their female 
counterparts, men were less inclined to rate toxic dumping (r = -.130) and asbestos exposure 
(r =  -.107) as serious offenses. There were no differences for gender for other scenarios. 
Conversely, with the exception of rape, older subjects rated all scenarios as serious crimes. 
Interestingly, the correlation coefficient for the asbestos vignette (r = .280) is even stronger 
than that for murder (r = .247). Subjects with higher income levels were less likely to rate the 
toxic dumping case a serious crime (r = -.104), as were more politically conservative subjects 
(r = -.133) and Republicans (r = -.146). Similarly, those subjects belonging to no political 
party were less inclined to rate the toy scenario as a serious offense (r = -.108), even though 
children were the potential victims. 
The only other statistically significant associations were found with information 
source and attribution style. More specifically, those subjects who named the Internet as their 
medium of choice were less likely to rate the three physically harmful white-collar crimes as 
serious offenses (r = -.137, -.162, and -.118, respectively) relative to those who relied on 
more traditional news media. While this finding is puzzling, it could be that those subjects 
were already acquainted with other forms of state-corporate crimes that resulted in much 
greater harm, which in turn may have influenced their perception of seriousness.  
With the exception of rape, those subjects who attributed white-collar crime to greed 
were more likely to rate every offense described as serious crimes (r = .179, .117, .188, and 
.147, respectively). Further, those who attributed blame to low moral character were more 
likely to rate all five scenarios as serious offenses (r = .165, .137, .249, .111, and .213, 
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respectively). Moreover, even those more inclined to believe fiduciary responsibility to 
shareholders forces otherwise law-abiding citizens to commit white-collar offenses rated all 
three examples of elite deviance as serious crimes (r = .175, .206, and .146, respectively). 
Further, those who saw elite deviance as the result of a rational choice were more likely to 
perceive murder (r = .114) and asbestos exposure (r = .098) as serious offenses. Lastly, those 
who explained elite deviance as resulting from pressure to succeed were more inclined to 
consider the release of dangerous pollutants a serious offense (r = .098), whereas those who 
believed white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions were less likely to consider rape 
a serious crime (r = -.099). 
In summation, some showing of a mild form of consensus regarding the perceived 
seriousness of white-collar crime emerges after controlling for harm intensity. Phrased 
differently, with the notable exception of age and attribution style, very few differences in 
perception of offense gravity are discernable. In fact, most statistically significant 
relationships with white-collar crimes were this time negative, which could be due to their 
comparison with murder and rape, two street crimes that may cause more fear than safety 
violations. Nevertheless, it is worth reiterating that more conservative subjects and 
Republicans were less likely to perceive illegal toxic dumping resulting in serious illness as a 
serious offense, which once again suggests that political identity may influence perceptions 
of severity. It is unclear, however, whether subjects’ perceived seriousness influences their 
levels of punitiveness and if the latter varies as a function of the same sociodemographic 
variables. 
Sociodemographic Correlates of Punitiveness 
Recall that punitiveness was operationalized as participants’ choice of prosecutorial 
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process, fine, monetary compensation, and/or incarceration, as well as sentence severity (i.e., 
dollar amounts and number of years in prison). Table 15 presents the sociodemographic 
correlates of respondents’ choice of prosecutorial process for the five scenarios. Again, these 
choices are of increasing severity. That is, subjects could decide whether the case ought to be 
dealt with by some non-legal means (e.g., out-of-court financial settlement), in a non-
criminal court (i.e., civil court), or in a criminal court.  
First of all, the effect for murder was a constant, and 100% of the sample 
recommended a criminal prosecution for the perpetrator. With respect to white-collar 
offenses, as was the case before, very few correlation coefficients attained statistical 
significance. Further, their strength is once again very weak. Men were less inclined to 
support a severe prosecution style (i.e., in a criminal court) for the firm described in the 
asbestos exposure scenario (r = -.139). Perhaps men were more likely to believe a criminal 
conviction would not only impact the company and its employees but would also be very 
difficult to obtain. After all, recall that despite being more likely to adhere to “myths”, males 
were also more inclined to accept “truths” such as white-collar criminals’ relative legal 
immunity compared with street offenders. Conversely, older subjects were more likely to 
support a harsher prosecution style for those responsible in the asbestos exposure scenario (r 
= .124).  
No notable differences could be observed as far as race is concerned. Surprisingly, 
though, Hispanics were less inclined to demand a severe prosecution process for the rapist (r 
= -.170). It could be that ethnic minorities, whom are disproportionately represented in the 
criminal justice system (Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005; Unnever & Cullen, 2007) but 
relatively excluded from opportunities to commit white-collar crime, may perceive such gap 
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as racial discrimination. In turn, perceived injustice might lead them to evince more tolerance 
for street offenders and increased severity toward elite deviance. In fact, though not 
statistically significant, all associations between Hispanic subjects and white-collar crime 
scenarios are positive. 
More educated respondents were also less inclined to choose a severe prosecution 
method for the rapist (r = -.135), as were conservative Protestants (r = -.108). This last 
finding is surprising and runs counter to preconceptions regarding religious differences in 
punitiveness relative to street crime (Grasmick et al., 1993).  Subjects from the Northeast 
were more likely to demand harsher prosecutorial processes against offenders depicted in the 
illegal dumping and asbestos exposure scenarios (r = 145 and .101, respectively).  
On the other hand, those participants with higher income levels, as well as those who 
identified as Republicans, were less likely to support criminal prosecution against the 
offenders in the scenarios describing illegal toxic dumping and asbestos exposure (r = -.103 
and -.129, respectively. More conservative subjects were also less likely to condone harsh 
prosecutorial processes for these two offenses (r = -. 147 and -.111, respectively). These 
findings once again buttress the argument that attitudinal differences toward free market 
economics may influence sentiments about elite deviance. Similarly, those subjects inclined 
to believe white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions were less likely to require a 
severe prosecutorial method for decision-makers in the toxic dumping and asbestos exposure 
scenarios (r = -.130 and -.109, respectively).  
Conversely, those who believed that bad moral character is an important factor of 
elite deviance recommended harsher prosecutorial processes against offenders described in 
all three white-collar crime scenarios (r = .121, .133, .165, respectively). Similarly, those 
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who attributed crimes of the powerful to fiduciary responsibility to shareholders 
recommended a harsher prosecutorial process against those responsible in the defective toy 
scenario (r = .135), the toxic dumping scenario (r = .142) and the asbestos exposure vignette 
(r = .155). With the exception of the toxic dumping scenario, these results are mirrored 
among those who believed that greed is the root of elite deviance (r  = .098 and .104, 
respectively). Lastly, those who surmised that white-collar offenders choose their actions 
were more likely to select a harsher prosecutorial process for those responsible in the 
asbestos exposure scenario (r = .098).  
Overall, while absolute consensus was reached in regard to the best way to prosecute 
the murder case, disparities in punitiveness could be observed for the white-collar crime 
scenarios. As previously mentioned, perhaps some participants considered a criminal 
prosecution to be detrimental to business, a hypothesis seemingly supported by right-leaning 
respondents’ leniency. It once again appears that subjects with higher income levels and with 
political views favorable to capitalism were statistically less likely to recommend that 
offenders in the white-collar crime vignettes be tried in a criminal court. Still, it is worth 
reiterating that few statistically significant differences emerge, and those that did were weak.  
Though still very weak in strength, more correlation coefficients attained statistical 
significance when examining the sociodemographic correlates of participants’ choice of fine 
amount (see Table 16). Men were more likely to demand a higher fine against those 
responsible for illegal toxic dumping (r = .134). Such finding is consistent with previous 
research that found greater levels of retributiveness among men (Bohm, 1992; Gilligan, 
1977, 1982). 
Likewise, older subjects were more likely to recommend a fine for the asbestos 
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exposure vignette (r = .099). Ambiguous findings emerged for race, occupational status and 
political affiliations. More specifically, while Whites were more likely to choose a greater 
fine amount for the toxic dumping scenario (r = .101), Blacks were less inclined to do so 
against those responsible for selling a potentially dangerous toy (r = -.099), as did those 
subjects currently employed (r = -.097) and Democrats (r = -.101).  
Further, subjects from other political parties were more inclined to choose a more 
severe monetary sanction against toxic dumping (r = .155), unlike Democrats (r = -.136). 
Conservative Protestants were less likely to consider a fine a relevant form of punishment 
against the companies described in the toy and asbestos exposure scenarios (r = -.109 and -
.108, respectively). Moreover, conservative participants were more likely to support a higher 
fine against the perpetrators in both street crime scenarios (r = .108 and .119, respectively). 
Very few correlation coefficients attained statistical significance in regard to 
attribution style. More specifically, subjects who believed white-collar offenders have little 
self-control were more likely to require a higher fine in all five scenarios (r = .175, .116, 
.101, .129, and .109, respectively). Those who considered fiduciary responsibility to be a 
cause of elite deviance selected the same form of sanction for those responsible in the 
asbestos exposure case (r = .134). Other than these, no further statistically significant 
differences could be found.  It might be that participants felt that a fine would be a disservice 
to the company and hurt its business, and favored a more lenient punishment (i.e., monetary 
compensation for the victims and their families). Alternatively, they may also have 
considered that a more severe sanction (i.e., incarceration) would be more appropriate.  
Table 17 presents the sociodemographic correlates of participants’ choice of 
monetary compensation amount. Once again, few correlation coefficients attained statistical 
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significance and their strength is quite weak. All associations between age and white-collar 
crime scenarios are positive (r =  .118, .182, and 183, respectively). While no difference 
could be found between Whites and Blacks, subjects of other races were less likely to support 
this form of punishment against the company responsible for distributing the potentially 
dangerous toy (r = -.120). Further, participants from the Northeast were less inclined to 
support a monetary compensation in the case of the defective toy scenario (r = -.098). 
While no major differences could be found for political affiliation - with the 
exception of subjects of other parties supporting monetary compensation for the victims of 
illegal toxic dumping (r = .111) - a few notable gaps were observed with religious identity. 
More specifically, moderate Protestants favored this form of sanction for both murder and 
rape (r = .133 and .117, respectively) and also for the toxic dumping scenario (r = .113). 
Conversely, subjects who identified with other religions besides Catholicism and 
Protestantism were less inclined to support monetary compensation for the victims of deadly 
pollutants (r = -.107).  
As could be expected, those inclined to blame elite deviance on greed were more 
likely to support damages for the victims and the families in both the toxic dumping and 
asbestos exposure scenarios (r = .121 and .138, respectively). Conversely, those who 
believed white-collar crime derives from low self-control deemed monetary compensation a 
fair sanction in all cases, with the exception of the asbestos scenario (r = .139, .116, .119, and 
.118, respectively). Further, those inclined to cite fiduciary responsibility to shareholders as a 
motive for elite deviance supported the payment of damages in all scenarios, except for the 
release of deadly pollutants (r = .163, .117, .114, and .124, respectively). Those more likely 
to agree with the idea that white-collar crime stems from bad moral character only supported 
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monetary compensation in the asbestos case (r = .107). A likely explanation is their 
perception of white-collar offenders being inherently immoral led them to seek a more severe 
form of punishment. If this is the case, then positive relationships with prison sentence 
severity should emerge.    
Table 18 presents the sociodemographic correlates of prison sentence severity against 
white-collar crime and street crime. As was the case before, few correlation coefficients 
attained statistical significance, and those that did were weak. With the exception of the 
asbestos exposure scenario, older subjects were once again found to be quite punitive against 
elite deviance as they supported long prison time for the culprits in the toy and toxic dumping 
scenarios (r = .110 and .105, respectively) as they did for the murderer (r = .166) and rapist (r 
= .109).  
An interesting gap emerged between races. More precisely, while Whites were more 
likely to demand prison time for the homicide perpetrator (r = .150), Blacks and subjects of 
other races were less inclined to do so (r = -.099 and -.132, respectively). As previously 
mentioned, it could be that an acute perception of racial discrimination within the criminal 
justice among minorities - suggested by their greater likelihood of being convicted and 
incarcerated (Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005; Unnever & Cullen, 2007) - led them to display 
more leniency toward street offenders.  
Similarly, more educated subjects recommended longer prison time for those 
responsible in the defective toy scenario (r = .104) but not for the rapist (r = -.131). Likewise, 
perhaps because incarceration is after all a tax-financed punishment, the rape scenario did not 
elicit demand for a harsh prison sentence among employed subjects (r = -.114). Moderate 
Protestants were also less likely to demand a longer sentence length for the culprit in the 
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murder case (r = -.103).  
Conversely, more politically conservative subjects and Republicans were inclined to 
impose a more severe sentence on the murderer (r = .116 and .130, respectively).  With the 
exception of Catholics supporting prison time for denial of risk and peril in the asbestos 
exposure scenario (r = .106), no notable differences could be found in regard to religion. 
Further, subjects affiliated with no political party and those who use the Internet as their 
primary source of information were less inclined to support prison time for manufacturing 
and selling a potentially dangerous product destined for children (r = -.144 and -.161, 
respectively).  
In regard to attribution style, the defective toy scenario elicited stronger prison 
sentence severity among those who attribute white-collar crime to bad moral character (r = 
.110), choice (r = .109) and fiduciary responsibility (r = .101). Further, the toxic dumping 
vignette generated greater punitiveness among those inclined to believe greed is the cause of 
elite deviance (r = .106) as well as among those who cite low moral standards (r = .175) and 
fiduciary responsibility to shareholders (r = .128) as white-collar crime factors. In addition, 
those who blamed elite deviance on negative business environmental influences required a 
longer prison sentence for those responsible in the asbestos exposure scenario (r = .106). 
Conversely, as could be expected, those inclined to believe white-collar offenders see no 
wrong in their actions were also less likely to demand tougher sentences for the culprits in 
the toxic dumping and asbestos exposure scenarios (r =  -.137 and -.114, respectively). 
In summation, few but consistent gaps in punitiveness among this study’s subjects 
could be observed, suggesting significant popular dissensus in societal response to elite 
deviance. More specifically, older subjects were found to be more punitive both with street 
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and white-collar offenders. This finding may be in line with the curvilinear relationship 
between age and punitive attitudes; that is, people may become more punitive as they grow 
older until they reach a tipping point, whereupon punitiveness starts to decrease (Schwartz et 
al., 1993). In fact, Rossi and Berk (1997) found that those between the age of 35 and 64 were 
the most punitive, whereas those under 35 and above 64 years old were the least punitive. 
Moreover, recall that several studies found that older people tend to view elite deviance as 
somewhat more serious than conventional violent crime and narcotic offenses (Grabosky, 
Braithwaite, & Wilson, 1987; Hauber, Toonvliet, & Willemse, 1988). With a mean age of 
33.58, this study’s sample counted few very young or very old subjects, thus limiting the 
ability to draw any significant conclusions about the curvilinear findings from prior studies. 
Perhaps more interestingly, it is also worth reiterating that men, Whites, those with 
higher income levels, more politically conservative subjects, Republicans, conservative 
Protestants, and those who believed white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions were 
often more lenient in their attitudes towards elite deviance, both in terms of perceived 
seriousness and punitiveness, compared with street crime. More specifically, Table 14 reports 
lower perceived seriousness for white-collar crimes among conservative participants and 
Republicans. Further, Table 15 shows that males, wealthier and right-leaning subjects were 
less likely to rate harmful white-collar crime scenarios as serious offenses. Moreover, Table 
16 suggests that currently employed and politically conservative participants as well as 
conservative Protestants were less inclined to favor a fine for white-collar offenders. In 
addition, Table 17 reveals that moderate Protestants were more likely to support 
compensating the victims and their families, a somewhat lenient choice compared with the 
harsher sanction options proposed to them. Lastly, Table 18 reports that moderate Protestants 
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were less inclined to require a long prison sentence for those companies’ executives, and that 
Whites, politically conservative subjects as well as Republicans were more likely to demand 
prison time for the street offender in the murder scenario. Conversely, those inclined to 
believe that white-collar offenders are otherwise law-abiding citizens who see no wrong in 
their actions exhibited greater tolerance for those responsible in the toxic dumping and 
asbestos exposure scenarios. Importantly, recall that, with a few exceptions, those subjects 
generally scored poorly on the knowledge questionnaire and were also more likely to adhere 
to “myths” about white-collar crime. It is therefore possible that knowledge (or lack thereof) 
about elite deviance might influence general attitudes regarding this social issue.  
Table 19 presents zero-order correlations between knowledge about elite deviance, 
“truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence, and perceived seriousness of the eleven scenarios 
used in the National White-Collar Crime survey. Though weak in strength, positive 
associations between knowledge and the false drug label, espionage, and market rigging 
scenarios were statistically significant (r = .156, .129, and .176, respectively). These three 
scenarios - as well as embezzlement, identify theft, and insurance overcharge - were also 
positively correlated with “truth” acceptance (r = .128, .155, .158, .120, .107, and .101, 
respectively). However, no coefficient attains statistical significance in regard to “myth” 
adherence. 
A few statistically significant findings emerged when controlling for more physically 
injurious instances of elite deviance. Table 20 presents zero-order correlations between 
knowledge about elite deviance, “truth” acceptance, “myth” adherence and perceived 
seriousness of the five harmful white-collar crime and street crime scenarios. Knowledge was 
positively correlated with perceived seriousness of the asbestos exposure scenario (r = .126), 
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as was “truth” acceptance with the toxic dumping and workers’ endangerment vignettes (r = 
.101 in both cases). Conversely, “myth” adherence was negatively associated with perceived 
seriousness of denial of risk and peril described in the third white-collar crime scenario (r = -
.101). 
Similar findings emerged when comparing knowledge about elite deviance, “truth” 
acceptance and “myth” adherence with participants’ choice of prosecutorial process. Table 
21 reveals that those subjects who accepted “truths” regarding elite deviance were more 
likely to demand harsher prosecution for the company accused of knowingly selling a 
potentially dangerous toy (r = .138). In contrast,  “myth” adherers were less inclined to 
support a harsh prosecution process for the rapist (r = -.116). 
Although - as is evident in Table 22 - only one correlation coefficient attained 
statistical significance when comparing knowledge about elite deviance, “truth” acceptance 
and “myth” adherence with respondents’ choice of fine amount, knowledge is once again 
positively associated with the asbestos exposure scenario (r = .121). That is, those subjects 
who were more knowledgeable about white-collar crime were also more likely to support 
fining the company responsible for causing the deaths of several of its employees.  
Interestingly, Table 23 reveals that subjects with knowledge about elite deviance and 
“truth” acceptance were more inclined to support monetary compensation for the rapist (r = 
.131 and .121, respectively). Further, “truth” believers were more likely to condone such 
punishment against the perpetrators described in the illegal toxic dumping (r = .144). Lastly, 
Table 24 reports positive associations between knowledge about elite deviance, “truth” 
acceptance, and prison sentence severity for all three white-collar crime scenarios (r = .144, 
.110 and .124 for more knowledgeable subjects, and .139, .102 and .137 for “truth” 
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believers).  
Conclusion 
In summation, it appears that knowledge about white-collar crime does influence 
attitudes towards elite deviance. That is, while probably being aware of the numerous 
challenges inherent in successfully prosecuting a corporation, knowledgeable subjects were 
nevertheless more likely to perceive the white-collar infractions presented to them as more 
serious offenses compared with street crimes and to demand harsher sentences against their 
perpetrators. Conversely, less educated participants and “myth” adherers were generally less 
critical of elite deviance as a whole and more lenient in their choice of sanctions against it 
relative to traditional crime. Further, more knowledgeable subjects were found to be those 
who identified as Whites, with higher education levels, without any religious affiliation, and 
who used the Internet as their main source of information. In comparison, less 
knowledgeable participants turned out to be predominantly male, politically more 
conservative, Republican, conservative Protestant, who relied on traditional media sources 
rather than the Internet and who attributed white-collar crime to situational rather than 
dispositional factors. 
As previously mentioned, these last sociodemographic variables are usually 
correlated with greater support for elements of neoliberal economics such as market 
deregulation, a natural consequence of laissez-faire capitalism that has been shown to 
facilitate the commission of certain white-collar crimes (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006). It is 
therefore possible that pro-capitalism attitudes may have led these individuals to discount 
relevant information about elite deviance and biased their sentiments towards it. In light of 
such hypothesis, these sociodemographic variables will be further analyzed in chapter five. 
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Tables  
Table 2. Percent Subjective and Objective Knowledge about White-Collar Crime (N=408) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Percent Subjective Percent Objective Difference 
Not very informed 12.5 75.5 -63.0 
Somewhat informed 73.5 14.7 58.8 
Informed 11.3 7.4 3.9 
Very informed 2.7 2.4 .30 
________________________________________________________________________ 
*p < .05. 	  
Table 3. Percentage of Subjects with Scores on the Overall Knowledge Scale (N=408) 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Overall Knowledge Score 
 
Percentage of Subjects Cumulative Percent  
0 
 
0 0 
10 
 
0 0 
20 
 
2.8 2.8 
30 
 
6.6 9.4 
40 
 
16.9 26.3 
50 
 
24.0 50.3 
60 
 
25.2 75.5 
70 
 
14.7 90.2 
80 
 
7.4 97.6 
90 
 
2.2 99.8 
100 0.2 100 
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Table 4. Percent Correct, Percent Incorrect, and Percent Confident on the Overall 
Knowledge Scale and the Ten Items that Comprise It, and “Truth” Accepters (N=134), 
Lucky Guessers (N=90), “Myth” Adherers (N=67), and Honestly Uninformed Subjects 
(N=117) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Percent 
Correct 
Percent 
Incorrect 
Percent 
Confident 
“Truth” 
Accepters 
Lucky 
Guessers 
“Myth” 
Adherers 
Honestly 
Uninformed 
 
Overall 54.9 
 
 
45.1 49.9 32.8 
 
22.1 16.5 28.6 
Meaning of the Term 
“White-Collar Crime” 
 
89.2 10.8 71.8 66.9 22.3 4.9 5.9 
Financial Cost of White-
Collar Crime 
 
23.8 76.2 27.7 13.7 10.1 14.0 62.2 
 
 
Physical Harmfulness of 
White-Collar Crime 
 
3.2 96.8 66.2 2.7 0.5 63.5 33.3 
 
 
Legal Immunity (relative 
to street crime) 
 
32.8 67.2 58.5 27.2 5.6 25.2 42.0 
 
 
Reckless Disregard (Ford 
Pinto case) 
 
75.5 24.5 30.1 27.5 48.0 2.7 21.8 
 
 
Medical Crime (vs. 
homicides) 
 
38.2 61.8 25.7 13.2 25.0 12.5 49.3 
 
 
Human Trafficking (in the 
U.S. vs. abroad) 
 
30.9 69.1 43.4 11.0 19.9 32.4 36.7 
 
 
State Corporate Crime 
(private military firms) 
 
91.2 8.8 61.2 60.3 30.9 1.0 7.8 
 
 
Toxic Dumping (African 
American communities) 
 
66.7 33.3 39.2 31.4 35.3 7.8 25.5 
 
 
Toxic Emissions 
(Reluctance to invest in 
clean technologies) 
97.1 2.90 74.8 73.8 23.3 1.0 1.9 
___________________________________________________________________________ 	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Table 5. One-Way Between Subjects ANOVAs in the Effect of Sociodemographic 
Predictors of Knowledge about White-Collar Crime, “Truth” Acceptance and “Myth” 
Adherence (N = 408) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Knowledge “Truth” Acceptance “Myth” Adherence 
F (df) η2 F (df) η2 F (df) η2 
Age .96 (49, 358) - 1.16 (49, 358) - .89 (49, 358) - 
Race 1.50 (6, 401) - 1.07 (6, 401) - 3.24* (6, 401) .05 
Region  2.44* (4, 403) .02 .90 (4, 403) - 2.93* (4, 403) .03 
Residence .85 (9, 398) - .67 (9, 398) - 1.37 (9, 398) - 
Education  4.48* (6, 401) .06 3.47* (6, 401) .05 .311 (6, 401) - 
Employed 1.24 (4, 403) - 1.77 (4, 403) - 1.89 (4, 403) - 
Income 1.41 (9, 308) - .89 (9, 398) - 2.41* (9, 398) .05 
Pol. Ideology  2.87* (5, 402) .03 4.16* (5, 402) .05 1.79 (5, 402) - 
Pol. Affiliation  1.59 (5, 402) - 2.91* (5, 402) .03 2.06 (5, 402) - 
Religion  2.57* (7, 400) .04 1.91 (7, 400) - 1.35 (7, 400) - 
Information  1.13 (6, 401) - .54 (6, 401) - 2.63* (6, 401) .04 
Greed .79 (3, 404)  - 1.23 (3, 404) - 1.08 (3, 404) - 
Moral .97 (3, 407) - 1.50 (3, 404) - .15 (3, 404) - 
Control  1.56 (3, 404) - 4.33* (3, 404) .01 1.42 (3, 404) - 
Choice 2.99* (3, 404) .02 1.99 (3, 404) - .085 (3, 404) - 
Influence  5.84* (3, 404) .04 5.24* (3, 404) .04 4.39* (3, 404) .03 
Pressure  2.16 (3, 404) - 1.69 (3, 404) - 2.68* (3, 404) .02 
Fiduciary 1.78 (3, 404)  - 2.33 (3, 404) - 1.87 (3, 404) - 
No wrong .26 (3, 404) - .76 (3, 404) - .75 (3, 404) - 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. η2 = effect size. 
*p < .05. 	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Table 6. Zero-Order Correlations between Sociodemographic Characteristics, Knowledge 
about Elite Deviance, “Truth” Acceptance and “Myth” Adherence (N=408) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Knowledge “Truth” Acceptance “Myth” Adherence 
Male .910 .127* .160** 
Age .031 -.025 -.048 
White .154** .078 -.131** 
Black -.074 .051 .114* 
Other Race -.087 -.072 -.002 
Hispanic -.086 -.110* .090 
Northeast -.081 -.083 .065 
Urban -.014 .035 .037 
Income -.036 .076 .091 
Education .219** .175** .008 
Employed -.026 .074 .090 
Pol. Ideology -.158** -.142** .078 
Republican -.113* -.129** .120 
Democrat .017 .021 .026 
Other Party .070 .079 -.120* 
No Party -.013 -.061 -.071 
Catholic -.075 -.070 . 029 
Cons. Protestant -.142** -.142** .084 
Mod. Protestant -.044 -.003 .002 
Lib. Protestant -.027 -.016 .008 
Other Religion .099 .068 .004 
No Religion .140** .118* -.085 
Internet .075 .005 -.155** 
Greed .099 .068 .004 
Moral .140** .118* -.085 
Control .075 .005 -.155** 
Choice .065 .087 .037 
Influence .068 .071 -.022 
Fiduciary -.033 -.017 .082 
Pressure .119* .082 -.024 
No Wrong .182** .151** -.097 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table 7. Mean Crime Seriousness Scores for White-Collar and Street Crime Compared with 
Motor Vehicle Theft in the National White-Collar Crime Center Survey and the Present 
Study (N=408) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A mean of 1 = Much less serious, 2 = Somewhat less serious, 3 = About as serious, 4 = 
Somewhat more serious, and 5 = Much more serious. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 NW3C Survey Present Study Difference 
Burglary 3.7 3.2 .05 
Embezzlement 4.1 3.7 .04 
Identity Theft 4.3 3.9 .04 
False Charges 3.8 3.5 .03 
Robbery 4.0 3.6 .04 
Hacking 3.9 2.7 1.2 
False Drug Label 4.8 4.7 .01 
Espionage 4.8 4.8 .00 
Market Rigging 4.3 4.2 .01 
Counterfeit Sales 2.9 2.3 .06 
Insurance Overcharge 4.4 3.7 .07 
Overall 4.2 3.9 .03 
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Table 8. Results of Paired Samples t-Tests to Compare Mean Perceived Seriousness of 
White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (N=408)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Mean (SD) Toy  Murder Pollutants Rape 
 
Toy 
 
3.43 (0.76) - - - - 
Murder 
 
3.91 (0.36) -12.10** - - - 
Pollutants 
 
3.51 (0.64) -1.98* 11.50** - - 
Rape 
 
3.94 (0.24) -13.12** -1.67 -12.89** - 
Asbestos 3.72 (0.52) -7.76** 6.68** -7.07** 8.13** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A mean of 1 = Not very serious, 2 = Somewhat serious, 3 = Serious, and 4 = Very 
serious. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 	  
Table 9. Results of Paired Samples t-Tests to Compare Subjects’ Choice of Prosecutorial 
Process for White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (N=408)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Mean (SD) Toy Murder Pollutants Rape 
 
Toy 
 
2.74 (0.47) - - - - 
Murder 
 
3.00 (0.00) -11.13** - - - 
Pollutants 
 
2.70 (0.51) 1.45 11.90** - - 
Rape 
 
2.99 (0.99) -10.37** 2.01* -11.39** - 
Asbestos 2.71 (0.50) 1.12 11.75** -0.47 11.34** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A mean of 1 = Non-legal means, 2 = Civil court, and 3 = Criminal court. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 	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Table 10. Results of Paired Samples t-Tests to Compare Subjects’ Choice of Fine Amount 
for White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (N=408)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Mean (SD) Toy Murder Pollutants Rape 
 
Toy 
 
1.83 (1.72) - - - - 
Murder 
 
0.35 (0.98) 16.99** - - - 
Pollutants 
 
2.25 (1.75) -5.21** -21.51** - - 
Rape 
 
0.35 (0.96) 17.44** 0.22 21.68** - 
Asbestos 1.78 (1.82) 0.65 -15.77** 5.53** -16.99** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A mean of 0 = No Fine, 1 = Under $100,000, 2 = $100,000-499,000, 3 = $500,000-
1,000,000, and 4 = Above $1,000,000. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 	  
Table 11. Results of Paired Samples t-Tests to Compare Subjects’ Choice of Compensation 
Amount for White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (N=408)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Mean (SD) Toy Murder Pollutants Rape 
 
Toy 
 
1.58 (1.48) - - - - 
Murder 
 
0.97 (1.52) 7.00** - - - 
Pollutants 
 
1.85 (1.59) -3.35** -9.71** - - 
Rape 
 
0.77 (1.30) 10.18** 3.90** 13.04** - 
Asbestos 2.42 (1.54) -10.71** -15.73** -7.30** -19.16** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A mean of 0 = No Compensation, 1 = Under $100,000, 2 = $100,000-499,000, 3 = 
$500,000-1,000,000, and 4 = $Above 1,000,000. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 12. Results of Paired Samples t-Tests to Compare Mean Prison Sentence Severity for 
White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (N=408)  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Mean (SD) Toy Murder Pollutants Rape 
 
Toy 
 
0.84 (1.18) - - - - 
Murder 
 
4.68 (1.63) -40.20** - - - 
Pollutants 
 
0.94 (1.32) -1.56 38.32** - - 
Rape 
 
3.26 (1.57) -26.39** 16.75** -24.79** - 
Asbestos 1.35 (1.79) -5.90** 29.45** -5.48** 18.13** 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. A mean of 0 = No prison, 1 = 1-5 years, 2 = 6-10 years, 3 = 11-20 years, 4 = 21-30 
years, 5 = 31-40 years, 6 = 41-Life, and 7 = Death. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 	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Table 13. Sociodemographic Correlates of Perceived Seriousness of the National White-Collar Crime Center Survey Scenarios 
Compared with Motor Vehicle Theft (N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Burglary Embezzle ID Theft Charges Robbery Hacking False Label Espionage Market Counterfeit Overcharge 
 
Male -.005 -.139* -.102* -.184* .020 -.003 -.090 -.055 .105* -.104* -.160* 
Age .024 -.057 .033 -.007 .222* .192** .144** .128** .093 .128** .027 
White -.020 -.048 -.043 -.036 .034 -.131* .013 .069 .007 -.102* -.013 
Black -.005 .063 .049 -.011 -.007 .142** .032 -.028 .004 .020 -.010 
Other Race .001 -.007 -.002 .033 -.026 .091 .004 .000 .030 .069 .002 
Hispanic .037 .017 .020 .037 -.022 -.027 -.059 -.082 -.043 .077 .029 
Northeast .014 .070 .041 .101* -.002 -.028 -.028 .005 .012 .011 -.049 
Urban .040 .021 -.030 -.009 .057 .004 -.050 -.063 .033 .089 .044 
Income .118* -.005 .080 -.056 .090 .098* .059 -.062 -.022 -.050 -.031 
Education -.038 -.010 -.015 -.032 .077 .066 .076 .006 .087 .012 -.024 
Employed .103* .032 -.058 -.026 -.027 -.122* -.056 -.034 .003 -.074 -.062 
Pol.Ideology .040 .013 .006 -.041 -.027 -.030 -.122* .008 -.029 .026 -.042 
Republican .084 -.060 -.009 -.085 .033 .077 .010 .011 -.083 .031 -.040 
Democrat .011 .046 .038 .037 .068 .050 .021 .028 -.013 .031 .035 
Other Party -.077 -.001 -.032 .028 -.096 -.112* -.029 -.038 .078 -.056 -.005 
No Party -.048 -.016 -.017 -.022 -.069 -.081 -.061 -.039 -.017 -.090 -.056 
Catholic .057 .014 .031 .075 .008 .030 .001 .038 .092 .057 .021 
Cons. Prot. -.053 .019 -.036 .019 -.032 .034 -.038 -.044 -.144* .144** -.052 
Mod. Prot. -.049 -.007 .066 -.016 -.004 .043 -.026 -.015 -.048 -.023 .025 
Lib. Prot. .053 -.057 .013 -.014 .056 .058 .032 .044 .019 .046 .021 
Other Rel. -.050 .122* .032 .085 .055 .024 -.021 .046 .073 -.063 .002 
No Religion .036 -.060 -.069 -.096 -.036 -.115* .042 -.031 .020 -.108* -.008 
Internet .051 .031 -.046 -.045 -.033 -.102* .027 -.006 .047 -.137* -.145* 
Greed .075 .081 .110* .045 .026 .041 .212* .131** -.064 .124* .124* 
Moral .087 .038 .062 .000 .069 .028 .177** .113* .126* .051 .124* 
Control -.027 -.010 -.031 -.049 -.061 .026 -.102* -.128* -.017 .041 .039 
Choice .004 .035 .098* .096 .034 .063 .195** .073 .121* .044 .088 
Influence -.047 .140** .117* .105* -.014 .040 .104* .012 .220** .035 .121* 
Fiduciary .032 .104* .123* .102* .103* .035 .137** .162** .129** .067 .099* 
Pressure .000 .240** .188** .239** .067 .016 .014 -.051 .117* .052 .067 
No Wrong -.109* -.047 .032 .004 .042 .076 -.075 -.089 -.022 .042 -.011 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous predictors and Spearman’s rho when 
using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01.
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Table 14. Sociodemographic Correlates of Perceived Seriousness of White-Collar Crime & 
Street Crime (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
Male -.077 -.040 -.130** .032 -.107* 
Age .263** .247** .172** .092 .280** 
White .055 .001 -.023 .070 -.011 
Black -.082 .050 .051 .037 .000 
Other Race .016 .009 -.045 -.063 -.039 
Hispanic -.015 -.065 .025 -.092 .054 
Northeast -.005 .024 .053 .021 .044 
Urban -.085 -.051 -.081 .001 -.091 
Income .037 .030 -.104* .040 .019 
Education .002 .045 -.022 -.044 .015 
Employed -.084 .035 -.028 -.010 -.061 
Pol.Ideology -.049 .003 -.133** -.049 -.042 
Republican .009 .008 -.146** .006 -.007 
Democrat .045 .077 .032 .073 .041 
Other Party -.054 -.085 .081 -.081 -.037 
No Party -.108* -.088 .068 -.058 -.095 
Catholic -.051 .029 .030 .018 .022 
Cons. Prot. .024 -.040 -.086 -.051 -.025 
Mod. Prot. -.051 .018 -.008 -.030 -.039 
Lib. Prot. .020 .059 .049 -.084 .014 
Other Rel. .079 -.052 .015 .001 .058 
No Religion .005 .061 .014 .081 -.008 
Internet -.137** .038 -.162** -.019 -.118* 
Greed .179** .117* .188** .062 .147** 
Moral .165** .137** .249** .111* .213** 
Control -.012 -.060 -.023 -.029 .008 
Choice .081 .114* .081 .063 .098* 
Influence -.009 -.073 .056 -.018 .023 
Fiduciary .175** .080 .206** .031 .146** 
Pressure .064 .018 .098* -.010 .042 
No Wrong -.096 .008 -.054 -.099* -.068 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table 15. Sociodemographic Correlates of Choice of Prosecutorial Process against White-Collar 
Crime & Street Crime (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
Male -.008 - -.083 .000 -.139** 
Age .031 - .052 -.034 .124* 
White .012 - -.033 .071 -.082 
Black .006 - .013 .029 .061 
Other Race -.076 - .012 .025 .006 
Hispanic .047 - .028 -.170** .061 
Northeast .013 - .145** .023 .101* 
Urban .066 - -.053 -.074 -.026 
Income .073 - -.103* -.050 -.050 
Education .069 - -.051 -.135** -.008 
Employed .099 - .023 -.002 -.029 
Pol.Ideology -.072 - -.147** -.020 -.111* 
Republican -.015 - -.077 -.021 -.129** 
Democrat .012 - .052 -.007 .080 
Other Party .000 - .006 .024 .018 
No Party -.043 - -.022 .038 -.031 
Catholic -.069 - .053 -.030 .086 
Cons. Prot. .016 - -.050 -.108* -.047 
Mod. Prot. .009 - .006 -.025 -.004 
Lib. Prot. .005 - .002 .023 -.072 
Other Rel. -.008 - -.052 .030 -.025 
No Religion .034 - .020 .088 .019 
Internet -.080 - -.078 .016 -.068 
Greed .098* . .070 .006 .104* 
Moral .121* . .133** .035 .165** 
Control .000 . .010 -.054 -.025 
Choice .071 . .056 .059 .098* 
Influence .039 . .067 -.009 .048 
Fiduciary .135** . .142** .009 .155** 
Pressure -.008 . .064 .063 .018 
No Wrong -.033 . -.130** .083 -.109* 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 16. Sociodemographic Correlates of Choice of Fine Amount against White-Collar Crime 
& Street Crime (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
Male .033 .028 .134* .026 .044 
Age .079 .073 -.041 .087 .099* 
White .059 -.006 .101* -.004 .058 
Black -.099* .016 -.068 -.039 -.085 
Other Race -.017 -.029 -.054 .025 -.037 
Hispanic .027 .021 -.039 .023 .033 
Northeast -.036 -.062 -.049 -.057 -.061 
Urban -.029 -.013 -.022 -.019 -.015 
Income .084 .008 .065 -.039 .049 
Education -.021 .010 -.057 -.027 .003 
Employed -.097* -.028 -.047 -.028 -.044 
Pol.Ideology .036 .108* .078 .119* .004 
Republican .060 .024 -.020 .076 -.006 
Democrat -.101* -.069 -.136** -.068 -.080 
Other Party .058 .052 .155** .011 .087 
No Party .063 .038 .090 .018 .046 
Catholic .049 .001 -.055 .019 -.004 
Cons. Prot. -.109* -.023 -.056 .033 -.108* 
Mod. Prot. .015 .092 .069 .041 .064 
Lib. Prot. .049 .034 .026 -.046 .003 
Other Rel. -.040 .049 -.001 .024 -.033 
No Religion .029 -.095 .016 -.059 .047 
Internet -.015 -.095 .047 -.035 -.041 
Greed .009 .013 .072 -.008 .009 
Moral .062 .047 .052 .003 .081 
Control .175** .116* .101* .129** .109* 
Choice -.012 .029 .002 -.002 .066 
Influence -.056 -.088 -.065 -.059 .014 
Fiduciary .085 .077 .066 .058 .134** 
Pressure -.031 -.043 -.041 -.024 .016 
No Wrong .024 .056 .082 .069 .023 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 17. Sociodemographic Correlates of Choice of Monetary Compensation Amount against 
White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
Male .064 .029 -.037 .025 .062 
Age .118* .041 .182** .077 .183** 
White .078 .058 .053 .082 -.042 
Black -.021 -.072 -.077 -.082 .057 
Other Race -.120* -.029 -.078 -.042 -.056 
Hispanic .012 .012 -.005 -.005 .059 
Northeast -.098* -.090 -.041 -.073 -.067 
Urban -.051 -.041 -.068 -.009 -.080 
Income .066 .025 .041 .018 .058 
Education -.072 -.017 -.061 -.004 -.073 
Employed .087 -.034 .004 .048 .010 
Pol.Ideology -.025 .055 .028 .053 .005 
Republican .023 .004 .002 .049 .022 
Democrat .020 -.056 -.094 -.038 .001 
Other Party -.038 .055 .095 .001 -.018 
No Party .031 -.017 .111* -.019 .008 
Catholic -.029 -.043 -.022 .013 -.025 
Cons. Prot. .028 -.035 -.058 -.037 .007 
Mod. Prot. .073 .133** .113* .117* .054 
Lib. Prot. -.043 .027 -.064 -.013 -.032 
Other Rel. -.061 -.030 -.107* .004 -.063 
No Religion -.001 -.038 .059 -.066 .022 
Internet -.062 -.063 -.093 -.027 -.016 
Greed .069 .060 .121* .048 .138** 
Moral .045 .053 .095 .073 .107* 
Control .139** .116* .119* .118* .053 
Choice .019 .012 .081 .002 .077 
Influence -.033 -.064 .006 -.056 -.079 
Fiduciary .163** .117* .085 .114* .124* 
Pressure -.047 -.026 -.020 .019 -.030 
No Wrong .028 .013 .021 .018 .067 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.
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Table 18. Sociodemographic Correlates of Prison Sentence Severity against White-Collar Crime 
& Street Crime (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
Male .023 .040 .015 -.045 -.016 
Age .110* .105* .166** .109* .094 
White -.039 .150** -.005 .074 .003 
Black .055 -.099* -.049 -.048 -.072 
Other Race .017 -.132** -.012 -.049 .047 
Hispanic -.013 -.012 .071 -.020 .028 
Northeast .010 -.042 .080 -.050 .021 
Urban .042 .006 .017 -.023 .026 
Income .063 .014 -.062 -.067 -.021 
Education .104* -.058 .039 -.131** .037 
Employed -.046 -.003 -.005 -.114* -.035 
Pol.Ideology .003 .116* -.060 -.006 -.051 
Republican .089 .130** -.034 .067 -.081 
Democrat .000 -.096 .000 -.029 .021 
Other Party -.069 -.001 .026 -.023 .041 
No Party -.144** 0.43 -.056 .032 -.020 
Catholic .008 .018 .092 .012 .106* 
Cons. Prot. .053 -.002 -.015 -.033 -.056 
Mod. Prot. -.085 .036 -.103* .019 -.062 
Lib. Prot. .021 -.067 -.042 -.016 -.063 
Other Rel. -.036 -.024 -.014 -.032 .037 
No Religion .031 .005 .047 .025 .015 
Internet -.161* -.050 -.055 -.012 -.080 
Greed .079 .058 .106* .061 .052 
Moral .110* .059 .175** .037 .077 
Control .051 .001 .024 -.066 .012 
Choice .109* .026 .057 .089 .042 
Influence .078 .058 .093 -.029 .106* 
Fiduciary .101* .000 .128** -.005 .060 
Pressure .032 -.047 .036 -.061 .045 
No Wrong -.031 .035 -.137** .007 -.114* 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 19. Zero-Order Correlations Between Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” 
Acceptance, “Myth” Adherence and Perceived Seriousness of the National White-Collar Crime 
Center Survey Scenarios Compared with Motor Vehicle Theft (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Knowledge -.093 .090 .085 .061 .055 .044 .156** .129** .176** -.056 .032 
“Truth”  -.066 .120* .107* .047 .083 .020 .128* .155** .158** -.010 .101* 
“Myth” .092 .034 .060 .011 .032 .044 -.076 -.006 -.062 .021 .016 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01. 
1=Burglary 5=Robbery 9=Market Rigging 
2=Embezzlement 6=Hacking 10=Counterfeit Sales 
3=Identity Theft 7=False Drug Label 11=Insurance Overcharge 
4=False Charges 8=Espionage  
 
Table 20. Zero-Order Correlations Between Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” 
Acceptance, “Myth” Adherence and Perceived Seriousness of White-Collar Crime and Street 
Crime (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
Knowledge .009 -.074 .086 -.012 .126* 
“Truth” .069 -.084 .101* -.051 .101* 
“Myth” .012 -.046 -.069 -.035 -.101* 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01. 
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Table 21. Zero-Order Correlations Between Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” 
Acceptance, “Myth” Adherence and Choice of Prosecutorial Process (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
Knowledge .069 - .038 .080 .050 
“Truth” .138** - .050 .015 .072 
“Myth” .007 - -.015 -.116* -.010 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
Table 22. Zero-Order Correlations Between Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” 
Acceptance, “Myth” Adherence and Choice of Fine Amount (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
Knowledge .073 .038 .079 016 .121* 
“Truth” .065 .074 .083 .068 .087 
“Myth” .023 .003 .038 .017 -.023 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
Table 23. Zero-Order Correlations Between Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” 
Acceptance, “Myth” Adherence and Choice of Monetary Compensation Amount (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
Knowledge .061 .056 .144* .131** .024 
“Truth” .067 .074 .019 .121* .069 
“Myth” .021 .003 -.076 .017 .052 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 24. Zero-Order Correlations Between Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” 
Acceptance, “Myth” Adherence and Prison Sentence Severity (N=408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
Knowledge .144** -.049 .110* -.027 .124* 
“Truth” .139** .018 .102* -.029 .137** 
“Myth” .014 .026 -.033 -.010 -.026 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Correlation coefficients reported in all tables are Pearson’s r when using dichotomous 
predictors and Spearman’s rho when using multinomial nominal and/or ordinal predictors. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
SUPPLEMENTARY RESULTS 
 
Preliminary analyses reported in chapter four revealed a series of noteworthy 
considerations, including a positive relationship between knowledge about elite deviance and 
sentiments (i.e., perceived seriousness and punitiveness) towards it. Conversely, those subjects 
who were found to be less knowledgeable, less inclined to accept “truths” and more likely to 
adhere to “myths” about white-collar crime were also less prone to perceive it as a serious social 
issue compared with street crime, and were generally more lenient in their prescribed sanctions 
against it. Further, dissensus in both knowledge and attitudes about elite deviance in this sample 
was found to stem from sociodemographic differences in gender, age, race/ethnicity, education, 
socio-economic status, and attribution style. Phrased differently, those who exhibited relatively 
more tolerance for white-collar offenses tended to be male, younger, white, less educated yet 
wealthier, and to support the notion that elite deviance results from situational rather than 
dispositional factors. 
Perhaps more importantly, considerable politico-religious divergences were suggested by 
the lesser likelihood of politically conservative subjects, Republicans and conservative 
Protestants to rate the instances of white-collar crime presented to them as more serious than 
traditional offenses and to seek more stringent sanctions against them. As previously mentioned, 
empirical research has established that these individuals are usually more critical of and punitive 
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against traditional crime than are their more liberal counterparts (Grasmick et al., 1993; Unnever 
et al. 2005). Further, they have also been found to be more supportive of free market economic 
policies (Gallup Poll, 2012), whose deregulation has been showed to facilitate the commission of 
white-collar crime (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006). The goal of this chapter is to investigate the 
hypothesis that knowledge and attitudes about elite deviance (i.e., perception of offense gravity 
and punitiveness) vary as a function of indicators of support for capitalism. To this effect, 
multivariate regression models were run to determine whether differences found at the bivariate 
level would persist after a more stringent analysis. 
In the following regression models, reference groups include White for race, Republican 
for political affiliation, and conservative Protestant for religious identity. That is, these three 
suppressed categories are coded 0 on their respective dummy variables, which allows for 
comparing their impact on knowledge and sentiments about white-collar crime relative to other 
races, political parties and religions, with all other variables controlled. In each analysis, 
standardized regression coefficients (betas) and their corresponding significance levels are 
presented. Importantly, with no variance inflator factor greater than 4, excessive multicollinearity 
could not be detected. 
Knowledge about Elite Deviance, “Truth” Acceptance and “Myth” Adherence 
Table 25 presents the regression analysis summary for sociodemographic predictors of 
knowledge about elite deviance, “truth” acceptance, and “myth” adherence. These models 
predicted the outcome with limited success, with adjusted R2 ranging between .110 and .160. 
Further, as was the case with correlation coefficients, statistically significant betas are both 
scarce and weak. Compared to Whites, non-Black subjects who reported belonging to “other 
racial” groups were less likely to be knowledgeable about elite deviance (b = -.153), as were 
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Hispanics relative to non-Latinos (b = -.129).  
Conversely, education and belonging to “other” religions or no religion at all (compared 
with conservative Protestants) significantly increased the likelihood of having knowledge about 
white-collar crime (b = .268, .162, and .159, respectively). Similar results emerged as far as 
“truth” acceptance. More specifically, compared to Whites, members of other races were less 
likely to accept relevant information about white-collar crime (b = -.118), as were Hispanics (b = 
-.138), and more politically conservative subjects (b = -.142). Once again, however, more 
educated participants as well as those belonging to other religious groups were more likely to 
agree with empirically validated facts about elite deviance (b = .162 and .137, respectively). 
Lastly, those more likely to adhere to “myths” about white-collar crime were males (b = .183) 
and Blacks (b = .112), whereas those less likely to espouse such unfounded beliefs included 
subjects who used the Internet as their main source of information (b = -.204), as well as those 
inclined to cite negative business environmental influences as a leading cause of elite deviance (b 
= -.120). 
In summation, while several associations were no longer statistically significant, a 
number of sociodemographic divergences persisted after running the regressions. Once again, 
Whites and better-educated individuals were found to be more knowledgeable about elite 
deviance, a disparity that may find its root in racial and ethnic gaps in educational attainment 
(U.S. Census, 2012). Conversely, politically conservative subjects and conservative Protestants 
proved to be less knowledgeable than their liberal counterparts. It therefore appears that political 
and religious affiliations supportive of capitalism are also significant predictors of lack of 
knowledge about elite deviance. What remains to be seen is whether such discrepancies are 
reflected in subjects’ attitudes about white-collar crime. 
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Perceived Seriousness of White-Collar Crime vs. Auto Theft 
Table 26 presents the regression analysis summary for sociodemographic predictors of 
perceived seriousness of the National White-Collar Crime Center survey scenarios compared 
with motor vehicle theft, controlling for knowledge about elite deviance. There was considerable 
difference in the percentage of variance explained in each model, with adjusted R2 ranging from 
.040 to .088. Males were less likely to rate embezzlement as more serious than motor vehicle 
theft (b = -.162), as were those prone to believe that white-collar offenders see no wrong in their 
actions (b = -.108), unlike more politically conservative subjects (b = .158) and those inclined to 
blame elite deviance on pressure to succeed (b = .229). Identity theft was rated as more serious 
than car theft by subjects with higher income levels (b = .134), and by those who believed that 
white-collar crime results from negative business environment influences (b = .077). Males were 
also less likely to deem the false charges scenario more serious (b = -.177), unlike those inclined 
to agree with the idea that pressure to succeed causes elite deviance (b = .200). Those currently 
employed evinced less perceived seriousness toward hacking (b = -.124), unlike older subjects, 
Blacks and members of other races (b = .208, .154, and .114, respectively). 
Only those who attributed elite deviance to greed rated the false drug label scenario as 
more serious than auto theft (b = .171). While wealthier subjects rated market rigging as less 
serious than car theft (b = -.105), the perception of offense gravity was reversed among older 
subjects (b = .106), Catholics (again, relative to conservative Protestants, b = .191), and those 
inclined to blame white-collar crime on negative business environmental influences (b = .142).  
Lastly, several significant differences could be observed for the vignette describing counterfeit 
sales. More specifically, older subjects and urban residents deemed it more serious than the 
baseline crime (b = .130 and .105, respectively). Conversely, moderate Protestants rated it as less 
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serious than did their more conservative counterparts (b =-.152), a finding echoed among 
subjects from other religious groups (b = -.158) and those with no religion (b = -.243). In 
summation, compared with their respective counterparts, younger, wealthier as well as politically 
and religiously conservative participants exhibited less perceived seriousness about these 
examples of elite deviance than they did toward instances of street crime and petty white-collar 
crimes. 
Slightly similar findings emerged after controlling for the acceptance of “truths” and the 
adherence to “myths” about elite deviance. Table 27 presents the regression analysis summary 
for sociodemographic predictors of perceived seriousness of the National White-Collar Crime 
Center survey scenarios compared with motor vehicle theft, controlling for “truth” acceptance 
and “myth” adherence. As was previously the case, these models do not account for a large 
percentage of the variance, with adjusted R2 ranging from .045 to .093. Perhaps because 
embezzlement is not an organizational offense and profits individual employees rather than the 
company, it was once again rated as more serious by politically conservative subjects (b = .160) 
as well as those who attributed such crime to pressure to succeed (b = .234), but not by those 
who believed white-collar offenders see no wrong in their practices (b = -.122).  
While males were less likely to rate identity theft as more serious than car theft (b = -
.108), those with higher income levels and who blame elite deviance on pressure to succeed 
deemed it more serious (b = .117 and .171, respectively). Men were also found to be less critical 
of false charges (b = -.190), unlike those prone to attribute white-collar crime to outward 
influences (b = .068). Several associations reached statistical significance in regard to hacking. 
More specifically, whereas currently employed respondents found it to be less serious than car 
theft (b = -.127), males, older subjects, Blacks and Hispanics expressed the opposite opinion (b = 
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.059, .211, .149, and .107, respectively). As was the case before, attribution of blame to greed 
was the sole significant predictor of perceived offense gravity in the false drug label scenario (b 
= .174). Further, subjects who reported higher income levels once again rated market rigging as 
less serious than car theft (b = -.115), unlike older participants (b = .109), Catholics (relative to 
conservative Protestants, b = .189), and those prone to attribute white-collar crime to negative 
business environmental influences (b = .142).  
Results with respect to counterfeit sales were somewhat different after controlling for 
“truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence. More specifically, while older subjects and urban 
residents once again rated such offense as more serious than car theft (b = .129 and .106, 
respectively), those belonging to other races (compared with Whites) and politically conservative 
participants shared the same views (b  = .101 and .015, respectively). On the other hand, 
moderate Protestants were again found to perceive less seriousness than their more conservative 
counterparts (b = -.159), an attitude mirrored by members of other religions (b = -.168), those 
with no religion (b = -.254), and males (b = -.060).  
To conclude, despite weak relationships, these results tend to confirm the few statistically 
significant differences in perceived offense gravity between younger, wealthier as well as 
politically and religiously conservative participants and their respective counterparts found in the 
correlational analysis. We now turn our attention to the five scenarios describing injurious white-
collar crimes and violent street crimes. 
Perceived Seriousness of Injurious White-Collar Crimes vs. Violent Street Crimes 
Table 28 presents the regression analysis summary for sociodemographic correlates of 
perceived seriousness of white-collar crime and street crime. In an effort to reduce 
multicollinearity, each scenario comprises two models. Knowledge about elite deviance is 
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included in model 1 whereas model 2 controls for “truth” acceptance and “myth” adherence. 
These models perform relatively better than before, with adjusted R2 ranging from .037 to .148, 
but can still be considered weak.  
The only differences observed for the vignette describing consumer safety violations (i.e., 
through the manufacturing and selling of a defective and potentially hazardous toy) included age 
and situational attribution. More specifically, older subjects were more likely to deem it a serious 
offense (b = .213 and .214), unlike those inclined to believe white-collar offenders see no wrong 
in their actions (b = -.109 and -.116). Age was also a significant predictor of perceived 
seriousness of murder (b = .151 and .141), as was believing that elite deviance is caused by bad 
moral character in model 2 (b = .116), contrary to knowledge about white-collar crime (b = -
.137) and “truth” acceptance (b = -.148).  
More ambiguous findings emerged in regard to toxic dumping. While politically 
conservative subjects were expectedly less inclined to rate it as a serious offense in model 1 (b = 
-.177), a similar finding emerged among those who relied on the Internet as their main source of 
information (b = -.138), an unexpected finding. Conversely, those unaffiliated with any political 
party were more likely than conservative Protestants to perceive the release of deadly pollutants 
a serious crime in model 1 (b = .134), as were those prone to link elite deviance to bad moral 
character (b = .187, also in model 1). Lastly, while males and “myth” adherers were less inclined 
to rate the asbestos exposure scenario as a serious offense (b = -0.76 in model 1 and -.115, 
respectively), older subjects, Hispanics and “truth” accepters evinced higher perceived 
seriousness in the second model (b = .212, .111, and .111, respectively).  
In summation, it appears the largest differences in perceived seriousness of these five 
crime scenarios were found in regard to age, race/ethnicity, political views and attribution style. 
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Once again, older subjects were more critical of white-collar crime whereas minority members 
perceived street crime to be of lesser gravity. These attitudes are reversed with respect to right-
leaning subjects as well as those prone to believe white-collar offenders see no wrong in their 
actions. Let us now move on to predictors of subjects’ punitiveness. 
Choice of Prosecutorial Process 
Table 29 presents the regression analysis summary for sociodemographic predictors of 
choice of prosecutorial process against white-collar crime and street crime. Once again, these 
models yield low adjusted R2 ranging from .051 to .059. Further, the models for the murder 
scenario could not be run, as it was a constant (i.e., every single participants agreed that the 
murderer should be tried in a criminal court). Whereas subjects who grew up in Northeastern 
states were more likely to recommend a harsher prosecution style for those responsible in the 
toxic dumping vignette (b = .149 and .150), more politically conservative subjects were less 
punitive (b = -.211 and -.209), as were those who believed that white-collar offenders see no 
wrong in their actions (b = -.139 and -.143). Several noteworthy divergences appeared in regard 
to the appropriate prosecution style for rape. More precisely, older subjects in the second model 
were less likely to recommend the rapist be tried in a criminal court (b = -.131), as were 
Hispanics (b = -154 and -154), but also more educated participants and “myth” adherers in model 
2 (b = -.177 and -.177, respectively).  
The opposite view was held among those with no religious affiliation (b = .200 and .200), 
as well as those inclined to believe white-collar offenders are otherwise law-abiding citizens who 
do not think that their business practices are really wrong (b = .103 and .118). The latter group 
and males were also less likely to require that those responsible in the asbestos exposure case be 
tried in a criminal court (b = -.106 in model 2, and -.120 and -.127, respectively). Once again, 
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despite few and weak statistically significant relationships, consistent patterns continue to 
emerge, with right-leaning participants and those more likely to find excuses for elite deviance 
being less punitive toward white-collar crime relative to street crime.   
Choice of Fine Amount 
Table 30 presents the regression analysis summary for sociodemographic predictors of 
choice of fine amount against white-collar crime and street crime. As was previously the case, 
these models do not perform very well, with adjusted R2 ranging from .039 to .058. While those 
currently employed opposed a fine against the company responsible for selling a potentially 
dangerous toy (b = -.118 and -.129), the reverse position was observed in regard to religious 
views, relative to conservative Protestants. More precisely, among those who supported a harsher 
fine were Catholics (b = .154 and .154) and liberal Protestants (b = .113 and .113). Similar 
results were found among those inclined to blame elite deviance on low self-control (b = .199 
and .202). In fact, the variable measuring attribution to impulsiveness yielded several significant 
relationships in these models. For example, those individuals prone to accept that white-collar 
offenders have difficulty controlling themselves were also more inclined to demand a higher fine 
amount against the murderer (b = .109 and .119), along with males (b = .050 and .054), and those 
disposed to believe white-collar offenders see no wrong in their actions (b = .112 and .110). 
Similarly, those subjects attributing elite deviance to self-control were more likely to favor a 
harsher monetary sanction against the company responsible for release deadly pollutants in a 
river (b = .107 and .108), as were males (b = .116 and .109).  
Taken together, these results parallel previous divergences in punitiveness. Males, older 
subjects and those blaming elite deviance on low self-control were found to be the most 
retributive (at least in their choice of fine amount). Although few differences could be detected 
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with respect to sanction options for the toxic dumping and asbestos exposure scenarios, 
conservative Protestants were less likely than other religious groups to support a monetary fine 
against the company guilty of distributing a potentially harmful toy. It could be that capitalism 
supporters (weary of the firm’s financial well-being) may favor a punishment less harmful to 
business. This includes either paying damages to the potential victims or their families (as in the 
Ford Pinto case) or sentencing those responsible to prison. We now turn our attention to these 
two options. 
Choice of Monetary Compensation Amount 
Table 31 presents the sociodemographic predictors of choice of monetary compensation 
amount against white-collar crime and street crime. Once again, these models produced weak 
adjusted R2 ranging from .039 to .058. Males were more likely to recommend the payment of 
damages in the defective toy scenario (b = .121 and .126), as were older subjects (b = .117 and 
.118), currently employed participants (b = .128 and .124), as well as those blaming elite 
deviance on low self-control (b = .102 and .107) and fiduciary responsibility to shareholders (b = 
.137 and .137). On the other hand, better-educated subjects deemed monetary compensation an 
inadequate sanction (b = -.142 and -.130). Age and blame attribution to low self-control were 
significant predictors in regard to the toxic dumping scenario (b = .171 and .172, and .115 and 
.116, respectively), as was knowledge about elite deviance (b = .175), and with respect to rape (b 
= .166 and .173, and .122 and .127, respectively). Once again, subjects more knowledgeable 
about white-collar crime were more likely to support such sanction against the rapist (b = .140), 
unlike “myth” adherers (b = -.008).  
Lastly, the asbestos case created much dissensus in regard to whether paying damages to 
the victims and/or their families is an appropriate form of punishment. More specifically, those 
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inclined to support this relatively more lenient sanction included males (b = .121 and .117), older 
subjects (b = .169 and .173), Hispanics (b = .103 and .106), as well as wealthier subjects in 
model 1(b = .106). Conversely, those less prone to favor such option were urban residents (b = -
.103 and -.103), better-educated subjects (b = -.167 and -.163), and those attributing elite 
deviance to negative business environmental influences (b = -.109 and -.108).  
In summation, older subjects and those blaming low self-control as a leading factor of 
white-collar crime were once again the most punitive. However, participants with higher 
education levels were less likely to support monetary compensation against white-collar 
offenders. Further, no significant differences emerged in terms of political and religious 
affiliations. It is not certain, however, whether these individuals considered paying damages a 
more lenient punishment or a financial burden to the company. Being admittedly the harshest 
form of sanction, prison sentence might yield less equivocal results. 
Prison Sentence Severity 
Table 32 presents the regression analysis summary for sociodemographic predictors of 
prison sentence severity against white-collar crime and street crime. Once again, these models 
yield low adjusted R2 values that explain between only 5.6% and 6.6% of the variance. Fewer 
statistically significant differences emerged this time. Compared to Republicans, those subjects 
affiliated to no political party were less likely to favor a harsh prison sentence against those 
responsible for distributing a potentially dangerous toy (b = -.206 and -.209), as were those who 
used the Internet as their main source of information (b = -.154 and -.151), a somewhat odd 
finding given that these individuals were also found to be less likely to espouse “myths” about 
elite deviance. More expectedly, participants more knowledgeable about white-collar crime and 
“truth” believers were more inclined to require a longer prison sentence (b = .135 and .127, 
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respectively). Lastly, further forms of dissensus emerged with respect to toxic dumping. More 
specifically, while older subjects and “truth” believers were more inclined to support the 
incarceration of those responsible for releasing deadly pollutants in a river (b = .189 and .193, 
and .108, respectively), wealthier subjects as well as those who believe white-collar offenders 
see no wrong in their actions were more lenient in their decision (b = -.108 in model 2, and -.118 
and -.123, respectively).  
In summation, the very few statistically significant coefficients bring only partial support 
to the hypothesis under examination. Although public dissensus in prison sentence severity 
emerged, it was not due to politico-religious differences. Rather, more knowledgeable subjects 
and “truth” believers were more inclined to require a harsher prison sentence for the white-collar 
offenders described in the abovementioned scenarios. Conversely, participants who reported 
higher income levels and those with situational attribution styles were less likely to recommend a 
severe prison sentence for such offenses (all expected findings). It is not certain, however, 
whether such tolerance displayed towards the perpetrators of elite deviance was motivated by 
lesser perceived fear or, alternatively, disbelief in the effectiveness of the sanctions proposed to 
them. These results and their implications are further discussed in the sixth and last chapter. 
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Tables  
Table 25. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Knowledge about 
Elite Deviance, “Truth” Acceptance, and “Myth” Adherence (Betas; N =408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Knowledge “Truth” Acceptance “Myth” Adherence 
Male .046 .095 .183*** 
Age .048 -.009 -.088 
Black -.070 .051 .112* 
Other Race -.153** -.118* .041 
Hispanic -.129** -.138** .098 
Northeast -.065 -.059 .058 
Urban -.015 -.009 .013 
Income -.096 .037 .065 
Education .268*** .162** -.020 
Employed -.028 .085 .092 
Pol. Ideology -.141 -.142* .021 
Democrat -.035 .000 -.063 
Other Party .053 .125 -.139 
No Party -.025 -.038 -.094 
Catholic .056 .060 -.064 
Mod. Protestant .086 .127 -.084 
Lib. Protestant .003 .010 -.039 
Other Religion .162** .137* -.022 
No Religion .159* .158 -.116 
Internet .074 -.013 -.204*** 
Greed .018 .011 .057 
Moral .012 .060 -.052 
Control -.032 -.073 .065 
Choice .098 .038 .005 
Influence .070 .038 -.120* 
Fiduciary .035 .081 .056 
Pressure .095 .083 -.087 
No Wrong 
Intercept 
.039 
1.551 
.094 
-1.135 
.091 
2.099 
Adj. R2 .160*** .130*** .110*** 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include White for race, Republican for political affiliation, and 
conservative Protestant for religious identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01., ***p < .001. 
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Table 26. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Perceived Seriousness of the National White-Collar 
Crime Center Survey Scenarios Compared with Motor Vehicle Theft, Controlling for Knowledge about Elite Deviance (Betas; 
N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Burglary Embezzle ID Theft Charges Robbery Hacking False Label Espionage Market  Counterfeit  Overcharge 
 
Male -.015 -.162* -.089 -.177* .062 .060 -.088 -.021 .098 -.055 -.158 
Age .000 -.080 -.025 -.047 .157** .208** .062 .074 .106* .130* .001 
Black .012 .061 .041 -.019 -.008 .154** .037 -.021 .028 .005 -.028 
Other Race -.013 -.017 .010 .021 -.050 .114* .011 .012 .017 .092 .011 
Hispanic .026 .011 .032 .025 -.043 .002 -.038 -.072 -.073 .079 .035 
Northeast .006 .079 .058 .097 .016 -.010 .002 .007 -.005 .012 -.043 
Urban .011 .031 -.037 .007 .052 -.010 -.045 -.037 .048 .105* .056 
Income .103 .029 .134* -.013 .087 .072 .007 -.036 -.105* -.072 -.019 
Education -.078 -.002 -.054 .023 .043 .014 .052 -.029 .060 .008 -.025 
Employed .077 .013 -.063 -.035 -.042 -.124* -.060 -.034 -.023 -.080 -.065 
Pol. Ideology .018 .158* .083 .028 -.067 -.117 -.095 .023 .066 .005 .001 
Democrat -.121 .132 .087 .118 -.011 -.133 -.132 .033 .060 .033 .019 
Other Party -.149 .062 .002 .110 -.073 -.122 -.100 -.042 .079 .050 .050 
No Party -.101 .022 -.004 .030 -.060 -.122 -.114 -.035 .023 -.044 -.038 
Catholic .104 -.027 .043 -.003 .026 .010 .044 .097 .191** -.119 .068 
Mod. Prot. .046 .003 .112 -.027 .024 .001 .021 .010 .080 -.152* .066 
Lib. Prot. .097 -.057 .034 -.039 .039 .006 .042 .074 .078 -.062 .057 
Other Rel. .017 .088 .039 .040 .059 -.009 -.007 .054 .120 -.158* .041 
No Religion .152 -.034 .008 -.112 -.002* -.110 .060 .054 .149 -.243* .052 
Internet .073 .017 -.023 -.055 .021 -.050 .085 .036 .049 -.102 -.116 
Greed .079 .062 .066 .052 .018 .032 .171** .080 .067 -.096 .070 
Moral .064 -.023 .004 -.080 .055 -.037 .036 .046 .052 .027 .028 
Control -.036 -.021 -.064 -.055 -.042 .026 -.086 -.089 -.020 .084 .058 
Choice -.036 -.005 .035 .085 -.015 .038 .098 -.044 -.018 .031 .010 
Influence -.022 .088 .077** .058 -.056 .010 .054 .017 .142** .053 .099 
Fiduciary -.036 .044 .042 .046 .077 -.036 .065 .132* .074 .021 .020 
Pressure .034 .229** .162 .200** .086 .033 -.005 -.037 .061 .036 -.006 
No Wrong -.079 -.108* -.019 -.043 .034 .055 -.087 -.045 -.030 .049 -.024 
Knowledge -.062 .083 .091 .041 .010 .051 .095 .114* .084 -.026 .026 
Intercept 3.022 2.196 1.758 2.424 1.846 1.827 3.144 4.135 1.567 2.267 3.156 
Adj. R2 .011 .084** .040* .080** .020 .075** .088** .022 .080** .065* .019 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include White for race, Republican for political affiliation, and conservative Protestant for religious 
identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 27. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Perceived Seriousness of the National White-Collar 
Crime Center Survey Scenarios Compared with Motor Vehicle Theft, Controlling for “Truth” Acceptance and “Myth” Adherence 
(Betas; N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Burglary Embezzle ID Theft Charges Robbery Hacking False Label Espionage Market  Counterfeit  Overcharge 
 
Male -.031 -.182 -.108* -.190* .054 .059** -.086 -.034 .099 -.060* -.173* 
Age .005 -.069 -.012 -.038 .161** .211* .064 .082 .109* .129* .007 
Black .008 .042 .021 -.031 -.013 .149** .030 -.039 .021 .005 -.039 
Other Race -.017 -.020 .003 .016 -.049 .107* .008 .012 .015 .101* .019 
Hispanic .013 .008 .024 .018 -.042 -.004 -.034 -.067 -.070 .088 .044 
Northeast .000 .076 .053 .093 .016 -.014 .003 .008 -.004 .016 -.040 
Urban .010 .030 -.038 .006 .051 -.011 -.045 -.038 .048 .106* .056 
Income .105 .012 .117* -.022 .083 .066 -.003 -.054 -.115* -.071 -.028 
Education -.081 .004 -.043 .029 .040 .027 .062 -.023 .067 -.006 -.035 
Employed .074 -.005 -.080 -.045 -.048 -.127* -.067 -.052 -.031 -.083 -.078 
Pol. Ideology .014 .160* .081 .025 -.064 -.123 -.094 .029 .068 .015** .012 
Democrat -.112 .133 .089 .120 -.009 -.134 -.138 .030 .055 .035 .020 
Other Party -.128 .063 .007 .117 -.073 -.119 -.111 -.054 .069 .044 .043 
No Party -.092 .031 .004 .036 -.056 -.122 -.116 -.030 .022 -.042 -.031 
Catholic .112 -.024 .048 .001 .026 .013 .042 .095 .189** -.122 .065 
Mod. Prot. .059 .003 .116 -.022 .022 .006 .015 .001 .074 -.159* .058 
Lib. Prot. .102 -.055 .037 -.037 .040 .007 .040 .073 .076 -.062 .057 
Other Rel. .019 .088 .044 .044 .056 -.002 -.005 .051 .121 -.168* .031 
No Religion .166 -.029 .018 -.103 -.003 -.102 .057 .049 .145 -.254* .043 
Internet .090 .040 .002 -.038 .028 -.044 .085 .049 .051 -.103 -.106 
Greed .073 .058 .062 .048 .016 .032 .174** .079 .069 -.097 .067 
Moral .074 -.025 .004 -.078 .054 -.037 .030 .039 .046 .024 .024 
Control -.046 -.021 -.066 -.058 -.041 .024 -.081 -.082 -.015 .088 .063 
Choice -.040 -.001 .040 .087 -.015 .043 .104 -.039 -.013 .027 .009 
Influence -.011 .098 .090 .068** -.054 .014 .053 .021 .142** .050 .100 
Fiduciary -.038 .034 .034 .041 .073 -.036 .063 .123* .072 .017 .010 
Pressure .044 .234** .171** .207 .087 .039 -.007 -.038 .059 .031 -.010 
No Wrong -.085 -.122* -.031 -.050 .028 .055 -.088 -.057 -.033 .044 -.037 
“Truth” -.073 .109 .088 .033 .036 .008 .091 .158** .089 .042 .109* 
“Myth” 
Intercept 
.109* 
2.845 
.074 
2.227 
.081 
1.781 
.067 
2.392 
.027 
1.835 
.011 
1.875 
-.036 
3.275 
.016 
4.234 
-.026 
1.725 
.002 
2.264 
.035 
3.191 
Adj. R2 .018 .093** .045* .082 .017 .070** .086** .031 .079** .064* .029 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include White for race, Republican for political affiliation, and conservative Protestant for religious 
identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.  	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Table 28. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Correlates of Perceived Seriousness of White-Collar Crime & Street 
Crime (Betas; N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Male -.015 -.027 .022 .035 -.070 -.065 .056 .066 -.076* -.061 
Age .213** .214** .151** .141* .085 .084 .075 .070 .216 .212** 
Black -.065 -.070 .039 .059 .064 .063 .032 .042 .033 .033 
Other Race .027 .037 -.022 -.017 -.016 -.013 -.072 -.076 -.010 -.008 
Hispanic .019 .029 -.084 -.084 .046 .054 -.106* -.112* .097 .111* 
Northeast .007 .011 .008 .010 .040 .044 .025 .023 .044 .051 
Urban -.082 -.081 -.063 -.062 -.074 -.073 -.009 -.009 -.094 -.093 
Income .066 .064 .006 .027 -.069 -.073 .059 .068 .035 .028 
Education -.038 -.054 .062 .049 .023 .024 -.035 -.032 .001 .008 
Employed -.078 -.086 .036 .055 .004 .001 -.006 .005 -.048 -.049 
Pol.Ideology -.092 -.080 -.089 -.090 -.177* -.173 -.028* -.036 -.093 -.089 
Democrat -.016 -.014 .014 .017 .009 .004 -.004 -.003 -.060 -.070 
Other Party .005 -.001 -.025 -.017 .080 .066 -.076 -.068 .003 -.022 
No Party -.087 -.082 -.056 -.060 .134* .131 -.064* -.069 -.075 -.084 
Catholic -.092 -.095 .048 .047 .065 .061 .074 .076 -.010 -.019 
Mod. Prot. -.095 -.103 .067 .072 .023 .014 .042 .049 -.029 -.044 
Lib. Prot. -.020 -.020 .046 .046 .091 .089 -.051 -.050 -.010 -.015 
Other Rel. .047 .035 .085 .082 .030 .028 .049 .055 .060 .059 
No Religion -.048 -.059 .017 .016 .028 .019 .126 .132 .001 -.014 
Internet -.064 -.060 .034 .016 -.138* -.144 .032 .024 -.043 -.058 
Greed .079 .077 .028 .028 .093 .097 .013 .015 .020 .027 
Moral .016 .013 .110 .116* .187* .180 .090** .094 .095 .084 
Control .017 .021 -.025 -.030 -.018 -.011 -.037 -.042 .033 .045 
Choice -.006 -.010 .075 .068 -.042 -.039 .033 .032 .086 .093 
Influence -.038 -.039 -.075 -.082 -.041 -.047 -.024 -.026 -.023 -.034 
Fiduciary .078 .071 .021 .030 .093 .091 .000 .008 .028 .029 
Pressure .059 .054 .090 .087 .063 .058 .033 .036 .014 .005 
No Wrong -.109* -.116* -.002 .009 -.067 -.067 -.086 -.077 -.064 -.060 
Knowledge -.019 - -.137* - .053 - -.046 - .102 - 
“Truth” - .069 - -.148* - .075 - -.099 - .111* 
“Myth” 
Intercept 
- 
2.984 
.024 
2.975 
- 
3.318 
-.026 
3.249 
- 
2.543 
-.051 
2.657 
- 
3.772 
-.016 
3.772 
- 
2.805 
-.115* 
2.984 
Adj. R2 .090** .092** .037* .146** .146** .148** .005 .010 .099** .107** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include white for race, republican for political affiliation, and conservative protestant for religious identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 29. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Choice of Prosecutorial Process against White-Collar 
Crime & Street Crime (Betas; N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Male -.016 -.019 - - -.048 -.052 .012 .038 -.120* -.127* 
Age .003 .004 - - .025 .028 -.124 -.131* .080 .084 
Black -.004 -.010 - - .021 .015 .034 .042 .066 .058 
Other Race -.060 -.052 - - .066 .066 .030 .022 .032 .033 
Hispanic .060 .073 - - .039 .041 -.154** -.154** .074 .076 
Northeast .057 .063 - - .149** .150** .021 .022 .096 .096 
Urban .059 .060 - - -.050 -.050 -.069 -.069 -.036 -.036 
Income .064 .058 - - -.075 -.081 -.002 -.002 .001 -.007 
Education .032 .025 - - -.056 -.053 -.137* -.117* .007 .008 
Employed .013 .004 - - .036 .030 .043 .053 -.026 -.034 
Pol.Ideology -.120 -.109 - - -.211** -.209** .017 .007 -.048 -.045 
Democrat -.082 -.086 - - -.106 -.107 -.011 -.022 .114 .114 
Other Party -.008 -.024 - - -.043 -.047 -.053 -.063 .122 .118 
No Party -.049 -.049 - - -.051 -.050 -.021 -.035 .059 .062 
Catholic -.119 -.126 - - .023 .022 .110 .107 .053 .053 
Mod. Prot. -.017 -.030 - - .036 .034 .104 .103 .024 .020 
Lib. Prot. -.028 -.031 - - .019 .018 .112 .108 -.065 -.065 
Other Rel. -.030 -.039 - - -.058 -.058 .102 .114 -.018 -.021 
No Religion -.053 -.068 - - .004 .003 .200* .200* .028 .026 
Internet -.066 -.067 - - -.072 -.067 .000 -.018 -.028 -.020 
Greed .012 .013 - - -.007 -.007 .050 .058 -.002 -.003 
Moral .061 .053 - - .086 .084 .070 .065 .100 .097 
Control .000 .008 - - .015 .017 -.095 -.091 -.017 -.015 
Choice .015 .015 - - -.031 -.029 .051 .060 .062 .064 
Influence .017 .012 - - .081 .082 -.052 -.061 -.001 .001 
Fiduciary .103 .097 - - .096 .093 .013 .024 .087 .082 
Pressure -.033 -.041 - - .006 .006 .043 .041 -.004 -.004 
No Wrong -.032 -.039 - - -.139** -.143** .103* .118* -.099 -.106* 
Knowledge .045 - - - .042 - .077 - .044 - 
“Truth” - .115* - - - .055 - -.012 - .069 
“Myth” 
Intercept 
- 
2.363 
-.030 
2.440 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
2.844 
.006 
2.879 
- 
2.899 
-.117* 
2.924 
- 
1.988 
.016 
2.019 
Adj. R2 -.004 -.004 - - .059** .058** .051** .056** .057** .058** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include white for race, republican for political affiliation, and conservative protestant for religious identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 30. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Choice of Fine Amount against White-Collar Crime & 
Street Crime (Betas; N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Male .011 .004 .050* .054* .116* .109* .047 .044 .041 .044 
Age .100 .106 .120 .118 .010 .017 .146* .146** .114* .118* 
Black -.054 -.067 .021 .020 -.070 -.082 -.013 -.019 -.056 -.065 
Other Race -.002 -.006 -.018 -.011 -.048 -.055 .053 .062 -.009 -.015 
Hispanic .035 .034 .041 .054 -.036 -.040 .049 .064 .057 .055 
Northeast -.051 -.053 -.084 -.078 -.050 -.053 -.080 -.073 -.058 -.060 
Urban -.009 -.010 .018 .019 .004 .002 .008 .009 -.008 -.009 
Income .079 .066 -.021 -.025 .089 .076 -.045 -.052 .064 .053 
Education -.042 -.032 .016 .013 -.088 -.075 -.059 -.067 -.057 -.041 
Employed -.118* -.129* -.018 -.022 -.037 -.048 -.006 -.015 -.033 -.040 
Pol.Ideology -.059 -.059 .128 .136 .043 .039 .080 .092 -.042 -.047 
Democrat -.163 -.165 .108 .102 .057 .055 -.016 -.019 -.055 -.060 
Other Party -.068 -.072 .108 .090 .137 .137 .001 -.017 .033 .027 
No Party .011 .014 .117 .113 .135 .137 .007 .007 .042 .040 
Catholic .154* .154* .027 .020 -.001 .001 -.004 -.011 .066 .066 
Mod. Prot. .093 .091 .064 .052 .085 .086 -.014 -.028 .131 .130 
Lib. Prot. .113* .113* .033 .030 .062 .062 -.077 -.079 .039 .038 
Other Rel. .050 .052 .083 .077 .015 .020 .027 .016 .033 .040 
No Religion .137 .139 -.011 -.026 .006 .012 -.035 -.051 .106 .109 
Internet .034 .045 -.049 -.056 .065 .077 .003 .001 .006 .010 
Greed -.055 -.056 -.025 -.022 -.001 -.001 -.097 -.096 -.066 -.064 
Moral .078 .074 .062 .054 .090 .089 -.002 -.011 .096 .092 
Control .199** .202** .109* .119* .107* .108* .110* .119* .095 .098 
Choice -.055 -.049 .037 .038 -.041 -.035 .026 .026 .024 .031 
Influence -.073 -.068 -.092 -.100 -.094 -.088 -.037 -.042 -.008 -.007 
Fiduciary .054 .049 .062 .059 .037 .033 .051 .044 .092 .092 
Pressure -.067 -.065 -.096 -.104 -.060 -.055 -.105 -.114* -.052 -.049 
No Wrong .004 -.003 .112* .110* .092 .087 .109* .102* .020 .020 
Knowledge .091 - .048 - .087 - .047 - .104 - 
“Truth” - .091 - .094 - .067 - .126* - .067 
“Myth” 
Intercept 
- 
1.330 
.016 
1.544 
- 
-1.295 
-.061 
-1.100 
- 
-.424 
.024 
.587 
- 
.151 
-.032 
.319 
- 
-.716 
-.023 
-.388 
Adj. R2 .058** .056** .039* .044* .044* .040* .014 .024 .027 .019 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include white for race, republican for political affiliation, and conservative protestant for religious identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.	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Table 31. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Choice of Monetary Compensation Amount against 
White-Collar Crime & Street Crime (Betas; N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Male .121* .126* .045 .027 -.021 .001 .046 .042 .121* .117* 
Age .117* .118* .109 .120* .171** .172** .166** .173** .169** .173** 
Black -.039 -.043 -.082 -.098 .016 .013 -.079 -.094 .073 .065 
Other Race -.066 -.070 -.009 -.017 -.018 -.039 -.025 -.031 .001 .001 
Hispanic .023 .025 .030 .018 .046 .036 .000 .000 .103* .106* 
Northeast -.096 -.095 -.087 -.094 -.029 -.034 -.076 -.077 -.075 -.074 
Urban -.057 -.057 -.024 -.025 -.041 -.042 .013 .012 -.103* -.103* 
Income .087 .079 .058 .045 .065 .053 .048 .030 .106* .097 
Education -.142* -.130* -.021 -.010 -.107 -.065 -.045 -.028 -.167* -.163* 
Employed .128* .124* -.031 -.045 .047 .048 .055 .041 .058 .050 
Pol.Ideology -.127 -.129 .041 .036 -.021 -.040 .031 .029 -.057 -.055 
Democrat -.022 -.028 .101 .105 -.066 -.077 .033 .028 -.026 -.028 
Other Party -.074 -.083 .129 .140 .014 .008 .022 .013 -.034 -.041 
No Party .024 .021 .060 .069 .103 .092 .016 .017 .005 .006 
Catholic -.065 -.066 -.026 -.019 .011 .014 .018 .018 -.043 -.044 
Mod. Prot. -.004 -.008 .110 .118 .105 .110 .103 .098 .025 .020 
Lib. Prot. -.082 -.084 .024 .027 -.046 -.049 -.028 -.029 -.050 -.050 
Other Rel. -.087 -.083 -.017 -.011 -.076 -.053 .006 .011 -.062 -.063 
No Religion -.120 -.121 -.034 -.019 .049 .063 -.048 -.047 -.020 -.022 
Internet -.019 -.020 -.002 .022 -.027 -.032 .036 .046 .042 .047 
Greed .003 .006 .015 .010 .053 .061 -.009 -.007 .044 .044 
Moral .011 .006 .061 .065 .056 .052 .048 .042 .066 .062 
Control .102* .107* .121* .116* .115* .116* .122* .127* .020 .023 
Choice -.007 -.001 .007 .011 .024 .041 .001 .010 .045 .049 
Influence -.047 -.048 -.071 -.057 -.015 -.014 -.066 -.062 -.109* -.108* 
Fiduciary .137* .137* .061 .055 -.017 -.008 .041 .036 .048 .044 
Pressure -.076 -.077 -.066 -.056 -.059 -.052 -.019 -.017 -.050 -.051 
No Wrong .026 .027 .024 .014 .013 .026 .046 .041 .075 .071 
Knowledge .082 - .057 - .175** - .140* - .060 - 
“Truth” - .062 - .037 - .024 - .124 - .077 
“Myth” 
Intercept 
- 
.938 
-.040 
1.209 
- 
-1.192 
.094 
-1.288 
- 
-.732 
-.087 
-.215 
- 
-1.484 
-.008* 
-1.185 
- 
.544 
-.002 
.717 
Adj. R2 .070** .066** .027 .032 .080** .058* .037* .031 .060** .060** 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include white for race, republican for political affiliation, and conservative protestant for religious identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
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Table 32. Regression Analysis Summary for Sociodemographic Predictors of Prison Sentence Severity against White-Collar Crime & 
Street Crime (Betas; N=408) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Toy Murder Pollutants Rape Asbestos 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Male .027 .029 .045 .035 .030 .027 -.013 -.018 -.015 -.021 
Age .079 .083 .099 .098 .189** .193** .063 .064 .051 .058 
Black .094 .083 -.110* -.109* -.006 -.016 -.050 -.051 -.052 -.068 
Other Race .058 .054 -.137* -.124* .017 .018 -.034 -.032 .065 .066 
Hispanic .024 .028 -.026 -.016 .068 .074 -.006 -.005 .028 .036 
Northeast .043 .044 -.046 -.041 .070 .072 -.056 -.056 .011 .014 
Urban .046 .045 .044 .045 .040 .040 .010 .010 .032 .032 
Income -.020 -.035 .018 .022 -.098 -.108* -.038 -.038 -.026 -.043 
Education .054 .069 -.047 -.070 .007 .012 -.133* -.138* -.031 -.024 
Employed -.053 -.063 .011 .009 -.021 -.031 -.084 -.086 -.057 -.073 
Pol.Ideology -.007 -.007 .049 .062 .013 .017 -.034 -.032 .057 .063 
Democrat -.168 -.175 -.126 -.122 -.022 -.026 -.127 -.125 .105 .099 
Other Party -.104 -.118 -.115 -.118 .029 .017 -.130 -.128 .092 .076 
No Party -.206** -.209** -.033 -.028 -.034 -.034 -.061 -.058 .049 .051 
Catholic -.046 -.049 .047 .043 .036 .033 .091 .091 .113 .109 
Mod. Prot. -.124 -.132 .040 .033 -.105 -.113 .057 .057 -.042 -.054 
Lib. Prot. -.033 -.035 -.052 -.051 -.053 -.055 .038 .039 -.034 -.036 
Other Rel. -.061 -.057 .024 .010 -.039 -.041 .027 .024 .022 .019 
No Religion -.012 -.015 .052 .040 .020 .014 .102 .102 .023 .015 
Internet -.154** -.151* .008 .008 -.035 -.032 .040 .043 -.098 -.090 
Greed .027 .031 .055 .051 .062 .063 .061 .059 .068 .070 
Moral -.015 -.023 .010 .009 .026 .019 -.008 -.007 -.049 -.059 
Control .013 .021 .006 .009 .025 .032 -.067 -.068 -.006 .003 
Choice .023 .031 .017 .009 -.054 -.050 .054 .052 -.053 -.047 
Influence .075 .074 .106 .103 .103 .102 .022 .023 .103 .104 
Fiduciary .056 .053 -.031 -.037 .062 .057 -.021 -.023 .022 .014 
Pressure .027 .025 -.066 -.073 .052 .049 -.090 -.090 .015 .011 
No Wrong -.013 -.016 .024 .016 -.118* -.123* .033 .030 -.144* -.153* 
Knowledge .135* - -.074 - .083 - -.020 - .130* - 
“Truth” - .127* - .023 - .108* - .000 - .167* 
“Myth” 
Intercept 
- 
-.463 
-.042 
-.134 
- 
3.807 
.027 
3.642 
- 
-.937 
-.020 
-.699 
- 
3.854 
.022 
3.771 
- 
.624 
-.017 
1.092 
Adj. R2 .059** .056** .019 .013 .064** .066** .000 -.003 .024 .031 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Reference categories include white for race, republican for political affiliation, and conservative protestant for religious identity. 
*p < .05, **p < .01.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
DISCUSSION 
 
A growing body of research has evidenced formidable discrepancies between the 
harmfulness of street crime and that of elite deviance (Knowlton et al., 2011; Landrigan et al., 
2002; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Herbert & Landrigan, 2000; Rebovich & 
Jiandani, 2000; Reiman & Leighton, 2010).  More precisely, while traditional property offenses 
such as burglary and theft cost the public about $18 billion each year (UCR, 2010), annual losses 
due to white-collar crime (including various forms of fraud and health costs caused by work-
related injuries and illnesses as well as environmental pollution) exceed a trillion dollars 
(Knowlton et al., 2011; Landrigan et al., 2002; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 2006).  
The harms associated with elite deviance include physical harm as well. For example, 
compared with the 14,000 people who lose their lives to murder and negligent manslaughter 
every year (UCR, 2010), an estimated 300,000 die annually as a result of work-place related 
accidental injuries due to the company’s negligence, illnesses caused by prolonged exposure to 
toxic chemicals, toxic waste dumping and deadly pollutants, faulty consumer products, nefarious 
and addictive substances (Herbert & Landrigan, 2000; Leigh, 2011; Lynch & Michalowski, 
2006), as well as medical malpractice (Starfield, 2000).  
However, in spite of these astounding differences, street crime continues to overshadow 
elite deviance in the news media (Barak, 1994; Barlow & Barlow, 2010; Ericson et al., 1991;
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Lynch & Michalowski, 2006; Lynch, Nalla & Miller, 1989; Lynch, Stretesky & Hammon, 2000), 
the criminal justice system (Calavita, Tillman, & Pontell, 1997; Maddan et al., 2011; Payne, 
Dabney, & Ekhomu, 2011; Tillman & Pontell, 1992) and even academia (Lynch, McGurrin & 
Fenwick, 2004; McGurrin, Jarrell, Jahn & Cochrane, 2013). Surprisingly, scholarly efforts that 
have investigated societal response to crimes of the powerful have limited their field of inquiry 
to public opinions about white-collar crime (e.g., Huff, Desilets, & Kane, 2010; Kane & Wall, 
2006; Rebovich et al., 2000; Schoepfer, Carmichael & Piquero, 2007, etc.). These studies have 
provided valuable empirical evidence of a growing concern among Americans regarding the 
danger posed by elite offenses. Their failure to include a valid measure of lay knowledge about 
white-collar crime, however, significantly limits our ability to infer the extent to which the public 
is familiar with the scope and magnitude of this social issue.  
The present study sought to address such limitation by providing the first measure of 
public knowledge about elite deviance. This project was designed to explore five research 
questions that included (1) the extent of public information about white-collar crime, (2) whether 
a gap exists between subjective (perceived) and objective (actual) knowledge, (3) the existence 
of popular “myths” about elite deviance akin to public misconceptions regarding street crime 
(e.g., crime being rampant, overly violent, etc.), (4) the sociodemographic correlates of 
knowledge about white-collar crime, and (5) whether such knowledge is associated with attitudes 
towards elite deviance. Such attitudes comprised (a) participants’ perceived seriousness of 
financially costly and harmful white-collar crimes as well as property and violent street crimes, 
and (b) respondents’ level of punitiveness, including their choice of prosecutorial process (i.e., 
by non-legal means, in a non-criminal court or in a criminal court) and of punishment (i.e., 
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monetary compensation, fine and/or prison sentence), and punishment severity (in dollar amount 
and/or years in prison).  
Methodology Followed and Key Findings 
The subjects in this study were recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, a web service 
that coordinates the supply and demand of human intelligence tasks such as social science 
surveys. Four hundred and eight participants completed an online questionnaire that comprised 
measures of respondents’ (1) sociodemographic characteristics, (2) subjective and objective 
knowledge about elite deviance, (3) perceived seriousness of white-collar crimes compared with 
a baseline property crime, (4) perceived seriousness of physically harmful white-collar crimes 
compared to violent street crimes, as well as punitiveness with choice of prosecutorial process, 
sentence determination, and sentence severity, and (5) choice of attribution style (i.e., 
perceptions of white-collar offenders’ motives). Statistical analyses of the data collected via this 
instrument provided the following answers to the five research questions: 
1) Is the public informed about elite deviance? If it is, to which extent are Americans 
informed about it?  
Overall, participants’ level of information about elite deviance was low and erratic. While 
they seemed knowledgeable about the meaning of the term “white-collar crime”, the reluctance 
of some companies to invest in cleaner forms of energy, the calculated endangerment of 
consumers for profit, and about corporate human rights violations abroad, they were found to be 
rather uninformed about medical crime and the relative legal immunity enjoyed by elite 
offenders compared with street criminals. Further, though prone to recognize the greater 
financial cost of white-collar crime compared with traditional crime, they had difficulty 
estimating the true extent of such disparity. 
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2) Is there a gap between the public’s subjective and objective knowledge about white-
collar crime?  
Subjects tended to overestimate their knowledge about white-collar crime. A comparison 
of answer correctness and confidence, however, revealed a relative lack of certitude among 
participants regarding their awareness of the problem, suggesting that the concept of elite 
deviance and its various dimensions may still be arcane to many Americans. In fact, about 20% 
of this study’s sample admitted having never received any kind of information about it.  
3) Does the public hold common “myths” about elite deviance like they do regarding 
street crime?  
Despite their self-doubts regarding their acquaintance with the topic of white-collar 
crime, respondents were not inclined to acknowledge hard-earned empirical evidence such as the 
greater physical harmfulness of elite deviance over street crime and to recognize that some elite 
offenses - which they admit are common in underdeveloped nations (e.g., human trafficking) - 
can be committed in the United States with little to no legal repercussion for the perpetrators. 
Such reluctance provides support for the hypothesis that the American public may harbor 
“myths” about white-collar crime as they do regarding street crime.  
4) What are the correlates of knowledge about white-collar crime?  
There was significant variation among participants in their level of knowledge about elite 
deviance, acceptance of “truths” and adherence to “myths” with respect to gender, race/ethnicity, 
income, education, political ideology, religious affiliation, source of information, and blame 
attribution style. Despite admittedly small effect sizes, more knowledgeable subjects were found 
to be those who identified as Whites, with higher education levels, without any religious 
affiliation, and who used the Internet as their main source of information. In comparison, less 
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knowledgeable participants and “myth” adherers turned out to be predominantly male, politically 
more conservative, Republican, conservative Protestant, who relied on traditional media sources 
rather than the Internet and who attributed white-collar crime to situational rather than 
dispositional factors.  
 5) Is knowledge about elite deviance correlated with public opinion regarding white-
collar crime?  
Knowledge (and lack thereof) was associated with sentiments about elite deviance. More 
specifically, less knowledgeable subjects (including men, those with higher income levels, more 
politically conservative subjects, Republicans, conservative Protestants, and those who believed 
white-collar offenders saw no wrong in their actions) were often more lenient in their attitudes 
towards elite deviance, both in terms of perceived seriousness and punitiveness, compared with 
street crime. By suggesting profound politico-religious dissensus in the best way to deal with 
elite deviance, these findings stand in contrast with several studies on consensus theory which 
concluded that widespread agreement exists among all members of society about perceived 
seriousness of and response to crime (Blumstein & Cohen, 1980; Carlson & Williams, 1993; 
Cullen et al., 1985; Heller & McEwen, 1975; Levi & Jones, 1985; O’Connell & Whelan, 1996; 
Roth, 1978). 
In fact, previous research has shown that politically conservative subjects, Republicans 
and conservative Protestants tend to be more critical of traditional crime than are their more 
liberal counterparts and to support tougher policies against street offenders (Grasmick et al., 
1993; Unnever et al. 2005). Further, these individuals have been found to evince more support 
for elements of free market economic policies (Gallup Poll, 2012), whose deregulation has been 
showed to facilitate the commission of white-collar crime (Lynch & Michalowski, 2006). More 
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stringent analyses were therefore run to test the hypothesis that perceived seriousness of and 
punitiveness against elite deviance vary as a function of socio-demographic characteristics 
indicative of support for capitalism, with limited success. Overall, age was a stronger predictor 
of dissensus regarding the proper way to address the problem of white-collar crime than were 
political and religious categories usually associated with pro-capitalism attitudes.  
Implications of Findings  
To the extent that the sample is representative of the American population, these findings 
have significant implications. First of all, they suggest that the American public may not be 
sufficiently informed about crime categories that are statistically more likely to harm them than 
are traditional offenses. Who is to blame for such lack of information? Surely, the people’s 
overreliance on media outlets more intent to report on street crime (Dowler, 2003; Roberts & 
Doob, 1990; Surette, 1998) - perhaps due to pressure from corporate governance - does little to 
educate them about the ubiquity and peril of elite deviance. If such explanation is relevant, how 
then can we account for the fact that crimes of the poor are still given disproportionate academic 
attention compared to elite malfeasance (Lynch, McGurrin & Fenwick, 2004; McGurrin, Jarrell, 
Jahn & Cochrane, 2013), even when tenure guarantees protection to scholars whose research 
may threaten powerful interests?  
Could it be that the subversive political dimension of white-collar crime clashes with 
conservative beliefs and values of mainstream scholars (Greenberg, 1976; Werkentin, 
Hofferbert, & Bauerman, 1974)? Arguably, the reluctance of some criminologists to study the 
interwoven relationships of class, structure, and crime - let alone accept them - may belie 
psychological contradictions between trust in our capitalist economic system and inconvenient 
truths about its negative consequences. Recall that subjects in this study whose 
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sociodemographic characteristics are usually indicative of support for neoliberal capitalism 
tended to overlook the seriousness of elite deviance and to recommend relatively lenient 
sanctions against it. While the strength of these relationships was admittedly weak, perhaps a 
direct measure of pro-capitalism attitudes would have evidenced more robust associations. 
In fact, support for capitalism might explain subjects’ rather surprising recalcitrance 
about accepting information relative to the physical harmfulness of white-collar crime. Once 
again, a majority of respondents perceived the kinds of deleterious activities in which the upper 
class engages (e.g., consumer safety violation, toxic dumping, preventable work-related diseases, 
medical crime, etc.) to be less injurious than street crimes such as murder and rape. 
Hypothetically, supporters of capitalism should have no problem condemning offenses that are 
usually committed by disreputable and unsuccessful individuals. Conversely, it may be 
especially difficult for them to reconcile their admiration for economic prosperity with the 
unsettling reality of American firms sacrificing human lives for profits.  
Subjects’ resistance to information highlighting the physical harmfulness of elite 
deviance may also have stemmed from a belief that human rights are a primarily Western 
construct particular to capitalist societies (Schwab & Pollis, 2000). More precisely, participants’ 
refusal to accept evidence of human trafficking or racial discrimination domestically - as in the 
case of toxic dumping in African American neighborhoods - suggests the existence of a “myth” 
that the United States offers greater protection to its citizens against all forms of crime (including 
elite offenses) compared with non-capitalist nations and dictatorships. Recall that subjects in this 
sample were critical of U.S. private military corporations such as Academi and willing to accept 
information pertaining to the damage they inflict abroad in the name of profit. Yet, they were 
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also less inclined to acknowledge arguments that undermine American notions of justice and 
equality before the law such as white-collar offenders’ relative legal immunity.  
If sentiments about elite deviance are partly shaped by pro-capitalism attitudes, one may 
doubt the effectiveness of scholarly and journalistic efforts meant to increase the dissemination 
of knowledge about white-collar crime. Cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1956) suggests 
that individuals need to maintain a certain degree of balance between their cognitions (i.e., 
values, beliefs, attitudes, and opinions) and their behaviors. However, such balance may be 
threatened by incongruent arguments causing psychological dissonance. More specifically, 
messages that are both relevant and contradictory with our personal positions or actions may 
result in mental discomfort. As a result, we strive to remedy any inconsistencies by realigning 
incongruent messages to make them consistent with our original cognitions (Aronson, 1969; 
Brehm & Cohen, 1962; Festinger, 1957; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959; Kiesler & Pallak, 1976; 
Wickland & Brehm, 1976).  
Festinger (1957) proposes three types of cognitive dissonance resolution strategies. The 
first is to alter the dissonant cognition. This means either accepting the dissonant element and 
changing one’s cognitions or denying its validity and rejecting it. For example, pro-capitalism 
individuals might dismiss empirical evidence about the greater threat of elite deviance compared 
with street crime and the relative legal immunity enjoyed by white-collar offenders by invoking 
methodological flaws, unfounded socialist rhetoric, or inflexible trust in this country’s criminal 
justice system. The second strategy consists in restoring equilibrium by outnumbering the 
dissonant element with more consonant examples so it no longer creates any dissonance. For 
instance, the same individuals may retort that in the Ford Pinto case the company’s main priority 
was to maximize profit and not to harm its customers, thereby presenting white-collar offenders 
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as responsible but not culpable7. Finally, the third strategy is to accept the dissonant argument 
but downplay its importance. This subtler alternative may imply admitting evidence about elite 
deviance such as ecological damage while at the same time claiming that environmentally 
harmful behavior is a necessary evil in an otherwise prosperous economic system.  If these 
hypotheses were true, disseminating relevant information about white-collar crime might prove 
ineffective among those already immune to such arguments.  
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research 
This study had several limitations. These notable impediments need to be addressed to 
inform future research. First of all, the 2010 National White-Collar Crime Center survey 
included twelve scenarios, one of which described overbilling (“A company overbills another 
company it supplies with heavy equipment, making an extra $10,000 in unwarranted profits.”). 
This scenario was accidentally omitted in this dissertation’s analysis. Such omission, coupled 
with the fact that Huff and colleagues did not report standard deviations for perceived 
seriousness of the twelve crimes they asked their participants to compare with auto theft, 
precluded a test of statistical differences between the 2010 and 2013 surveys. 
Another limitation could be the arbitrary taxonomy used to categorize subjects in regard 
to their level of knowledge about elite deviance (i.e., “truth” accepters, lucky guessers, “myth” 
adherers, and honestly uninformed). Such typology does not capture the role unconscious 
knowledge may have played among subjects who seemingly guessed correctly on the knowledge 
questionnaire. In the field of cognitive psychology, unconscious knowledge is defined as 
knowledge we have, and could very well be using, but are not aware of (e.g., Dienes, 2008; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 This terminology was used to describe the role played by then French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius in the 1991 
infected blood scandal when it was revealed that the government-operated National Center of Blood Transfusion 
knowingly distributed blood products contaminated with HIV to haemophiliacs in 1984 and 1985.  
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Augusto, 2010). While this hypothesis is beyond the scope of the present study, future research 
may want to refine the classification system used here by including measures of metaknowledge 
(i.e., knowledge about knowledge, Dienes & Perner, 2002) about elite deviance to determine 
whether “lucky guessers” might actually be already informed about white-collar crime while 
being unable to specify how they acquired such information. 
Replications and extensions of the present study should also strive to develop a much 
better instrument comprising a greater number of dimensions of elite deviance. The knowledge 
questionnaire used in this dissertation only included ten items, which is far from providing an 
exhaustive review of a multifaceted construct like white-collar crime. A more comprehensive 
scale therefore ought to incorporate multiple examples of economic domination, including more 
technical and potentially less known offenses (e.g., price-gouging, price-fixing, insider trading, 
strategic bankruptcy, anti-trust violations, etc.). Additionally, further aspects of medical crime 
(e.g., medical negligence and malpractice, unnecessary operations, tests, and other procedures, 
fraudulent billing, etc.) should be covered since it was found that subjects had difficulty 
admitting its greater physical harm compared with homicides.  
Moreover, in view of participants’ reluctance to recognize the fact that U.S. citizens are 
not necessarily more protected here than is the case in non-democracies and dictatorships, 
measures of knowledge about government control should include both crimes committed 
internationally (e.g., destabilizing foreign nations through coups d’état, international law 
violation, unlawful warfare and war profiteering, etc.), and offenses perpetrated domestically 
(e.g., crimes of electioneering and usurpation of power, violations of individual civil rights such 
as illegal surveillance by law enforcement agencies, denials of due process of law, political party 
infiltration, etc.). Lastly, denial of human rights should also be more thoroughly covered by 
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incorporating items tapping labor exploitation, sexual harassment, and racial and gender 
discrimination in the workplace.  
Besides its admittedly unrefined measure of information relative to elite deviance, this 
dissertation was further limited by the non-random sample used to collect data about the 
American public’s knowledge and sentiments about white-collar crime. Far from being truly 
representative of the overall U.S. population, the sample comprised a disproportionate number of 
relatively well-educated white citizens. Moreover, those subjects were predominantly Democrats 
and less likely to identify with any religious affiliation. Lastly, the age group was relatively 
young, which may both explain respondents’ predilection for Internet-related activities and have 
influenced their definitions and perceptions of elite deviance. Recall although subjects were 
found to be less critical of crime in general compared with Huff and colleagues’ sample, older 
participants perceived elite offenses to be of greater seriousness and deserving of a more severe 
punishment. While such finding is in line with the curvilinear relationship between age and 
perceived seriousness of crime (Schwartz et al., 1993), the restricted age group in the present 
study impedes our ability to generalize its results. 
Further, because of the crude manner in which participants’ profession was asked (i.e., 
via an open-ended question), it was impossible to create a measure of occupation. Such 
limitation is regrettable since research suggests that occupations that either provide experience 
about white-collar crime (i.e., attorney, judge, prosecutor, scholar, journalist, etc.) or facilitate its 
commission (e.g., business executive, medical doctor, etc.) influence perceptions of seriousness 
of elite deviance (Cole, 1983; Frank et al. 1989; Hartung, 1953; McCleary et al., 1981).  
Moreover, controlling for occupational prestige would have been extremely useful in 
exploring the purported relationship between support for capitalism and attitudes about white-
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collar crime. Marx ([1867]1967) defined the structural model of capitalism in terms of one’s 
relationship to the means and modes of production, with those being owned by an elite - the 
bourgeoisie - who maximize their rate of surplus value (i.e., profit) by exploiting and 
impoverishing the proletariat or working class. Even though wealthier respondents were 
generally less critical of white-collar crime, it could not be determined whether class and power 
differentials created dissensus regarding the best way to deal with elite deviance since 
participants’ social position with respect to the means and modes of production remained 
unclear.  
Consequently, future research should seek to include a measure of occupational prestige 
along with other indicators of support for capitalism. Nevertheless, an Internet survey may be 
poorly suited to attract the elite given the small monetary incentive offered and potentially 
uncomfortable questions. In summation, although Amazon’s Mechanical Turk turned out to be 
an acceptable way to recruit subjects, a serious application of Marxist theory to the topic of 
knowledge and sentiments about elite deviance would necessitate a much better proxy for the 
American public. 
In fact, a sample with a wide spectrum of professional activities ranging from lay people, 
criminal justice experts, and potential elite offenders may even require different questionnaire 
sections with varying levels of complexity. Pilot testing of the instrument with undergraduate 
students suggested that several questions had to be rephrased and specific terms omitted or 
simplified because respondents did not even understand what was being asked. This implies that 
an instrument with questions of increasing difficulty for every correct answer given might be 
necessary and that an adaptive computerized assessment system may be a useful alternative to a 
simple standardized test.  
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 Perhaps the greatest limitation to the present study is the cross-sectional nature of the 
project. Knowledge and sentiments about white-collar crime were only measured at one given 
point in time. Although the intent was to examine the effect of knowledge on perceived 
seriousness of and punitiveness against elite deviance, what remains to be seen is the effect of 
exposure to relevant information on changes in such attitudes. Longitudinal studies on the effect 
of knowledge on sentiments about capital punishment using a one-group pretest-posttest design 
(e.g., Bohm, 1989, 1990; Bohm et al, 1990, 1991; Bohm & Vogel, 1991, 1994, 2002; Bohm et 
al., 1993) have evidenced a decrease in support for the death penalty among subjects after taking 
a course on the subject.  
However, Bohm and colleagues (1994) noted that those participants who held retributive 
attitudes were more likely to be immune to change, perhaps due to cognitive dissonance. While 
they did not find support for such claim, Cochran and Chamlin (2005) have posited that multiple 
previous “doses” of information might in fact enhance the effectiveness of a single exposure to 
the topic. In his study on the impact of ethics education on business students’ perceptions of 
white-collar crime, Kennedy (2010) suggested that such perceptions could be positively 
influenced over time through continued education and training. Consequently, future research on 
the relationship between knowledge and attitudes about white-collar crime should seek to 
investigate the effect of prolonged education regarding the numerous ramifications of the white-
collar crime construct, controlling for pro-capitalist cognitions as potential cognitive dissonance 
resolution strategies.  
To conclude, future replications and extensions of the present study may want to consider 
a longitudinal design involving a pre-test of knowledge and sentiments about elite deviance (i.e., 
perceived seriousness and punitiveness) followed by multiple post-tests to study the effect of a 
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treatment (i.e., exposure to relevant information about white-collar crime) on changes in the 
dependent variable, controlling for pro-capitalism attitudes. The treatment could consist of onsite 
and/or online material - including both written and video documents - reporting empirical 
evidence of the dangers posed by elite deviance. Importantly, it may be wise to ask participants 
to justify their attitudes about white-collar crime via open-ended questions, particularly if 
continuous exposure to pertinent information does not result in changes in perceived seriousness 
and punitiveness.  
As previously mentioned, the questionnaire should include a measure of occupational 
prestige to establish participants’ social position in regard to the means and modes of production 
as defined by Marx. This, coupled with a direct measure of attitudes about capitalism compared 
with rival economic systems, would help test the hypothesis that knowledge and sentiments 
about elite deviance vary as function of pro-capitalism attitudes. Nevertheless, ensuring the 
cooperation of elite membership (particularly in view of the time investment which longitudinal 
studies require) will necessitate a more ingenious and persuasive recruitment strategy than a 
nonprobability Internet sampling method, and provide participants with greater monetary 
compensation. It is not certain, however, which research-funding agency will agree to finance 
such a project. 
Despite evident challenges, those are but a few potential avenues for future research 
about knowledge and sentiments regarding white-collar crime. The present study was purely 
exploratory and as such should be considered the first step in a series of research projects meant 
to unravel the true extent of public information about elite deviance and the effect of awareness 
programs on perceived seriousness of and punitiveness against pernicious behaviors shrouded in 
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a veil of respectability. It is the author’s hope that this dissertation’s modest contribution to the 
field will encourage similar scholarly efforts.
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Appendix A: Table A. Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Analyses (N = 408) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sociodemographic 
Control Variables 
 
 
 
   
Gender Dummy variable 
- 0 = Female  
- 1 = Male 
 
 
 
50.2 
.5 .5 
Age Years 
 
 33.58 11.09 
Race Dummy variables 
- White* 
- Black 
- Other race  
 
 
79.2 
7.8 
6.1 
 
.79 
.08 
.06 
 
.41 
.27 
.24 
Ethnicity Dummy variable 
- 0 = Non-Hispanic  
- 1 = Hispanic 
 
 
 
6.9 
 
 
.07 
 
 
.25 
Region Growing Up Dummy variable 
- 0 = Other  
- 1 = Northeast 
 
 
 
36.0 
 
 
.36 
 
 
.48 
Current Residence Dummy variable 
- 0 = Rural  
- 1 = Urban 
 
 
 
64.2 
 
 
.64 
 
 
.48 
Household Income 10-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Under $10,000; 
10 = $150,000 +) 
 
 5.07 2.21 
Education 8-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Grade school;  
8 = Advanced degree) 
 5.37 1.35 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Employment Dummy variable 
- 0 = Not employed 
full time  
- 1 = Employed full 
time 
 
 
 
74.3 
 
 
 
.74 
 
 
 
.44 
 
Political Ideology 6-point ordinal scale  
(1 = Very liberal;  
6 = Very 
conservative) 
 
 2.98 1.25 
Political Affiliation Dummy variable 
- No party  
- Republican* 
- Democrat 
- Other party 
 
 
12.5 
16.9 
46.3 
24.3 
 
.12 
.17 
.46 
.24 
 
.33 
.37 
.49 
.43 
Religious Identity Dummy variable 
- No religion  
- Catholic 
- Conservative 
Protestant* 
- Moderate Protestant 
- Liberal Protestant 
-Other religion 
 
43.6 
14.5 
 
13.2 
        15.7 
        4.90 
8.10 
 
.44 
.14 
 
.13 
         .16 
.05 
.08 
 
.49 
.35 
 
.34 
.36 
.22 
.27 
 
Attribution Style 
 
    
Greed 4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 
 3.69 .51 
Bad Moral Character 4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 3.52 .61 
______________________________________________________________________________
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Low Self-Control 4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 
 2.19 1.0 
Choice 4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 3.68 .52 
 
Environmental 
Influence 
4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 
 2.88 .88 
Fiduciary 
Responsibility 
4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 
 3.35 .70 
Pressure to Succeed 4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 
 2.83 .77 
No Wrong 4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Strongly 
disagree; 
4 = Strongly agree) 
 2.50 .81 
Knowledge about 
Elite Deviance 
 
    
Subjective 
Knowledge 
4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Not informed; 
4 = Very informed) 
 
 2.04 .58 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                       (Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source of Information Dummy variable 
- 0 = Traditional 
media 
- 1 = Internet 
 
 
 
81.10 
 
 
 
.811 
 
 
 
.39 
 
Previous Exposure to 
Information about 
Elite Deviance 
0 = Never been 
exposed 
1 = College course 
2 = Movie/TV series 
3 = Documentary 
4 = Television news 
report 
5 = Newspaper article 
6 = Book 
7 = Internet 
8 = Other 
18.10 
 
    6.6 
    9.3 
  10.3 
 
  38.5 
         12.0 
           1.0 
    3.2 
    4.0 
4.52 2.09 
 
Objective Knowledge 
 
 
 
- Meaning of the term 
- Financial cost 
- Harmfulness 
- Legal immunity 
- Reckless disregard 
- Medical crime 
- Human trafficking 
- State-corporate 
crime 
- Toxic dumping 
- Toxic emissions 
 
10-item multiple-
choice and true or 
false questionnaire; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1.91 
 2.4 
4.38 
3.72 
1.25 
2.02 
1.31 
 
1.09 
1.33 
1.03 
 
 
 
 
 
  .31 
1.16 
1.02 
1.25 
  .43 
  .89 
  .46 
 
  .28 
  .47 
  .17 
 
 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                                                                       (Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Answer Confidence 
 
 
 
 
- Meaning of the term 
- Financial cost 
- Harmfulness 
- Legal immunity 
- Reckless disregard 
- Medical crime 
- Human trafficking 
- State-corporate 
crime 
- Toxic dumping 
- Toxic emissions 
 
“Truths”  
 
 
- Meaning of the term 
- Financial cost 
- Harmfulness 
- Legal immunity 
- Reckless disregard 
- Medical crime 
- Human trafficking 
- State-corporate 
crime 
- Toxic dumping 
- Toxic emissions 
4-point Likert-type 
confidence scale  
(1 = Not at all 
confident; 
4 = Very confident) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Correct answer + 
confident or very 
confident 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
        3.09 
2.12 
2.94 
2.62 
2.07 
1.98 
2.41 
 
2.80 
2.29 
3.06 
 
 
 
 
         .67 
.14 
.03 
.27 
.27 
.13 
.11 
 
.60 
.31 
.74 
 
 
 
 
 
         .88 
.88 
.92 
.89 
1.05 
.85 
.86 
 
.96 
.94 
.83 
 
 
 
 
         .47 
.34 
.16 
.44 
.45 
.34 
.31 
 
.49 
.47 
.44 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
“Myths” 
 
 
- Meaning of the term 
- Financial cost 
- Harmfulness 
- Legal immunity 
- Reckless disregard 
- Medical crime 
- Human trafficking 
- State-corporate 
crime 
- Toxic dumping 
- Toxic emissions 
 
Incorrect answer + 
confident or very 
confident 
 
  
 
 
       .05 
.14 
.63 
.25 
.03 
.12 
.32 
 
       .01 
.08 
.01 
 
 
 
            .22 
.35 
.48 
.44 
.16 
.33 
.47 
 
.10 
.27 
.10 
Perceived Seriousness 
 
Perceived Seriousness 
of White-Collar and 
Street Crime 
Compared with Auto 
Theft 
 
- Burglary 
- Embezzlement 
- Identity theft 
- False charges 
- Robbery 
- Hacking 
- False drug label 
- Espionage 
- Market rigging 
- Counterfeit sales 
- Insurance    
overcharge 
 
11 scenarios;  
5-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Much less 
serious; 
5 = Much more 
serious) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
          3.2 
 3.7 
3.89 
  3.5 
3.59 
2.69 
4.71 
4.80 
4.18 
2.31 
 
3.87 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         .64 
.80 
.03 
.79 
.07 
.21 
.64 
.52 
.88 
.91 
 
.85 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Perceived Seriousness 
of White-Collar 
Crime and Street 
Crime 
 
- Consumer Safety 
Violations (toy) 
- Murder 
- Toxic Dumping 
- Rape 
- Asbestos Exposure 
5 scenarios; 
4-point ordinal scale 
(1 = Not very serious; 
4 = Very serious) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
        3.43 
3.91 
3.51 
3.94 
3.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         .76 
.36 
.64 
.24 
.52 
 
Punitiveness 
 
Prosecutorial Process 
 
 
 
 
 
- Consumer Safety 
Violations 
- Murder 
- Toxic Dumping 
- Rape 
- Asbestos Exposure 
 
 
 
3-point ordinal scale 
(1 = By some non-
legal means 
2 = In a civil court 
3 = In a criminal 
court) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.74 
  3.0 
2.69 
2.99 
2.71 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.47 
0 
.51 
.09 
.50 
Fine 
 
 
 
- Consumer Safety 
Violations 
- Murder 
- Toxic Dumping 
- Rape 
- Asbestos Exposure 
5-point ordinal scale 
(0 = No fine; 
4 = Above 
$1,000,000.00) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
1.83 
  .35 
2.25 
  .35 
1.78 
 
 
 
 
 
1.72 
  .98 
1.75 
  .96 
1.81 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
(Continued on next page) 
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Table A (Continued). 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variables Coding/Range Percent Mean SD 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Monetary 
Compensation 
 
 
 
- Consumer Safety 
Violations 
- Murder 
- Toxic Dumping 
- Rape 
- Asbestos Exposure 
5-point ordinal scale 
(0 = No fine; 
4 = Above 
$1,000,000.00) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
1.58 
  .97 
1.85 
  .77 
2.42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.48 
1.52 
1.59 
1.29 
1.54 
 
Prison Sentence  
 
 
 
- Consumer Safety 
Violations 
- Murder 
- Toxic Dumping 
- Rape 
- Asbestos Exposure 
7-point ordinal scale 
(0 = No prison; 
6 = 41 years-life) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  .84 
4.68 
  .94 
3.26 
1.35 
 
 
 
 
 
1.18 
1.63 
1.32 
1.57 
1.79 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. *Reference categories. 
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Appendix B: Survey 
 
A.        BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.         Sex 
 
            0. Female        
            1. Male 
 
2.         What is your age? __________ 
  
3.         Race 
 
            1. White 
            2. Black or African American 
            3. Asian  
            4. Middle Eastern 
            5. Native Hawaiian or other Pacific Islander 
            6. American Indian or Alaskan Native 
            7. Other: __________________ 
 
4.         Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
5.         In what region of the country did you grow up? 
 
1. North 
2. East 
3. South 
4. West 
5. Midwest 
6. Other: ________________ 
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6.         Which of the following describes the area in which you currently reside? 
 
            1. A large central city (over 250,000) 
            2. A medium size central city (50,000 to 250,000)  
            3. A suburb of a large central city 
            4. A suburb of a medium size central city 
            5. An unincorporated area of a large central city (e.g., township, division) 
            6. An unincorporated area of a medium central city  
            7. A small city (10,000 to 49,999) 
            8. A town or village (2,500 to 9,999)  
            9. An incorporated area less than 2,500 or an unincorporated area (1,000 to  
                2,499) 
           10. Open country within larger civil divisions (e.g., township, division) 
  
7.         What is the annual combined income of everyone in your household? 
 
1. Under $10,000 
2. $10,000-$19,999 
3. $20,000-$29,999 
4. $30,000-$39,999 
5. $40,000-$49,999  
6. $50,000-$69,999  
7. $70,000-$89,999  
8. $90,000-$119,999  
9. $120,000-$149,000  
10. $150,000 + 
 
8.         How much education have you completed? 
 
1. Grade school or less 
2. Some high school 
3. High school graduate  
4. 1 or more years of technical, vocational, or trade school 
5. Some college 
6. College graduate 
7. 1 or more years of graduate, law, or medical school 
8. Advanced degree (e.g., Master’s, Ph.D., J.D., M.D., etc.) 
 
9.         What is your employment status? 
 
1. Disabled  
2. Employed full-time 
3. Employed part-time 
4. Self-employed 
5. Unemployed 
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10.       What is your occupation? ___________________ 
 
11.       Circle the position that best describes your social and political views. 
 
1. Very liberal 
2. Liberal  
3. Somewhat liberal 
4. Somewhat conservative  
5. Conservative 
6. Very conservative 
 
12.       With which political party do you identify? 
 
1. Republican Party 
2. Democratic Party 
3. Independent Party 
4. Reform Party 
5. Other: ______________ 
6. I am not registered  
7. I do not identify with any political party 
 
13.       What religion, if any, do you identify with? 
 
1. Catholicism 
2. Protestantism 
3. Judaism 
4. Buddhism 
5. Islam  
6. Other: __________________ 
7. None 
 
14.       If Protestant, which denomination are you? 
 
1. Baptist 
2. Assembly of God 
3. Church of Christ 
4. Lutheran 
5. Methodist 
6. Presbyterian 
7. Episcopalian 
8. Other: _____________ 
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15.       What is your primary source of information? 
 
1. Television news stations 
2. Radio news stations 
3. Newspapers 
4. Magazines 
5. Books 
6. Internet 
7. Other: _______________ 
 
16.       Have you previously been exposed to relevant information about white-collar crime? 
            If so, what was your primary source of information? 
 
            1. College course 
2. Movie/TV series 
3. Documentary 
4. Television news report 
5. Newspaper article 
6. Book 
7. Other: ________________ 
8. I have not been exposed to such information 
 
17.       How informed would you say you are about white-collar crime? 
 
1. Not informed 
2. Somewhat informed 
3. Informed  
4. Very informed 
 
B.        KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WHITE-COLLAR CRIME  
 
18.       A.        The term “white-collar crime” is based on:  
  
                        1. The occupation of the victims 
                        2. The occupations of the perpetrators 
      3. The offenders’ association with religion  
 
B.        How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
 1. Not at all confident 
 2. Somewhat confident 
 3. Confident 
 4. Very confident 
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19.       A.       How much does street crime cost the American public compared to  
                       white-collar crime? 
 
                 1. Significantly less 
                 2. Somewhat less 
                 3. The costs are about the same 
                 4. Somewhat more 
                 5. Significantly more 
 
B.       How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
1. Not at all confident 
2. Somewhat confident 
3. Confident 
4. Very confident 
 
20.        A.      Statistically, street crimes like assaults, murders, and muggings are  
                       ______ to injure or kill people than/as white-collar crime. 
  
                 1. Significantly less likely 
                 2. Somewhat less likely 
                 3. As likely 
                 4. Somewhat more likely 
                 5. Significantly more likely 
 
B.       How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
1. Not at all confident 
2. Somewhat confident 
3. Confident 
4. Very confident 
          
21.        A.      Someone who commits a street crime like burglary and steals $1000  
                       is _____ to be convicted and to receive a similar sentence than/as   
                       someone who commits a white-collar crime like fraud and steals $1000. 
             
                      1. Significantly less likely 
                      2. Somewhat less likely 
                      3. As likely 
                      4. Somewhat more likely 
                      5. Significantly more likely 
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B.      How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
                      1. Not at all confident 
                      2. Somewhat confident 
                      3. Confident 
                      4. Very confident 
 
22.       A.      Although Ford knew their Pinto model’s gas tank represented a safety  
                      defect, they chose not to invest in an inexpensive and safer design,     
                      reasoning that it would be cheaper to pay out expected wrongful death  
                      lawsuits. As a result, several people died in fiery crashes.  
 
                     1. True  
         2. False 
 
B.      How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
                     1. Not at all confident 
                     2. Somewhat confident 
                     3. Confident 
                     4. Very confident 
 
23.        A.    Compared to criminal homicides, _______________ people in the US die  
                     from medical malpractice. 
 
                     1. More 
                     2. An equal number of 
                     3. Fewer 
 
B.     How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
                     1. Not at all confident 
                     2. Somewhat confident 
                     3. Confident 
                     4. Very confident 
 
24.        A.    Human trafficking is more common in underdeveloped countries than  
                     in developed nations. 
 
                     1. True  
                     2. False 
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 B.    How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
                     1. Not at all confident 
                     2. Somewhat confident 
                     3. Confident 
                     4. Very confident 
 
25.        A.    Private American military companies have been accused of engaging in   
                     a number of human rights violations including the abuse and torture of  
                     detainees, shootings and killings of innocent civilians, destruction of  
                     property, and sexual harassment and rape. 
 
                     1. True  
                     2. False 
 
             B.     How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
                     1. Not at all confident 
                     2. Somewhat confident 
                     3. Confident 
                     4. Very confident 
 
26.        A.    Landfills and toxic waste disposal sites are more likely to be located  
                     near African American communities than white communities. 
 
                     1. True  
                     2. False 
 
 B.    How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
  
                     1. Not at all confident 
                     2. Somewhat confident 
                     3. Confident 
                     4. Very confident 
 
27.        A.    Toxic emissions could be reduced much more if industries agreed to  
                     employ appropriate technologies. 
 
                     1. True  
                     2. False 
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B.     How confident are you that you answered that question correctly? 
 
    1. Not at all confident 
    2. Somewhat confident 
    3. Confident 
    4. Very confident 
 
C.         COMPARED WITH SOMEONE STEALING A PARKED CAR WORTH  
             $10,000, PLEASE INDICATE HOW SERIOUS THE FOLLOWING  
             SCENARIOS ARE. 
 
28.       A burglar steals $10,000 worth of jewelry from a private residence while the 
            owner is away on vacation.  
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
29.       A bank teller becomes friends with a customer and steals $10,000 out of his  
            personal account over the course of two years.   
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
30.       A computer hacker steals personal patient information from a healthcare    
            clinic’s database and then sells this information to a third party for $10,000. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
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31.       A large manufacturing company adds false charges to an invoice, costing a  
            small business owner $10,000. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
32.       Someone attempts to rob several joggers in the park. Although they fail to  
            make off with any money, the joggers sustain non-fatal injuries and receive  
            treatment at the hospital. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
33.       A hacker sends out viruses on the Internet and infects many personal  
            computers with software that allows the hacker to distribute millions of spam  
            messages. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
34.       A pharmaceutical company falsely advertises as safe an anti-depressant drug  
            it knows to be unsafe. The drug is later found to be related to a string of  
            random violent acts, costing the lives of several people.  
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
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35.       A former employee of a U.S. defense contractor sells nuclear secrets and  
            other classified information he acquired during his employment to foreign  
            governments. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
36.       A Wall Street financial firm conspires to manipulate the precious metals  
            market, profiting at the expense of other traders and owners of precious  
            metals who are unaware of the price-fixing scheme. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
37.       A person sells a counterfeit antique bracelet on an online auction site,  
            misrepresenting its true value and making an extra $1,000. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
38.       An insurance agent sells an insurance policy at an inflated price to an  
            unsuspecting customer and pockets an extra $20,000. 
 
1. Much less serious 
2. Somewhat less serious 
3. About as serious 
4. Somewhat more serious 
5. Much more serious 
 
D.        READ THE FOLLOWING SCENARIOS AND ANSWER THE  
            QUESTIONS. 
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39.       Because of cost reductions, the materials used by a company to build a  
            popular toy will present a potential hazard to the product’s users. The  
            company decides to manufacture and distribute the toy regardless of the  
            risks. 
 
A.     How serious do you think the offense is? 
 
         1. Not very serious 
         2. Somewhat serious 
         3. Serious 
         4. Very serious 
 
B.     How should a case such as this be handled? 
 
         1. By some non-legal means 
         2. In a non-criminal court 
         3. In a criminal court 
 
C.     Choose the punishment you feel most appropriate and designate the  
         amount of punishment (circle all that apply and, if circled, record the  
         appropriate fine or punishment amount): 
 
         1. Fine / Fine Amount: $_______ 
         2. Victim’s compensation / Compensation Amount: $________  
                     3. Imprisonment / Length of Sentence: ________ 
 
40.       Someone attempts to rob a couple while they are walking back to their car at 
            night. The husband tries to disarm the attacker, but is shot by him. He later 
            dies of his injuries.  
 
A.     How serious do you think the offense is? 
 
         1. Not very serious 
         2. Somewhat serious 
         3. Serious 
         4. Very serious 
 
B.     How should a case such as this be handled? 
 
         1. By some non-legal means 
         2. In a non-criminal court 
         3. In a criminal court 
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C.     Choose the punishment you feel most appropriate and designate the  
         amount of punishment (circle all that apply and, if circled, record the  
         appropriate fine or punishment amount): 
 
         1. Fine / Fine Amount: $_______ 
         2. Victim’s compensation / Compensation Amount: $________  
         3. Imprisonment / Length of Sentence: ________ 
 
41.       In order to increase profits and meet production goals, a manufacturing  
            company uses production processes that allow for the release of pollutants  
            into the water and air and exceed legal limits. Several people become  
            seriously ill as a result. 
 
A.     How serious do you think the offense is? 
 
         1. Not very serious 
         2. Somewhat serious 
         3. Serious 
         4. Very serious 
 
B.     How should a case such as this be handled? 
 
         1. By some non-legal means 
         2. In a non-criminal court 
         3. In a criminal court 
 
C.     Choose the punishment you feel most appropriate and designate the  
         amount of punishment (circle all that apply and, if circled, record the  
         appropriate fine or punishment amount): 
 
         1. Fine / Fine Amount: $_______ 
         2. Victim’s compensation / Compensation Amount: $________  
         3. Imprisonment / Length of Sentence: ________ 
 
42.        Someone breaks into a dorm at night and forcibly rapes a female student. 
 
A.     How serious do you think the offense is? 
 
         1. Not very serious 
         2. Somewhat serious 
         3. Serious 
         4. Very serious 
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B.     How should a case such as this be handled? 
 
         1. By some non-legal means 
         2. In a non-criminal court 
         3. In a criminal court 
 
C.     Choose the punishment you feel most appropriate and designate the  
         amount of punishment (circle all that apply and, if circled, record the  
         appropriate fine or punishment amount): 
 
         1. Fine / Fine Amount: $_______ 
         2. Victim’s compensation / Compensation Amount: $________  
                     3. Imprisonment / Length of Sentence: ________ 
 
43.       A mining company fails to ensure safety measures such as proper ventilation  
            and the use of masks, goggles and gloves among its workers, and covers up   
            evidence regarding the link between asbestos exposure and lung cancer  
            deaths. 
 
A.     How serious do you think the offense is? 
         1. Not very serious 
         2. Somewhat serious 
         3. Serious 
         4. Very serious 
 
B.     How should a case such as this be handled? 
 
         1. By some non-legal means 
         2. In a non-criminal court 
         3. In a criminal court 
 
C.     Choose the punishment you feel most appropriate and designate the  
         amount of punishment (circle all that apply and, if circled, record the  
         appropriate fine or punishment amount): 
 
         1. Fine / Fine Amount: $_______ 
         2. Victim’s compensation / Compensation Amount: $________  
                     3. Imprisonment / Length of Sentence: ________ 
 
E.         PLEASE INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH YOU AGREE WITH EACH  
            OF THESE STATEMENTS. 
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44.       Most white-collar offenders are greedy individuals. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
45.       Most white-collar offenders have bad characters and no personal ethics  
            because they place profit above public safety. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
46.       Most white-collar offenders have the inability to control themselves. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
47.       Most white-collar offenders choose to violate the law when the perceived  
            benefits of their actions outweigh the perceived costs. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
48.       The business environment of most white-collar offenders encourages the 
            commission of white-collar crimes. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
49.       Most white-collar offenders have a fiduciary responsibility (legal or ethical  
            relationship of trust) to their company’s shareholders.   
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
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50.       Most white-collar offenders are pressured/coerced by their superiors to   
            reach business goals. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
 
51.       Most white-collar offenders are otherwise law-abiding citizens who do not  
            think that their business practices are really wrong. 
 
1. Strongly agree 
2. Somewhat agree 
3. Somewhat disagree 
4. Strongly disagree 
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         Appendix C: Consent Form 
 
INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH 
 
Information to Consider Before Taking Part in this Research Study 
 
IRB Study # Pro00009714 
 
Researchers at the University of South Florida (USF) study many topics. To do this, we need the 
help of people who agree to take part in a research study. This document tells you about this 
research study. We are asking you to take part in a research study that is called:  
 
Public Knowledge and Sentiments About Elite Deviance 
 
The person who is in charge of this research study is Cedric Michel. This person is called the 
Principal Investigator. The research will be done by administering a survey to Mechanical Turk 
workers such as you. 
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to determine public knowledge and attitudes about white-collar 
crime. You are being asked to participate because Mechanical Turk workers are representative of 
the American public. 
 
STUDY PROCEDURES 
If you take part in this study, you will be asked to answer questions about your background (sex, 
race, age, etc.), your knowledge about white-collar crime, how serious you perceive it relative to 
street crime, what you think white-collar offenders’ motives are, as well as your sentence 
preferences for a variety of offenses including several types of white-collar crime. Completion 
time should not exceed 20 minutes. 
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION/WITHDRAWAL 
You should only take part in this study if you want to volunteer.  You should not feel that there is 
any pressure to take part in the study.  You are free to participate in this research or withdraw at 
any time.  However, please note that payment will be denied if you stop taking part in this study 
or do not complete this survey.   
 
BENEFITS 
We are unsure if you will receive any benefits by taking part in this research study. 
 
RISKS OR DISCOMFORT 
This research is considered to be minimal risk. That means that the risks associated with this 
study are the same as what you face every day. There are no known additional risks to those who 
take part in this study. 
 
COMPENSATION 
You will be paid $2.00 to complete this survey. 
	  	  	  
	  
197 
PRIVACY & CONFIDENTIALITY 
We must keep your study records as confidential as possible. Your answers will be stored 
securely on servers. Individual accounts are password protected and only statistical aggregation 
of these data summarizing findings from this study will be published or shared with the public. 
Finally, in accordance with USF procedures, all research data will be kept for a minimum of 5 
years after the Final Report is approved by the IRB. 
 
However, certain people may need to see your study records. By law, anyone who looks at your 
records must keep them completely confidential. The only people who will be allowed to see 
these records are: 
• The research team, including the Principal Investigator, the Advising Professor, and all other 
research staff. 
• Certain government and university people who need to know more about the study. For 
example, individuals who provide oversight on this study may need to look at your records. This 
is done to make sure that we are doing the study in the right way. They also need to make sure 
that we are protecting your rights and your safety. These include: 
o The University of South Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) and the staff that work for 
the IRB. Other individuals who work for USF that provide other kinds of oversight may also 
need to look at your records. 
o The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 
 
We may publish what we learn from this study. We will not publish anything that would let 
people know who you are. If you agree please proceed with the survey. 
 
 
Cedric Michel, M.A 
Doctoral Candidate 
cmichel@usf.edu 
Department of Criminology 
University of South Florida 
Tampa, FL 33620 
Division of Research Integrity & Compliance  
ARC Help Desk (eIRB, eCOI, eIACUC): (813) 974-2880 - E-Mail: rsch-arc@usf.edu 
Mail: 12901 Bruce B. Downs Blvd, MDC35, Tampa, FL 33612-4799 
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Appendix D: IRB Approval Letter 
 
 
 
3/26/2013  
 
Cedric Michel, M.A.  
Criminology  
13301 Bruce B. Downs Blvd.  
MHC 1110  
Tampa, FL 33612 
  
RE:  Expedited Approval for Amendment  
IRB#:  Ame1_Pro00009714  
Title:  Public Knowledge and Sentiments About 
Elite Deviance  
 
Dear Mr. Michel:  
 
On 3/25/2013, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED your 
Amendment. The submitted request has been approved for the following:  
 
1. Deletion of Kathleen Heide as key personnel 
2. The study is now funded by the PI’s Department, Criminology: $100 to help pay subjects  
3. Hillsborough County 13th Judicial District court in Tampa, FL (George E. Edgecomb 
courthouse) deleted as a study site.  
4. Revised protocol, v2 dated 3/21/13  
5. Change in inclusion/exclusion criteria: Population will include men and women 18 years and 
up rather than between the ages of 18-70.  
6. New anticipated end date of 6/1/13  
7. Revised survey, v2 dated 3/21/13  
8. Change in procedures: Addition of online survey on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.  
9. Change in compensation: Participants will be paid $2.00 to complete the online survey  
10. Waiver of documentation of informed consent for online survey  
11. New online consent form, v2 dated 3/21/13. 
 
Approved Item(s): 
Protocol Document(s): 
  Study Protocol #2, 03/21/2013  	  	  
Tracked changed copy of revised protocol 
 
Consent Document(s)*:  
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  Online consent form, v2 dated 3/21/13    
 
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subject research at the University 
of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If you have any 
questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.  
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
John Schinka, Ph.D., Chairperson  
USF Institutional Review Board 
